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
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V. M. Sirsikar

Communication in India

MAN IS A social animal and therefore he can also be called a communicating animal. He likes to convey his thoughts, ideas, opinions, and sometimes even his convictions, to others. But communication is not a one-way traffic and hence every individual is receiving communication from others. In a primary society — where everyone knows everyone else — oral communication is not only easy, direct and continuous but also uncontrolled. But we live in a derivative mass society where one feels 'lonely in the crowd.' At the same time the means of communication have increased tremendously.

India is a peculiar mix of both the primary and the derivative societies. Hundreds of small villages, isolated from the outside world, even now represent the primary society. But the rest of the country, with its sprawling metropolises, cities, towns and semi-urban areas, is a typical derivative society. Just as the nature of the society is a mixed one so is the nature of communications — mixed and therefore complex.

The traditional means of communication are still in vogue and cover a large segment of the rural and semi-urban population. These means have been used for centuries in this country. It would be necessary to briefly take stock of the same. These include *kirtan*, *jatra*, folk drama, ballads, *powadas*, *bharud* and similar other means. The traditional means of communication are oral and not organized or structured in an integrated manner. These have a religious overtone, but these means of communication also cater to social needs. It is not necessary to describe these traditional means as these are known to all of us. We have not cared to understand them and their potential in the changed situation.

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Even in these days of radio, television, satellites and computers the traditional means have a role to play. With a very uneven development the country has any number of areas which remain outside the reach of modern communication. But the more important element is the direct personal contact of the communicator with his particular audience. These direct communicators have a far greater credibility than the electronic media. One reason is the faith placed by the rural audience on these individuals known to them personally. Their credibility is very high.

These traditional techniques of socio-religious communication have been cleverly used by political parties for their own propaganda. A crowd which has assembled to listen to a *kirtan* — a religious song and story-telling about gods — can be manipulated by the *kirtankar* — the person who does the *kirtan* to convey a political message. The gullible public takes in the message along with religious preaching. In earlier times *kirtan* was an important means of communication as the *kirtankar* was travelling all around the region.

During the freedom movement a lot of communication was done by the *shahirs* who sang *powadas*, glorifying Shivaji and other historical heroes and by subtle implications conveyed the message of opposition to the foreign rulers. Sometimes there were *powadas* about the leaders like Tilak, Gandhi and Nehru. But the singing of these and other patriotic *powadas* attracted the attention of the British government and resulted in imprisonment of the *shahirs*.

What was true of the *powadas* was also true of folk dramas — *tamasha*, *nautanki*, *lalit* and other forms of entertainment meant for the rural masses. These were conveyors of news from other areas, as these groups were always itinerant. But they could be used by the freedom fighters to send their messages to the masses. In Kerala the political drama is a very popular means of communication.

The modern means of communication came to India in the nineteenth century. The British were responsible for the printed word — the newspapers, books, journals, etc. Over a century and more the press has grown into a major industry. V K Krishna Menon was in the habit of castigating the leading English

newspapers as 'the jute press', implying its ownership by the jute barons. The Indian press can be categorized into three major groups. The first group comprises the English language press, at times wrongly referred to as the national press. The second group consists of regional language newspapers, some of whom have a history of a century and more. The district-level small newspapers constitute the third category.

In the English language newspapers there are two major chains — *The Times of India* and the *Indian Express*. The English press is given a place of prestige because of its elitist readership. The less than one per cent English-educated Indians flaunt their admiration for the English press and disdain for the regional language newspapers. The English press is better financed, better organized and better managed. *The Times of India*, right from the days of the British raj, when it was owned by a British company, is regarded as the spokesman of the establishment. This role has not changed with independence. The *Indian Express*, on the other hand, represents the anti-establishment force (stance). This became very pronounced during the emergency. All credit goes to the owner, Ramnath Goenka. There are other papers which are either on the side of the establishment or in the opposition. The English language press is of the elites, by the elites and for the elites in India.

It believes that it can influence public policy. The English press has one advantage over the regional press. It has a readership spread over the whole country, while that of regional language newspapers is limited to the region. The Indian press, both English and regional language press, had an important role in the freedom struggle. Many newspapers were started by the freedom fighters to educate their fellowmen and convey their messages. For doing this work many newspapers had to pay very heavy penalties, including imprisonment of the editors and the publishers.

After independence there was a spurt in regional language newspapers, both in number and circulation. This was the result of resurgence of the regional languages. The linguistic reorganization of the states was one of its expressions. But this did not mean that there was any decline of the English newspapers. In recent years

there has been a phenomenal growth of glossy journals in English language catering to the needs of the *nouveau riche*.

The district newspapers are even now in an underdeveloped state. They cannot compete with the regional or the English press due to paucity of resources, both human and material. But they are an important component in the communication link.

The newspapers depend on the news agencies, and the western news agencies like Reuter dominate the world scene. The effort of the third world countries to have their own network has not yet succeeded. India has its own news agency — the Press Trust of India—which mainly caters to the national news-distribution. The efforts to have an indigenous news agency using Hindi as the medium have not been very successful.

Hindustan Samachar and Samachar Bharati were efforts in the right direction. The western news agencies have a monopoly of gathering news in the non-communist world and there is always an effort to introduce a slant in the news of the third world. The west has not as yet accepted the third world countries as equals, and hence the slant.

The role of newspapers in India cannot be properly measured by the figures of circulation. The community-reading of newspapers by a literate person — generally the village school teacher — perceptibly increases the readership and also the impact of the printed word. This has also led to greater political awareness than one could expect in an illiterate society.

How far is the press in India free? It is not easy to answer this question. The statement by Justice E S Venkatramaiah of the Supreme Court 'that despite the guarantees of freedom of the press in the Constitution of India, the press is not quite free' is true. The illegitimate restrictions which the government can impose on the press are many — stopping of advertisements, arbitrary reduction of newsprint quotas, denial of credentials, etc. These are quite severe in their impact and it is extremely difficult for an "erring" newspaper to stand up to this subtle pressure. In addition to the executive branch of the government there are vested interests like the industrialists who can muzzle a free press.

The choice between a free press with all its faults of irresponsible, scurrilous, biased writing and the controlled press is very obvious. India needs a free press and not a controlled one. If the democratic process has any meaning in India it is due to the press which criticizes, exposes and lambasts the government and the leaders. The press is the main source of information generally free from bias, it is also for many an educating agency — with its editorials, comments, and cartoons.

The role of cartoons (and the cartoonists) as a means of communication is very crucial in a democratic society. Political cartoons are many times more telling commentaries on the leaders than long editorials. The cartoonist is not only an artist, but a shrewd political commentator, with an eye for the ridiculous in the behaviour of leaders. The cartoons prove decisively that no one in a democratic set up is above criticism and ridicule, if necessary. This keeps the leaders on their path. The cartoons provide the much needed relief to the common man who enjoys the ridicule heaped on the powerful and the mighty, who are at the same time, corrupt and exploitative.

The press is a major factor in politics, specially during the elections. The impact of newspapers was very correctly valued by the advertising agency which did the advertising for the Congress (I) in the 1984 elections. Full-page advertisements in hundreds of newspapers all over the country, both in the English and regional language newspapers were carrying the message to the common voter. Crores of rupees must have been spent by the party, but the harvest was equally rich. The visible printed word and the picture still hold the mind of the reader in spite of the other media of communication. In an illiterate society the symbol becomes very important. Hence the advertisements were magnifying the Congress (I) symbol — the hand.

A newspaper can play the game according to the ideology to which that newspaper is attached. The same news appearing in a left-inclined newspaper will be different than in a rightwing newspaper. Even news can be presented with a slant. Use of photographs can be done with or without some ulterior motive. The best example of misuse of photographs is that done by the

American press in 1936. The US newspapers published in 1936 photographs of extreme famine in Soviet Russia. The photographs were genuine, but they were photographs of 1923 famine in Russia ! Photographs do not lie ; but liars use photographs. Use of stereotypes, symbols, myths is very common in newspapers. The common man in his haste is not in a position to understand any such trick played by a newspaper. He is not 'informed' by that newspaper but 'misinformed'. The spread of 'misinformation' is undertaken by the government, vested interests and also individuals. 'Misinformation' is a technique perfected by those who control the communication network. A deliberate 'leak' from the official sources is many times at the root of 'misinformation.' The government agencies many times follow the wellknown principle of "suppressio very and suggestio falsi." No one can fix responsibility on them because of this technique.

Recently there were celebrations about the completion of 25 years of tv in India. What was a curiosity, a luxury for the very rich in 1960, has now become a common comfort for many, particularly in the urban areas. One can see tv antennae even in some of the slums in the major cities. The tv has spread mainly during the last five years. The government has given top priority to setting up tv stations and by the end of the VII Plan - 1990—there would be more than 400 tv stations in India. This rapid spread is not without reason. In a mass democracy the leader now has a facility at his command to contact the common people at a very convenient hour— evening or early nighttime. The viewers have done their day's work and are physically tired. A tired body has a tired mind. This is the most vulnerable time when a propaganda barrage can be mounted, catchy slogans can be announced and the minds of the audience can be very successfully attacked and influenced.

The electronic media—tv and the radio—have been the departments of the government. It was natural that when the radio broadcasting was started under the British rule it should be under control of the executive. But the Congress government has consistently refused to grant even semi-autonomous status to these two media. The result is obvious. These have lost credibility regarding their impartiality even in broadcasting news. The telling evidence in this regard came

on 31 October 1984 when Rajiv Gandhi was flying back to New Delhi. He was listening not to the AIR but the BBC to get the correct news about his mother !

The control of electronic media with its increasing reach to all corners of the country becomes even more important to the party in power. It comes very handy during the election times. Even during normal times the two media are consciously used to project the image of the prime minister. The Doordarshan is called the 'Rajiv Darshan' as earlier the AIR was nicknamed All Indira Radio. This projection is done by giving prime time almost everyday to the very unimportant minor activities of the prime minister at the cost of even important news, domestic or international. The government-controlled media have never realised the importance of their role as purveyors of news about social, economic, cultural and international events to the common people. It is a sad commentary on the AIR that most people use it only to listen to music programmes and whenever they want news they turn to the BBC.

The electronic revolution does not stop with the AIR and the tv. The computer, micro-processor, and the chips have come to India in recent times in a major way. The information storage, its retrieval, its transfer — all are being revolutionized. This has very serious consequences for the common people. The question is about the freedom of information. The right to freedom of information is being curbed. This is fundamental to his very freedom as an individual. With the electronic media, the computer, and its extending family, the government can control the flow of information as it likes. Control of information means control of the mind. Information is an instrument in the hands of the ruling elite to control the masses. Information is power and it can be manipulated to suit the interests of the ruling elites.

The rulers are exhorting the common people to be ready with the new hi-tech modernization to enter the 21st century. But in a subtle way the government is arming itself with a fast growing tv and radio to control the communication network. No one seems to be concerned about this unprecedented control over the media and its effect on the atmosphere of freedom. This can be termed

as the politics of communication. In this politics there are many weapons in the hands of the ruling elites to influence the people.

The importance of control of media can be seen from the examples of Nazi Germany, the USSR, the USA, China, India and any number of countries. When Hitler came to power the first thing he did was to control media. His propaganda minister made a science of communication control. Hitler developed the hate symbol of the Jews by manipulating the under-current of anti-semitism and nurturing the hurt ego of the Germans who had lost the first world war. His faith in telling big lies and telling them repeatedly was unlimited. He succeeded in creating a mass-hysteria against the Jews who were held responsible for the defeat.

The USSR does not believe in a free press, which it equates with bourgeoisie's trick to deceive the masses. Hence a state-owned and controlled press, electronic media and indoctrination of the mass of people — all these are regarded as necessary components of a socialist society.

The USA always prides itself about its free press, electronic media, privately-run telephones but uses the "Voice of America" for spreading its own version of events. During the McCarthy era, the flimsy claims about the freedom of press, universities, media could not protect those who were persecuted for their communist backgrounds. Even the lecture tour of Harold Laski was cancelled !

India does not stand out as a shining example of a free press or electronic media. This means that control of media has become necessary for all types of governments having different ideologies. There may be a difference in the degree of control but not in kind. It appears that the ruling elites in all countries feel insecure if they do not control the media. Freedom of the press is dependent on this feeling of insecurity. The attempts in the past by Bihar and Tamil Nadu governments, and the present efforts by Andhra Pradesh, to curtail and smother free newspapers speak eloquently about the feeling of insecurity of the ruling elites. Jamming of broadcasting wavelengths and tv channels is an effort to prevent the truth being conveyed by these media of a neighbouring country.

In modern communication battle for the minds of men, the lines between information, propaganda and advertisement often get blurred. Advertisement can and may influence the people who read newspapers, listen to the radio and view the tv. But the distinguishing mark of advertisement is that it is an open blandishment for a particular product. There may be a lot of efforts to praise the product. But there is nothing hidden or subtle about it. Many times advertisements do not cut any ice because the advertiser overdoes the promotion of his product. The people know that it is an advertisement for a particular product.

Propaganda on the other hand has many facets. It is subtle ; there are sly hints about a point of view, a person, a cause, a party, etc. The attack is not a direct, open one — but couched in words and phrases which appeal more to the heart than to the brain. Though totalitarian parties have perfected the techniques, democratic parties are not far behind. Myths, symbols, stereotypes are cleverly manipulated to suit the purpose of the campaign. The more subtle the propaganda, the greater is the impact on the subjects. Propaganda, like advertisement, is carried out as an organized campaign. It is a battle to win the minds of the people. Hence there are strategies and tactics to convince the subjects.

In sharp contrast to propaganda and advertising is information. The media are expected to give information about persons, policies, events and happenings. Information depends on facts — hard facts and nothing else. But there is always the possibility of the other two — propaganda and advertisement — encroaching on information. Thus it is necessary to distinguish between these over-lapping aspects of communication and strive for a free flow of information to the people.

A free press, autonomous broadcasting and television, independent news agencies are all central to the democratic society which we cherish. Democracy believes in freedom without any qualification. It believes that freedom is for all and not only for those in power.

These are the factors which create the atmosphere of freedom, where no one is afraid of expressing his views, and others are not

hindered to challenge the views. This free interaction of minds — an intellectual debate carried on without fear — constitutes the basis of a democratic society. In an age where common people like to hold 'readymade' opinions as they wear readymade clothes, the importance of a free flow of communication can never be exaggerated. If we want to build a democratic society, we must learn to live with a free press, which can reassert the basic democratic tenet that in a democracy no one is indispensable and each is equal to the other. No one can claim any ascriptive, dynastic status and only trees can be taller than us — the common people. Let not communication revolution result in the destruction of democratic values.

Prabhat Kumar Datta

Exploring the Character of The Indian State

ONE OF THE most important institutions of society is the state. The state as a political power in the developed form arises only in the course of the rise of the classes and of class struggles. It is a product of class antagonism as well as an instrument of class rule. As Engels puts it :

... it is a product of society at a certain stage of development ; it is an admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself... . But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle it became necessary to have a power seemingly standing above society ... and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.¹

In his *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel sought to present the state as the embodiment of general interest of societies, as standing above any particular interest. Marx rejected this claim and held that the state, in real life, did not stand for the general interest but defended the interests of property. Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto* : "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."²

It is against this backdrop of classical marxist formulation of the state that this paper attempts to examine the character of the state in India primarily in the light of some of the important industrial and agricultural policies pursued by the state since independence, and the linkages between the big business houses and the state. As a prelude to this exploration some light will be thrown on the nature of the Indian Constitution which is the

fundamental law of the land codifying the legal normative postulates.

Nature of the Constitution

The Indian National Congress, which spearheaded the freedom struggle, did not seize power from the imperialist masters. D N Sen says :

... the change in the political scene of 1947 was not due to seizure of power, but to a transfer based on compromise, and that the compromise was a tripartite agreement between British government, the Congress leadership and the League High Command.⁸

It was 'a constitutional device arrived at by negotiation.'⁴

The next task was the framing of the Constitution. The Indian National Congress leaders were born and brought up in an atmosphere of bourgeois liberal philosophy. "They could not even dream of a state of free India which was different from the bourgeois type of state ..."⁵ And, as expected, the Constituent Assembly formed for the purpose of framing the Constitution, was not based on the principle of universal adult suffrage. It consisted mainly of representatives from the Indian bourgeoisie and the feudal class.

The Constitution that was framed borrowed many of its fundamental features from the Government of India Act 1935, which was an instrument created by the British masters to preserve, protect and promote their imperialist interests. The Constitution, in spite of many pledges made by the Congress leaders during the freedom struggle to the common people, guaranteed the right to private property. Incidentally, although in terms of the 44th amendment of the Constitution the right to private property no longer falls within the purview of part III of the Constitution (the chapter on justiciable rights), the fact remains that article 300A incorporated in the Constitution in terms of the said amendment says : "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." Thus the Constitution regards the right to private property as a sacred right. Needless to mention that this is

a bourgeois ideal. And significantly, while guaranteeing the right to property as a justiciable right the Constitution has relegated the right to work to a secondary position of a mere non-justiciable directive principle. It was pointed out by some members of the Constituent Assembly like K T Shah that the Constitution would result in a "rule of a few capitalists and vested interests."⁶ The Constitution certainly reflected the philosophical positions and the class position of the leaders of the freedom movement. "It instituted," to quote Moin Shakir, "political domination of the propertied classes by codifying the forms of division within the framework of the class divided society."⁷

Planning and the Bourgeoisie

In the Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and 1956 the public policy makers opted for rapid industrialization of the country in the overall framework of economic planning and mixed economy. This policy was adopted because the Indian bourgeoisie was not capable of undertaking the development of the economy without state assistance. In the modern world the private monopolies cannot avoid competition from the international market where even giant monopolies look puny before still greater concerns. Under such circumstances the private monopolies have to fall back upon the state for aid.

Long before independence the Indian bourgeoisie favoured some kind of state capitalism. The Tatas and the Birlas worked in close collaboration with the National Planning Committee. This committee constituted by the Indian National Congress in 1938 consisted of 15 members. "Among the members are wellknown industrialists, financiers, professors, scientists as well as representatives of Trade Union Congress and the village industries."⁸ The same financial group confirmed their position by helping to work out the Bombay plan. This group included three directors of Tata enterprises — J R D Tata, A D Shroff and John Mathai — in addition to G D Birla.

During the Nehru era, some sections of the big bourgeoisie led by the Tatas got frightened because Nehru wanted to build up an

industrial base with planning and the state sector playing important roles. But with the failure of the Swantantra alternative and the growth of the large houses as a result of Nehru's policies, business confidence was re-established. The death of Nehru and the weakness of the political leadership, accompanied by stagnation, led the bourgeoisie to launch an all-out attack, and they largely succeeded. Shastriji, who succeeded Nehru, took a series of measures which undermined the power of the Planning Commission. He snapped the link between the cabinet and the Planning Commission by appointing a separate secretary to the Planning Commission. He formed a National Planning Commission with representatives of the bourgeoisie. To further undermine the Planning Commission and increase the involvement of the bourgeoisie in planning Shastri formed a Business Advisory Council with their representatives. And at a meeting Ashoke Mehta assured the business representatives that the process of consultation would be continued and that the scope for the development of the private sector would continue to be large.⁹ Thus the government accepted the demand of the bourgeoisie which was clamouring for the expansion of the private sector.

The Planning Commission was reduced to an expert, technical body completely separated from the government and acted as an advisory body. In keeping with the Administrative Reforms Commission's recommendation the Commission's staff of economic investigators and its special technical sections were dismantled. Frankel observes :

on the eve of the Fourth Plan, the Planning Commission's role was so reduced in scope as to virtually satisfy the demands of the business community reiterated since the mid-1950s that the proper sphere of activity for the public sector was to promote social overheads and incentives supportive of private investments.¹⁰

The annual plan that followed marked a much lower developmental outlay on industrial projects and further concession to the private sector. For example, the Fourth Plan included efforts to increase agricultural production, reduction in foreign aid and limiting of resort to inflationary financing by linking plan outlay more closely to domestic budgetary resource. This meant, "a modest plan relying on initiatives by the private sector."

The Public Sector

The origin of the public sector in India may be said to have been associated with three processes : (i) the transfer of property of the colonial government and governments of the former princely states to the hands of the state, (ii) nationalization of private enterprises, and (iii) the state government. As the second process is the most important for our purpose, we would try to concentrate our attention on this aspect.


The first process does not require a serious analysis. It has not brought about any significant change in the socioeconomic structure of India. To quote a Soviet expert,

Its role in the emergence and development of the state sector as a whole was conditioned by the former entrepreneurial activities of the colonial authorities and the governments of the princely states. The limited nature of those activities determined the limitations of its role.¹¹

This process is of great significance in the spheres of transport and agricultural infrastructure.

The second process — the nationalization of industries — does not by itself bring about any change in the character of the state. Nationalization in India has affected mainly the most worn-out and inefficient enterprises equipped with obsolete technology. But, as the state can draw on budgetary resources, it is capable of ensuring the functioning of the nationalized industries. In India nationalization has done a lot in stabilizing the economy as a whole, and by doing so it has helped the bourgeoisie.

It is true that nationalization came under serious attack from many leading industrialists. But it was admitted that there should be no objection to state intervention when it supplements the private enterprise. What is important is who benefits from the activities of the nationalized sectors. In India nationalization began as soon as state sovereignty was established. The first to be roped in was the central bank, the main vehicle of the state policy in the credit and monetary spheres. In the mid-fifties the largest commercial bank of the country, the Imperial Bank, was taken over. In 1969 the



government nationalized the 14 largest Indian private banks. The state has thus taken over the dominant position in the modern sector of the credit and finance system.¹² It was argued by the government that the nationalization of banks was motivated by the desire to delink the top business houses from the banking sector. But there has since been very little discussion at the policy-making levels for devising means to utilize banks as instruments of reducing concentration or regulating operation of the top industrial houses.

There is no doubt that bank nationalization has affected the immediate economic interests of the finance capital. But the fact remains that bank nationalization has brought about very little change in the credit policies of the banks. Banks still cater to the needs of the big business and the main beneficiaries of the extended amount of credit to the agricultural sector are the rich farmers. The credit policies of the commercial banks are determined by the National Credit Council where the private sector has its own representatives. It is true that there are on this body representatives from other sectors like the small industries, trade unions, agriculturists, etc, but the fashion is set by the leaders of Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries.

Apart from the banks the big business is represented in almost all the credit and investment organizations such as the Life Insurance Corporation, the Industrial Development Bank of India, the Reserve Bank of India, etc. As a result, a considerable portion of loans from the funding institutions has gone to relatively large borrowers. The financial institutions are expected to provide financial aid to private industries. The promotional finance is to be in the form of 'equity' capital. In practice, while during the initial stages there were certain restrictions on the form and size of loans granted by these institutions, later the gradual practice of relaxations has made them long-term lending institutions. The largest beneficiaries have been the big business houses. Most of the benefits from the infrastructure have accrued largely to the relatively affluent section and the vast majority has been barely touched. According to the Basic Statistical Returns of the Reserve Bank of India as at the end of June

1977, out of credit limits of Rs 1,462 crores for small industry as much as Rs 991 crores, or 68 per cent, had been granted to units with credit limits over one lakh each and over 20 per cent of credit to small-scale industry had gone to industry with credit limits of more than 10 lakhs.^{1 2}

It should be mentioned that the policy of management take-over as a prelude to nationalization has gained currency in recent years. This policy helps the private sector. The recent take-over of 13 textile mills is a case in point. The previous management had reduced these mills to deplorable conditions. As against their paid-up capital of Rs 11.36 crores these mills accumulated losses extending to Rs 100 crores. In the first quarter of 1983-84 the sick units taken over from the private sector accounted for Rs 200 crores in the total losses.

As a result, the public sector has been incurring huge losses. According to the annual report on the existing industrial and commercial undertakings of the central government for 1967-68 the overall performance during this period showed a net loss of Rs 35.23 crores as against the loss of Rs 10.18 crores during the previous year. In response to a question on the floor of parliament the minister-in-charge of industries pointed out that according to figures available 15 public sector units incurred losses of Rs 1000 crores annually.^{3 4} During 1982-83 losses amounted to Rs 1056 crores. In 1981-82 they made a net loss of Rs 110 crores, if the oil companies were excluded. The losses during 1980-81 and 1979-80 for all the public enterprises amounted to Rs 203 and Rs 74 crores respectively.

It is significant to note that the policy-makers often bring about changes in the public sector policies in line with the demand of the big bourgeoisie. For example, the bourgeoisie has long been clamouring for a shift of emphasis of the public sector from the capital goods sector to the consumer goods. This demand was voiced in the different resolutions of the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries. Since the mid-sixties there has been a phenomenal rise of state investment in the consumer goods industries which cater to the needs of the rich and upper middle class people.



Industrial Licensing Policies

The adoption of a mixed economy pattern has two implications : first, the continuance of the private sector of the economy and, secondly, the introduction of a system of controls to regulate the private sector. For the purpose of enabling the government to do the task of regulation, a large number of regulatory measures were adopted in the post-independence days. It gave the government a huge amount of allocative and distributive capacity. According to a study conducted by the Maharashtra Chambers of Commerce and Industries, Pune, in 1977 the various statutes enacted to control and guide the different types of economic activities in the country and the amendments to these statutes from time to time since 15 August 1947, up to 31 December 1976, totalled 659. However, in our country the most important device through which the state regulates the economic activities of the private sector is issuing of licences for a particular economic activity.

Licensing as a tool for carrying out industrial policy has certain specific objectives : (a) regulation of industrial development in accordance with the plan priorities and canalization of investment into priority industries ; (b) avoidance of monopoly ; (c) prevention of locational concentration so as to encourage dispersal of industries to underdeveloped regions ; (d) prevention of undue competition between large-scale industries and small and cottage industries ; and (e) optimum utilization of the scarce foreign exchange resources. But these objectives have not been achieved. The Monopolies Inquiry Commission comments :

The percentage of licences issued to those applied for, works out at 71·6% for big business and 65·1% for the rest ; the percentage of applications rejected work out at 28·4% for big business and 34·9% for the rest. This analysis clearly demolishes the theory that the licensing authorities favoured smaller businessmen as against the big ones.¹⁵

Another set of data also reveals that in spite of the MRTP Act the monopolies have received favourable treatment in matters of the granting of licences. Between 15 August 1970 and 30 April 1971, 97 fresh licences were issued. They included 7 for the Tatas, 8 for

the Birlas, 4 for Sriram, 3 for Sahu-Jain, 6 for J K Singhanian, 10 for Bird-Heilgers, 2 for ACC and 3 for the Dalmias.¹⁶

Another significant trend in the domain of licensing policies is the liberalization of the policies following the demand of the big business. In the 1951-54 period industrial enterprises with a capital below Rs 100,000 were exempted from licensing, in the 1953-60 period all non-factory enterprises were exempted, in the 1960-62 period enterprises employing less than 100 workers and with a fixed capital up to Rs 1 million and in the 1962-64 period industries with a fixed capital up to Rs 1 million were exempted. Since 1964 industries with a fixed capital up to Rs 2.5 million have been exempted from licensing. The big business was mounting pressure on the government for extending the benefit of relaxation of the licensing control to large industries. And the government yielded to the pressure by exempting from control, from May 1966 to May 1969, as many as 41 industries.

Following the reports of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (1965), the Industrial Licensing Policy Inquiry Committee (1969), and the MRTP Act, the government announced a new industrial policy in February 1970. Under this policy many new industries came under the purview of the licensing system. At the same time the investment barrier for projects exempted from licensing was raised from Rs 2.5 million to Rs 10 million of fixed capital. Since the mid-70s the state, in keeping with the demand of the big business, has continuously liberalized the industrial policies. The government announced that it would grant permission for the establishment of enterprises calling for investment above Rs 10 million, provided this did not entail any foreign currency expenditure. From 1975 onwards, the licensing of those of them to which the provisions of the MRTP Act did not apply, was totally discontinued in 21 industries, while the enterprises in 20 industries were given permission to utilize fully their installed capacities, even over and above those licensed.¹⁷

The process of liberalization which really began in 1973, took the form of increasing the area of 'delicensing', announcing exemptions from the operations of the convertibility clause, moving away from a regime of price controls either to removal of such control or

imposition of dual prices, with more concessions by way of a smaller proportion of production being subject to controlled prices, and a continuing 'regularization' of actual capacity much higher than originally licensed.¹⁸

The movement towards liberalization attained 'a real breakneck speed in the months since November 1984.' In order to 'improve' the environment of industrial growth some 25 industries and product groups were delicensed. At one stroke the exemption limit for individual units or groups regarding registration under the MRTP Act was raised to Rs 100 crores. The policy regarding price control had already been gradually changed by either abolition of price control in certain cases as the adoption of a system of dual prices, with a substantial part of the output of the concerned industries being left to be sold in the free market. Interestingly, the powers to regulate or control prices used to be exercised after consulting the Tariff Commission which was a statutory body. It was replaced by an intra-government organization, the Bureau of Industrial Costs and Prices. Its inquiries are confidential in nature, so also its reports.

There is an increasing emphasis not only on scrapping the MRTP Act but also in taking recourse to what has come to be known as 'privatization' of units which are at present in the public sector. Private sector concerns are being given more facilities for the mobilization of public savings and also for the ploughback of their own profits. The approach is to reduce public sector outlay on the ground of resource constraints, assuming that others, specially the private sector, will have no dearth of funds. The minister of information and broadcasting said that the spread of tv network by private concerns would be permitted in the future, as there was a resource constraint on public outlay. The liberal licensing policies, as a study¹⁹ has shown, have led to gross under-utilization of productive capacities acquired by the large private sector in the economy. This was the case with 31.8% of all licences issued in the 1956-66 period. The IIPA study surveyed 769 companies and revealed that the violations of the licensing system in terms of undertaking production beyond capacity were confined to 102 companies. The study has shown that in around 20% of cases capacities were

utilized to the extent of less than 75% of authorization, while in around 20% capacities installed were in excess of the licensed ones. Groupwise, 75% of licences held by the Tata companies and 58% by the Birla companies studied were not being utilized, even to the extent of 60%.

The Private Sector

It is very significant to note that despite an elaborate system of controls and regulations adopted to curb the growth of the private sector, the facts speak otherwise. The Monopolies Inquiry Commission showed that 75 houses led by the Tatas and the Birlas controlled 1,536 companies and 46.9% of the assets of the private corporate sector, excluding banking. The share of 75 biggest monopoly houses in the combined assets of the private sector joint stock companies increased from 47% in 1963-64 to 54% in 1967-68.*⁰ Interestingly, the monopolies in India go on making huge profits. According to a study by the *Economic Times*, between August 1970 and April 1971 the net profits of 422 companies increased by 27.5%.²¹ The table given below shows the rate of growth of the assets and profits of some big business houses between 1975 and 1985. The rate of growth was fairly high.

ASSETS AND PROFITS OF SOME BUSINESS HOUSES

	1975		1980		1985	
	Assets	Profits	Assets	Profits	Assets	Profits
(in crores of rupees)						
1 Birla	905.03	93.10	1431.99	121.15	4111.55	154.0
2 Tata	824.41	73.89	1538.97	110.03	3698.84	251.83
3 Thapar	197.90	26.69	348.06	28.40	1067.86	22.15
4 J K Singhania	209.56	16.38	412.72	18.21	1057.03	19.09
5 Mafatlal	244.23	22.16	427.54	31.93	964.60	45.02

Source : Answer No. 238 in the Lok Sabha, 18 July 1987

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The MRTP Act itself has certain inherent lacunae which promote the interests of the monopolies. For example, the act provided for an elaborate definition of 'interconnected undertakings' without creating any instrument for examining interconnection. In the act the Commission has been given the power to obtain information for the purpose of inquiry entrusted to it or taken up by it. It cannot therefore, go into the general question of interconnection except in the cases referred to it.

These and many other legal inadequacies in the act offered room to the big business to evade the provisions of the act. That apart, lack of clarity in the act gave them an opportunity to move to the court. H K Paranjape has rightly noted that the operation of the MRTP Act has not been successful either in breaking up existing concentrations or in preventing further concentration of economic power.²² The lack of effective policy guidelines has further complicated the matter.

Linkages Between the Big Business Houses and the Government

The private corporate sector follows a number of tactics to influence the policies of the government. In the first place, the monopolies maintain close contact with the party in power. It may be recalled that the proximity of the Indian big business to Indian political parties is not a new feature. During the freedom struggle many big business houses used to get in touch with the Indian National Congress. Birlas had never made a secret of their contacts with the Indian National Congress. Many top leaders of the Indian National Congress were helped by the big business. Nehru spent the summer months at J K Singhanias's guest house at Mussoorie, P D Tandon had virtually become a member of the Singhanias family. The house of the Tatas was used as the secretariat of the National Planning Committee. During the emergency a number of industrialists belonging to the large houses are reported to have been actively associated in raising funds for the ruling party. With the Janta Party coming to power, this connection was established with the new ruling party. For example, V Shankar, principal secretary

to the prime minister, was the director of the FICCI-promoted Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research, and N A Palkiwala, India's Ambassador to the USA, was the director of some Tata companies. Actually the monopoly houses have been extending financial support to the political parties for quite some time. A Government of India study shows that from 1962 to 1968 companies officially contributed Rs 25,970,797 to 47 political parties. The most significant recipient was the Congress, which received Rs 20,552,798 followed by the Swatantra Party which received Rs 4,602,553.²³ In 1969 a bill was passed prohibiting company contributions to political parties. It is, however, wrong to believe that legislations will free the parties and politicians from 'dependence' "on the munificence of private business, industry and rich agriculturists "

The Indian bourgeoisie has developed a network of organizations in the form of chambers and organizations. There are 250 chambers of commerce in India.²⁴ The two apex bodies of business in India are the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries and the Associated Chamber of Commerce. The FICCI, with headquarters in New Delhi, was founded in 1927. It made a modest beginning with 24 chambers of commerce in its associate membership list. Its primary objective is to represent Indian commercial opinion at the national level. In 1978 it had 442 ordinary members, 1,845 associate members, 6 honorary members and 4 overseas members. Assocham is a small organization. In 1976 it had a membership of 15 chambers and 188 associate members. Two associations and a large number of multi-nationals were among its members.

These organizations have been legitimized by the Government of India by way of consulting them on various problems facing the economy and the policies of the government. The government and the industrial houses have well-developed channels of communication and consultation at both formal and informal levels. T T Krishnamachari once said that while formulating the first five-year plan the basic targets for the various private industries had been worked out by a large number of special committees which included businessmen.²⁵

It should, however, be emphasized that there is, in fact, a small group of the big business which manipulates these organizations and a few, large but active, family houses control the activities of the organized business. In the FICCI, for example, there is a committee which is the pivot in the decision-making process. The committee consists of 61 persons although 1000 delegates take part in voting. These delegates are again nominated by member bodies and associate members. The big business houses have, in fact, the predominant control over the processes of entry into the executive committee. Kochanek says that in 1966 the Birla house alone controlled about 25% of the total associate members. He further shows that in 1966 associate membership was drawn predominantly from 41 of the top 75 business houses.

The big business houses seek to influence the decisions of the government on the economic management of the country and the structures at which they operate, mainly the legislature and the executive. In order to ensure that their viewpoint is freely expressed on the floor of the house and parliamentary committees important industrialists or their business executives contest elections. Babubhai Chinoy, G D Somani, Minoo Masani and Piloo Mody are some of the important businessmen or business executives who were members of parliament. N H Tata, L K Birla and Ramnath Goenka contested elections in 1971.

The private sector also influences public policies through their representatives on the different policy-making bodies of the government. They participate in almost all the advisory councils and committees functioning under the regulative bodies of the state — in 1978 participated in 81 of them.

The big business houses exert pressure on the government through their control over the news media. We find from a report that 15 large monopoly houses owned 5 newspapers and magazine groups which published 22 daily newspapers and 16 magazines with a total circulation of over 2.5 million. They account for nearly 28% of the total circulation of the daily newspapers, including 60% in English and 31% in Hindi.²⁶

And finally, it has been a common practice with the top monopoly houses to employ retired senior civil servants. By


employing them they utilize their connections with members of the higher bureaucracy who play a powerful role in the making of public policies. Between 1957 and 1962 alone 13 members of the ICS and 55 officials of the IAS and the police services were employed by the private companies. In almost all the big companies in India there are many bureaucrats on the boards of directors. There are retired civil servants on the board of directors of the Tata Iron and Steel, Tata Engineering, Escorts, J K Synthetics, Delhi Cloth Mills and Hindusthan Aluminium, to cite a few examples.²⁷ As the retired civil servants cannot be appointed without the government's permission, they are appointed as advisers or consultants. Significantly, the government also employs the senior functionaries of the big business houses. For example, Wadud Khan, a director of the Tatas, was invited to be the first chairman of the Steel Authority of India.²⁸

Agricultural Policies

Agricultural policies in India have been framed with two objectives in mind : (a) bringing about a structural change in the rural economy and (b) stimulating the rural productive operations. The first objective was sought to be achieved through land reforms. The national movement largely succeeded in making the anti-landlord and anti-feudal struggle a part of the struggle for national independence. In the process it was committed to initiate radical land reforms after coming to power.²⁹

There are three main aspects of the land reforms : (a) abolition of the feudal tenures, such as, zamindari, jagirdari, inamdari etc., and establishment of a uniform tenure system consisting of landowners with the right to transfer, and occupiers of land without the right to transfer, (b) conferring of permanent inheritable rights of possession on certain categories of tenants who had the optional right of purchasing land vested with the government, and (c) imposition of ceilings.

The measures relating to the abolition of zamindars and ceiling on land-holdings have not yielded desired results. There has not been any real redistribution of land from the rich to the poor or from the landlord to the tenant. Bardhan's study of Punjab shows



that the traditional landlords and peasants cultivate the major portion of land.⁸⁰ K L Sharma's study of Rajasthan reveals that the middle caste big tenants have become the big-khatedars in the Jagirdari areas. In the Raiyatwari areas of the UP, Punjab, Haryana and Andhra Pradesh the expropriatory tenants have become land-owners and rich peasants.⁸¹ The agrarian structure in India is essentially feudal. The ownership of land in India today is concentrated in the hands of a small minority. One can have some idea about the nature of landownership pattern by analysing the reports of three nationwide surveys — the National Sample Survey, the First Agricultural Labour Enquiry and the Census of Land holdings. The survey data demonstrate that three-fourths of the rural households own less than one-sixth of the total area, each household owning less than five acres of land. One-fourth of the rural households own 83.68 per cent of the total area. Even among them, 12.77 per cent of the households hold as much as 65.28 per cent of the total area.⁸² And significantly, the data on ownership as given above pertain to the year 1953-54 when the abolition of intermediaries in most parts of India was either in progress or almost complete.

The same is true with respect to the distribution of cultivated area. At the bottom, as many as 71.23 per cent of the households cultivate only 15.60 per cent of the total cultivated land in size-groups of less than 5 acres, while at the top, a small minority of 14.48 per cent of the households operate upon 65 to 85 per cent of the total cultivated area in size-groups of 10 acres and above. Hunter reports that 62 per cent of rural landholdings are below four acres.⁸³ The RBI survey of Debt and Investment 1971-72 found that 15 per cent of rural households had assets above Rs 20,000. In fact, assets owned by top one per cent in rural India was equal to the assets of nearly 60 per cent of the households at the bottom. It may be mentioned here that the number of small and marginal farmers has increased between 1970-71 and 1980-81 as a result of devolution and distribution of ceiling-surplus land. But the number of large holdings of 10 hectares and above is still very large (2.4 per cent of the total number) and operate a large area (22.8 per cent of the total area).⁸⁴

There is lack of political will on the part of the ruling class to undertake effective land reforms because the land reform measures, if put into practice effectively, will go against the interests of the feudal landlords and rich peasantry. On 31 July 1977 the area declared surplus was only 1.63 million hectares, the area taken out by the government was 0.85 million hectares and the area actually distributed was only 0.52 million hectares. It may be mentioned that according to some estimates, calculated on the basis of the National Sample Survey, the surplus area should be as high as 8.70 million hectares. The land ceiling laws have not been seriously enforced. Nor have the tenancy regulations followed the national guidelines. A plan document rightly concludes :

A more equitable distribution of land resources through land reforms has consistently been a major political objective since independence. But the will to implement this policy has been sadly lacking all along.⁸⁵

What is more significant about the land reforms programme in India is that it is the class of rich peasants who have mostly benefited from them. This is evident from the evaluation reports on land reforms implementation in four states sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission. In fact, as Mathew Kurian has said, "The history of land reforms is replete with examples of hypocrisy and treachery practised by the ruling party — the Congress."⁸⁶

Significantly, the land reform legislations themselves are full of loopholes some of which seemed to have been deliberately done to thwart the attempts at land reforms. The landed interests are well-represented in most of the state legislatures. Ladejinsky says that the rich and well-to-do farm groups in India count very much in the inner councils of the Congress both at the centre and in the states. The so-called vote banks are still under their control. To substantiate his thesis Ladejinsky referred to the composition of Punjab Assembly "where 45 out of 64 members are rated as big owners." In Haryana the respective numbers were 30 and 52. In Madhya Pradesh 96 out of 220 Congress legislators "are reported to have land in excess of the declared limit."⁸⁷ It may be mentioned here that the National Institute of Community Development undertook a

nation-wide survey of rural politicians in 1965. The survey revealed that 64 per cent of the rural politicians, or almost two-thirds, owned 10 acres or more of land each, with 38·2 per cent owning 25 acres or more each.³⁸ The survey covered 365 villages in 16 states in India and as many as 365 political leaders. Because of the heavy representation of the landed interests in the legislatures the legal provisions did not aim so much at abolishing intermediaries as at preserving the dominant landholding positions. Some lacunae in the laws hardly escape any attention. For example, the land reform legislations in some states permit the landlords to transfer lands to other members of the family up to a ceiling limit. The legal benefits extended to secure tenurial rights have not been fully reaped because of the right of resumption for personal cultivation granted to the landlords in many states through the land reform legislations.

Personal cultivation resulted in the eviction of millions of tenants and retaining of 500-700 and even 1000 acres of land in the post-reform era in Bihar. Interestingly, in Bihar there was no surplus land because the landowner was given the right to transfer by way of gift any land held by him to his son or daughter or to such other person who would inherit such land, or would be entitled to a share of the land after the death of the landlord.³⁹ That apart, lands are often transferred to persons not belonging to the families of the landowners with a view to evading ceiling laws. For example, a reputed gentleman in the district of Midnapore in West Bengal was recorded to be the owner of 25 acres of land of which he was not aware.⁴⁰

The provisions in the legislations permitting the religious institutions to keep any amount of land above the ceiling limit and the exemptions of tanks, fisheries, orchards, etc. from the purview of the acts have also promoted the interests of the landed gentry. It has been rightly pointed out in the *Report of the Task Force on Agrarian Relations* that the land reform laws are defective in many respects. Some loopholes were deliberately built in, while others were the result of poor drafting.⁴¹

What remained in the legislations in the interests of the poor cultivators came to be stalled by the bureaucracy. The *Report of the Task Force on Agrarian Relations* has squarely blamed the

administrative organization for the failure of the implementation of land reforms. Referring to the attitude of the bureaucracy the *Report* notes that it was generally "lukewarm and apathetic," because those in the higher echelons of the administration are also substantial landowners themselves or they have close links with the big landowners.⁴³ In a micro-survey among 96 officials of the Indian Administrative Service conducted by B Subramaniam in the early 70s it was revealed that those in favour of radical economic changes constituted only 27.5 per cent of the young officials. After independence the IAS has succeeded the ICS. But "very little change" has been effected either in the system of recruitment or in the in-service training. It has been said by many that the civil service today is very important and powerful representative of the vested interests. A survey has revealed that the fathers of 51.2 per cent of the representatives of the IAS officers appointed on the basis of competition in 1959, had held managerial positions in the upper echelons of administration.⁴⁸ Traditions in the families of officials determine their mode of living and also their attitude.

It should be mentioned that a huge sum of compensation money has been paid by the state to the landowners for the acquisition of land beyond the ceiling limit. According to one estimate, the total sum including rehabilitation grant and interest, amounted to Rs 604.1 crores.⁴⁴ The Reserve Bank of India has estimated that the total compensation payment amounted to Rs 670 crores of which Rs 360 crores had been paid by 1975.⁴⁵ Roughly the average price of land paid to intermediaries for every acre of land works out to about Rs 20 per acre. And there is no doubt this amount at the prevailing rate of interest is quite adequate for providing a reasonable income to the ex-zamindars. Thus the state has always been careful about the interests of the big landed gentry. The failure of land reforms and recession in the mid-60s called for a change in the agricultural strategy. This 'new strategy' was called for by the bourgeoisie as it would involve a market for consumer goods and also for modern agricultural inputs. In 1964 there took place two major developments in the field of state agricultural policies. It was decided that (i) developmental efforts should subsequently be concentrated in the 20 to 25 per cent of the cultivated area where the supply of assured water could create the

possibility for increase in production, and (ii) within these areas the application of science and technology to raise yields was to be encouraged.

The 'new strategy' brought about a 'breakthrough' in agricultural production. In 1960-61, the country was producing 82 million tons of foodgrains which rose to 121 tonnes in 1975-76.⁴⁶

It is interesting to note here that although the 'Green Revolution' increased food production no attempt was made to tax the rural rich. On the contrary, agricultural taxes were reduced. Land revenue and betterment levies were either abolished or reduced. For example, direct taxes on agriculture amounted to only 5.1 per cent of the total tax revenue of the central and the state governments in 1964-65 and 1.8 per cent in 1976-77.⁴⁷ This shows the strength of the rural rich in the state system. The benefits of the 'new agricultural strategy' have been enjoyed by the rich or the rural gentry who could exploit the full potentialities of this new policy.

The National Commission on Agriculture noted that new agricultural technology had largely benefited the bigger farmers and tended to add to the disparity between the more privileged and the less privileged in the rural sector. One of the effects of 'Green Revolution' has been the swelling of the bulk of the agrarian proletariat. The number of landless agricultural labourers increased by about 19 million between 1964 and 1971. The share of landless agricultural workers in the total unorganized work force increased from 18 per cent to 24 per cent during this period.

This partly explains why, despite tremendous growth in food production, rural poverty is still persisting. The agrarian structure operates as a powerful drag on the rapid development of agriculture and alleviation of poverty in most parts of rural India. There is any amount of evidence to suggest that the alleviation programmes have miserably failed.⁴⁸

The state investment in the agricultural field has considerably increased over the years. For example, the contribution of institutional credit to agricultural development was 3 per cent in 1950-51. In 1960-61 it rose to 16 per cent. According to some calculations total credit outflow from cooperative and institutional sources by

the end of 1983 was expected to be over Rs 7,500 crores.⁴⁹ In order to shift the balance of the state support in favour of the poor some attempts have however been made since 1969 by establishing small farmers' development agency and marginal farmers' and agricultural labourers' projects meant for catering to the small and marginal farmers and agricultural labourers.

But the benefits of the institutional credit and the other specific programmes have gone in favour of a small minority.⁵⁰ According to the Basic Statistical Returns of the Reserve Bank of India, in agriculture about 30 per cent of the outstanding bank credit had gone to the borrowers with credit limits above Rs 1 lakh. Under indirect finance for agriculture the amount of credit outstanding in favour of parties with credit limit of over Rs 1 crore was as high as Rs 149 crores out of the total of Rs 300 crores.⁵¹

The problem is that loans are advanced against security. Small farmers have very little assets to offer as security. What is necessary is that loans have to be advanced to them either against the security assets to be financed by loans, or where the amounts involved are small, on personal credit. Land is the basic productive asset in the rural areas. Without a radical restructuring of the land-holding pattern, all attempts to help the rural poor are bound to help the landed gentry.⁵²

Concluding Observations

The above analysis shows that the state in India has been upholding the cause of the big bourgeoisie and the rich peasants with whom the bourgeoisie shares state power. Interestingly, it has been admitted by the state managers also that the political and economic system has benefited the upper strata — the bourgeoisie and the landlords. Indira Gandhi said at a meeting of the National Development Council that the fruits of planning had not reached the poorer sections of the people and there was discrimination in favour of the well-to-do.⁵³ Again, over time an elaborate system and complex bureaucratic network has emerged encompassing price controls, rationing, licensing procedures, MRTP, FERA regulations, etc, which, without actually affecting the big bourgeoisie, is

retarding the growth of the industrial sector in general and the small sector in particular.⁵⁴

It is however very difficult to find out one-to-one relationship between the state policies, on the one hand, and the interests of the big bourgeoisie and rich peasants, on the other. There had been many occasions when the policies of the state did not directly serve their interests. For example, there were sharp differences of opinion within the FICCI on the question of bank nationalization, and because of these differences the FICCI refused to openly condemn the government.⁵⁵ Having failed to explore one-to-one relationship some have come to the conclusion that the Indian state is in the hands of the rich peasantry and the lower middle class. There are other theories too.⁵⁶ The character of a state should not be judged simply in terms of relationship between each and every state policy and the class benefited by it. A critical examination of the general trend of state policies in the light of class approach seems to be more useful for this purpose.

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- 53 *The Economic Times*, Bombay, 30 July 1969, quoted in Kochanek, *Business and Politics in India* (Berkeley : University of California, 1974), p. 224.
- 54 See A K Bagchi, *The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press), pp. 213-32.
- 55 For details see K N Raj, *The Politics and Economy of Intermediate Regimes*, R R Kala Memorial Lecture (Bombay : Orient Longman, 1973).
- 56 Bardhan provides a model that explains state policies as the outcome of balance of power among what he identifies as three dominant 'proprietary classes.' See P Bardhan, *The Political Economy of Development in India* (Oxford : Blackwell, 1984). For a summary of other models see B R Rubin, "Economic Liberalisation and the Indian State", *Third World Quarterly*, London, vol. 7, no. 4, October 1985. Anupam Sen has tried to demonstrate that the "state in India conditioned by the nature of its social formations, was and is still autonomous" (A Sen, *The State Industrialization and class Formation in India : A Neo-Marxist Perspective on Colonialism, Underdevelopment and Development* (London : Routledge or Kegan Paul, 1981).



Mira Ganguly

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Communication Media and Urban Voters

POLITICAL LIFE IS essentially an exercise in communication. The degree and forms of communication differ from one situation to another depending on the environment — both spatial and temporal — and the type and the number of people involved. Elections provide an occasion when communication reaches a particularly high pitch. In fact, an election itself could be regarded as a process of communication. Each step in an election involves communication, starting right from the demand for holding an election, through the announcement of the election, the formation of electoral alliances, the selection of the candidates, and the election campaign, to the stage of final voting and the announcement of the results. Then starts a new cycle of communication, covering formation of the government and the liaison between the government, the opposition and the people.

The election campaign represents the communication process in one of its most visible forms. Election campaigns clearly seek to communicate information about candidates, issues, political parties and various other aspects of the political life. Long ago, Lenin admitted that election campaigns provide “an amazing abundance of politico-educational material and serve to bring out in the greatest possible relief the class basis of the ‘various parties.’”¹ Elections “provide a wealth of instructive material for a *true* study of the character of the various parties, and the class tendencies, or class significance of their policies.”² A study of the role of the communication media in the election campaign could, therefore, provide a focal point for analysis of political life.

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A study of the role of the communication media in the domain of electoral behaviour is actually nothing but a study of political rhetorics. By rhetorical communication we do not, however, mean verbal messages alone. It may be defined as "the process of a source stimulating a source-selected meaning in the mind of a receiver by means of verbal and nonverbal messages."³ Today every student of the political rhetorics has to recognize the importance of electronic and print media. It is well known that long before the emergence of these media numerous writers had worked on the different aspects of rhetorics, and some of these aspects covered problems of political rhetorics. Although nobody can deny the contributions — direct and indirect — made by Corax, Tisias, Isocrates, Cicero or Quintilian to the development of political rhetorics, Aristotle is regarded as the greatest thinker ever to write on rhetorical communication. Aristotle defines rhetorics as the "faculty of discovering in particular case what are the available means of persuasion." His main guide to the search for persuasion is the use of *topoi* or lines of argument.⁴

In fact, in any election campaign which provides an important occasion for political rhetorics, every contestant, particularly every political party, has to place a lot of stress on the *topoi*. Explaining the significance of universal franchise, Karl Marx pointed out in *The Class Struggles in France* that it "became our best means of propaganda" and added :

In election agitation it provided us with a means, second to none, of getting in touch with the mass of the people, where they still stand aloof from us ; of forcing all parties to defend their views and actions against our attacks before all the people. ...⁵

This brief paper seeks to examine the impact of the communication media in the context of two elections : the Lok Sabha Election 1984 and the election to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation 1985. The spatial context in both the cases is Calcutta. Communication media are particularly active in a city like Calcutta because "the pulse of political life beats faster" here. Here are located the important centres of most of the political parties operating in the state of West Bengal, and the leading newspapers of all trends and shades are

published from here. The best public speakers are mobilized to address the election meetings here.

Data Base

Though both qualitative and quantitative data have been used in this paper, the main source is provided by quantitative data. The nature of campaign has been assessed through an analysis of the contents of four dailies — including one political party daily — published from Calcutta, and five periodicals and magazines. We also relied on the election manifestos, leaflets, pamphlets, posters and graffiti of the different political parties and candidates. Moreover, information was collected through focussed and conversational interviews with political party leaders and activists, apart from the observation reports obtained from 29 investigators.

This paper, however, is mainly based on the data collected through structured interviews with 418 respondents in eight polling stations located in two assembly constituencies in Calcutta. The assembly constituencies chosen were Jadavpore and Belgachia West. From each of these assembly constituencies four polling stations were selected by using a table of random numbers. From each polling station respondents were chosen again by using the same table of random numbers.

We had intended to interview 400 individuals without any substitution. But on the basis of our past experience and also the suggestion made earlier by the ICSSR, a larger sample was selected at the outset. As the ICSSR had correctly pointed out, the number of completed interviews at the end of a sample survey often fell short of the targeted number by 30 to 35 per cent. So, we selected 70 respondents from each polling station. In Jadavpore we interviewed 221 respondents and in Belgachia West 197. The sample survey was carried out simultaneously in all the polling stations in August and September 1985, that is, soon after the Calcutta Corporation election. The interview schedule had been pre-tested and the necessary changes had been made. It must be pointed out here that the non-voters have been excluded in the matter of data analysis. The data-analysis is based on the responses obtained from

those electors who actually exercised their franchise in both the elections — Lok Sabha election 1984 and Calcutta Corporation election 1985.

We have sought to assess here the impact of the communication media on the electoral behaviour of these voters. Usually when people use the term “communication media” they refer to the media agencies like newspapers, radio, television, magazines, books and films. But communication is a process which not only covers transmission of messages from one place to another but also encompasses “the process of one person stimulating meaning in the mind of another by means of a message.”⁶ So, in this study by communication media we have not meant only the print media and the electronic media. We have covered all the important media forms through which messages are transmitted in the pre-election days.

Campaign Scene

In order to understand media behaviour, it is necessary, at the very outset, to look at the organization of the election campaign. The immediate aim of all election campaigns is to influence the voters’ decision-making process. Several researchers in the west, however, have expressed the view that election campaigns are of little significance in shaping partisan choice.⁷ On the other hand, several studies both in the west and in India have revealed that campaign does influence decision-making.⁸ In our post-election survey of West Bengal voters in 1980, 17·54 per cent of the respondents said that they had made up their minds just before the voting, 15·78 per cent said that they had done so about seven days prior to the election, and 7·01 per cent admitted having done so about 15 days before the election. These data indicate that the election campaign does have some impact on decision-making.

Lok Sabha Election The impact of the election campaign naturally depends on the way it is organized, and organization of the election campaign brings out the situation within the party, particularly the amount of dissension and the degree of dissatisfaction with the nomination process. As factionalism was more in

evidence in the nomination process of the Congress(I) — as compared with that of the Left Front — in 1984, it had a greater impact on its campaigning. The Left Front in West Bengal scored higher than its opponents in organizing the campaign. Formal campaigning was started, immediately after the announcement of the election, through Left Front rallies held on a district-based programme. Schedules of meetings to be addressed by ministers and state leaders were drawn up. Programmes were regularly published showing which leaders would address which meetings, when and where, in support of which candidates. Immediately after the announcement of the Lok Sabha election, the CPI(M) state committee in West Bengal issued instructions to the effect that each party member, worker and sympathizer would have to carry out some amount of election work every day. It also decided that reports about electoral preparations would be received by party centres and district committees every ten days. Even if these aims of all-out participation by party members and sympathizers may not have been fully realized, there can be little doubt that many party members and sympathizers did do their best to make the campaign a success.

The Congress(I) in West Bengal did not show the same amount of organized efforts for campaigning. The campaign was particularly lukewarm in the initial stage. It appears that in many places, by the time the Congress(I) campaign started in right earnest the campaign workers of the Left Front had filled up most of the wall space with slogans, pictures and statistics.

It would be wrong to think, however, that the top leadership of the Congress(I) had been totally unconcerned about the campaign all through this period. Even if the party workers could not be activated, media power purchased with money could be relied upon. Newspaper reports suggested that the Congress(I) started planning for a nation-wide campaign as early as January 1984. It is learnt that Mrs Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi had decided that publicity should be handled by an advertising agency which could utilize foreign expertise. In the 1980 Lok Sabha election the Congress(I) had preferred to use party men to provide the campaign ideas. The Congress(I) and the Janata Party had utilized the newspapers for campaigning by inserting advertisements in 1980. In fact,

in 1977 also the Congress and the Janata Party had utilized the newspapers and had inserted quite a few advertisements. But the Congress(I) campaign for the 1984 Lok Sabha election surpassed its earlier record both in terms of the size and the number of advertisements inserted in the dailies and periodicals in different languages throughout the country. The entire job was handled by an advertising concern, which, according to newspaper reports, has links with a well-known American advertising agency. Apart from these advertisements in the newspapers and periodicals, the Congress(I) published quite a few printed posters with coloured photographs of Mrs Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi and the electoral symbol of the party. From the quality of the paper and printing and the huge number of such posters the amount of expenditure involved can be easily inferred. Some people say that the total campaign expenditure of the Congress(I) on newspapers and posters alone ran into crores of rupees for the whole country.

Apart from this type of campaign, the Congress(I) also fully utilized the tv for the purpose of propaganda. In a letter to the Chief Election Commissioner, Shanti Bhushan, former union law minister and treasurer of the BJP, protested against the continuing misuse of the government media by the ruling party. Drawing the attention of the Chief Election Commissioner to a telecast of an interview with Mrs Gandhi on the national hook-up by Doordarshan on the eve of the election Shanti Bhushan wrote : "As the ruling Congress is campaigning in the name of Indira Gandhi, such a telecast on the eve of the election is a gross misuse of the media." He also referred to another telecast in which the chairman of the Minorities Commission had made a fervent plea for support to Rajiv Gandhi. Joyti Basu told reporters in Calcutta that the telecast of an interview with Mrs Indira Gandhi just before the elections was an attempt to influence the voters. He wondered if such practices meant a "free and fair" election befitting the "second largest democracy in the world." He also objected to the broadcast of the prime minister's speeches in the national programme of Doordarshan and held that these violated the electoral norms.

A new feature of the campaign techniques adopted by the Congress(I), and also to some extent by some of the other parties, in

1984 was the use of audio and video cassettes. Through these cassettes the Congress(I) tried in the main to influence the voters' mind by showing different aspects of the life and activities of Mrs Gandhi.

In West Bengal neither the Congress(I) nor the Left Front constituents laid special stress on big rallies. Both the sides tried to reach the maximum number of people in the shortest possible time by organizing small meetings. Both did try to utilize national-level leaders. The Congress(I) arranged several meetings addressed by Rajiv Gandhi. Likewise, meetings arranged by the opposition were addressed by Farooq Abdullah. But even these were not supposed to be big rallies.

The techniques of door-to-door campaign and *padayatra* were used extensively in 1984. The CPI(M) which had a start over the Congress(I) in West Bengal, because it had finalized its list of candidates much earlier, was able to conduct door-to-door campaign in several areas. But the latter also did use this technique on a limited scale.

As a new feature of their campaign, the Left Front workers sent printed letters to voters in some areas and invited them to join group discussions. At these meetings voters were "provoked" to raise questions, even "awkward" questions.

TABLE 1
CANONICAL CORRELATIONS : LOK SABHA ELECTION 1984

Left Front (N=134)	Congress (I) (N=242)
.5957630	.5897586
.4850534	.3959372
.3966363	.3525590
.3805673	.3211147
.2990932	.2371536
.2548263	.1423566
.1947808	.1256181
.1214436	.0924850
.0679758	.0423471

Corporation Election It is well-known that on the whole the techniques adopted by the different parties remain more or less the same in different elections, though there is some difference in emphasis on one technique or the other and there may be some innovations. Naturally all the candidates cannot use the different techniques on the same scale and in the same way. Financial constraints play an important determining role. Moreover, one particular party may not attach the same importance to a particular technique in all the elections. Election manifestos, however, are almost an inevitable part of an election campaign. Though the ordinary voter is only marginally interested in the manifesto itself, the campaigners do use it as a necessary instrument. Both the Left Front and the Congress(I) did issue manifestos for the Corporation election also. Each manifesto presented a 16-point programme and some of the points were naturally the same. The Left Front manifesto was issued just three weeks after the announcement of the election. It is of interest to note that the Left Front issued a second manifesto to counter what it called "the lies, half-truths and exaggeration" contained in the Congress (I) manifesto.

The Left Front had drawn up its campaign programme more than two months before the election date. It was decided that the top leaders of the Front would hold meetings at the beginning of the campaign on a zonal basis, each zone to be constituted with seven or eight wards. Left Front election committees in each ward were also set up about two months prior to the date of election. The campaign programme included ward meetings, street corner meetings, small group meetings, and door-to-door campaign. A day-to-day roster of the larger meetings was drawn up and published daily in the CPI(M) organ. The ancillary organizations also participated in the campaign. Several dramas were staged by the cultural groups affiliated to the Left Front constituents. The leftists had planned to hold small and big meetings. Actually they relied mainly on door-to-door campaign. The CPI(M) cadre had been instructed to approach the people individually and to explain the Front's shortcomings. They were to answer the questions raised by the people. At the fag end of the campaign an ancillary organization of the Left Front produced a short film calling on the people to rally round the Front to save Calcutta.

Naturally both the sides utilized common devices like posters, leaflets, meetings, processions and graffiti. But the main emphasis in the Congress(I) campaign was on *padayatras*, which could perhaps be regarded as a variant of the door-to-door campaign. Though literally a *padayatras* would indicate a march on foot, cars, bedecked with festoons, posters and microphones and bearing the leaders as well as the candidate, formed a part of such *padayatras*. Often the party workers marched on foot behind the cars.

The newspapers were also pressed into the campaign and the Congress(I) inserted several advertisements in the local dailies. An appeal by some leading intellectuals was also inserted by the party in the form of an advertisement. But the appeal lost much of its impact when one of the 'signatories' wrote to the different newspapers denying having signed it. Just on the eve of the election the Left Front inserted in all the leading dailies of Calcutta — also in the form of an advertisement — an appeal by leading intellectuals.

Jyoti Basu alleged at an election meeting that barring a few newspapers most of big newspapers were campaigning against the Left Front. If we analyse the pattern of ownership of the newspapers in India we may say that a leader of Basu's stature should not be surprised even if this charge were totally correct. Many newspapers, however, did cover Left Front campaign also, though more coverage was given to the campaigning by the other side. Still, there can be no doubt that a few newspapers campaigned almost openly in favour of the Congress(I). Opinion polls indicating a Congress(I) victory were indeed flashed and naturally this could be expected to influence the partisan choice. Distribution of news items, particularly constituency surveys, in some newspapers did indicate a positive role in favour of the Congress(I).

Usually any election campaign is a combination of different types of issues, though the emphasis varies from one election to another. An overall view indicates that this happened in Calcutta in the 1984 election also, and there was greater stress on national level issues. In 1985, the emphasis was naturally on Calcutta and its problems. The nature of campaigning by both the sides revealed however that this election was more a political fight between two

major political forces rather than a mere attempt to capture a civic body. Both the sides fought a political battle.

TABLE 2

CANONICAL CORRELATIONS : CALCUTTA CORPORATION
ELECTION 1985

Left Front (N=178)	Congress (I) (N=159)
·6644167	·7011157
·4297438	·5019742
·3687979	·4298182
·3220163	·3238282
·2843911	·2798905
·2114751	·2340527
·1410726	·1610406
·1102095	·0969980
·0485824	·0716432

Analytic Tools

In analysing the quantitative data we had two sets of variables for a sample of subjects, each set of variables representing multiple measurements. In the first set, which may be described as a set of independent variables, we considered the exposure to nine communication media. In the other set we had the dependent variables, the decisional variables relating to the electoral behaviour of the respondents. That is to say, we considered two sets of variables with a joint distribution, and we analysed the correlations between the variables of one set and those of the other. We found a new coordinate system in the space of each set of variables in such a way that the new coordinates displayed unambiguously the system of correlations.⁹ This statistical method, known as canonical correlation, is of particular usefulness in exploratory studies. Originally developed by Hotelling,¹⁰ the canonical correlation is the maximum correlation between linear functions of two vector variables. But after the pair of linear functions that maximally correlates is located there may be an opportunity to locate additional pairs that maximally correlate subject to the restriction that the

functions in each new pair are uncorrelated with all the previously located functions in both the domains. That is to say, "each pair of functions is so determined as to maximize the correlation between the new pair of canonical variates, subject to the restriction that they be entirely orthogonal to all previously derived linear combinations."¹¹

In canonical correlation linear combinations of the X variables and also of Y variables are formed. Of the infinite number of possible linear combinations for each set, coefficients are chosen following such a method that the resultant linear combination of the X set variables is maximally correlated with the linear combinations of the Y set variables. We have to find that combination of the X set variables which has the highest correlation with any combination of the Y set variables and also that combination of Y variables maximally correlated with any X combination. Of the infinite number of linear combinations of the two sets of variables we have to find that particular pair which is most highly related to each other. The correlation coefficient is termed canonical correlation.¹²

Applications of canonical correlation in political analysis have not so far been extensive, though this statistical technique is a powerful tool that can "resolve the problem of indeterminacy that results from multicollinearity."¹³ Most probably the main reason why it is generally avoided is that the canonical model appears first to be a complicated way of expressing the relationship between two measurement batteries. But some writers believe that it is the simplest analytic tool that can begin to do justice to this difficult problem of scientific generalization.¹⁴

A useful supplement to canonical correlation is provided by the multiple correlation of each variable in each set regressed on all the variables of the other set.¹⁵ Instead of resorting to this procedure we have in this study made an attempt at measuring the association of the communication media with the decisional variables of the voters by using the principal components method of factor analysis as supplementary to canonical correlation. We have resorted to this combination because on the basis of our earlier studies we have found that the factor model, if used in combination with other properly selected tools, always helps the investigator in the process

of identifying fundamental and meaningful dimensions of a multivariate domain.¹⁶

In the present study we have adopted the method of factor analysis by combining the two sets of variables in supermatrices and have examined the loadings of variables in both the sets. As in our earlier studies, we have here adopted the method of orthogonal rotation of the factors according to the varimax solution developed by Kaiser. The varimax rotation cleans up factors rather than variables. For each factor it tends to yield high loadings for a few variables.

We have chosen the combination of the factor model with the canonical correlation model, because there is one common bond between the two : the canonical correlation uses the same analytic method to display the structure of relationships across domains of measurement that the factor model uses for displaying the structure of relationships within a domain. "The factor model selects linear functions of tests that have maximum variances subject to restrictions of orthogonality. The canonical model selects linear functions that have maximum covariances between domains, subject again to restrictions of orthogonality."¹⁷

Media and the Psychological Variates

For the purpose of ascertaining the relationship between the media and the psychological domain of the voters we have chosen 22 variables. Degrees of exposure to 9 media forms have been treated as independent variables and 13 psychological variables constituting the voters' behaviour set have been treated as dependent variables. Exposure to the following media forms have been taken into consideration :

- (i) newspapers, (ii) advertisements, graffiti and posters,
- (iii) radio, (iv) television, (v) party pamphlets and leaflets,
- (vi) meetings and processions, (vii) door-to-door campaign,
- (viii) friends and acquaintances, and (ix) family.

For measuring the degree of exposure to the media we have used a Likert-type scale with the scale scores varying between 2 and 4. In the case of friends and acquaintances and family, instead of measuring the degree of exposure, we have, for obvious reasons, assessed the degree of influence on the voters. It must be pointed

out here that these media forms do not influence the voters' mind in isolation and as separate forms. Rather, usually they interact and their influence becomes mixed up.

The psychological variables examined are :

- (i) difficulty in decision making, (ii) political awareness, (iii) satisfaction with the performance of the central government, (iv) dissatisfaction with the performance of the central government, (v) dissatisfaction with the performance of the Left Front government, (vi) satisfaction with the performance of the Left Front government, (vii) expectation about the future, (viii) efficacy of political parties, (ix) belief in the legitimacy of the system, (x) sense of political efficacy, (xi) awareness of self as a political actor, (xii) partisan preference, and (xiii) partisan antipathy.

It may be noted here that in the supermatrices constructed with the independent and the dependent variables these dependent variables have been designated as variable numbers 10 to 22. The serial numbers of the independent variables have remained unchanged.

An analysis of the data presented in tables 1 and 2 reveals that all the media forms chosen by us were positively associated with the psychological variables that constituted the behaviour set in the case of both the left and the Congress (I) voters. It is of interest to note that both in the case of the left and the Congress (I) voters four canonical correlations have been found significant

Most of the authors who have worked on canonical correlations have regarded values less than ± 0.30 as trivial. Thus in the case of both the left and the Congress (I) voters – in each of the two elections studied – five correlations may be regarded as trivial. In the case of both the left and the Congress (I) voters outside Calcutta only three canonical correlations were trivial. One may thus safely infer that the media played a much more significant role outside Calcutta.

Factor Scores From the data presented in tables 3 to 6 it is quite obvious that the newspapers played the most important role both in the Corporation and the Lok Sabha elections in Calcutta. The part played by the advertisements, graffiti and posters was second in importance. But the role of the media was less important with the left voters at the time of the Lok Sabha election than at the time of the Corporation election.

TABLE 3
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX : LEFT FRONT—LOK SABHA ELECTION 1984

Variables	FACTORS											h^2
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX			
1	.0692	.2220	.0675	.1187	-.0872	.7136	.1847	-.0857	.1131			.64381
2	.0883	.1053	.0361	.8020	-.0653	.0933	-.0081	-.0710	.0577			.68473
3	-.0271	-.0745	.0315	.3284	-.0224	.7242	-.0033	-.0333	-.1112			.65351
4	-.0162	-.0070	-.0752	.8528	-.0142	.2260	.0202	.0170	-.0759			.79103
5	.2059	.0259	.0672	.2767	-.1004	-.2326	.0528	.0775	-.7124			.70458
6	-.0607	.6942	.1065	.1082	-.1131	.2008	-.0889	-.1840	-.0892			.61150
7	.1707	.8512	.1529	.0263	-.0930	.0514	-.0607	.0331	-.0394			.79522
8	-.0719	.6621	.0466	-.0139	-.0205	-.0800	.4728	-.0999	.1008			.69644
9	-.1348	-.0305	-.0389	.0233	-.0177	.1136	.9124	-.0041	.0145			.86712
10	-.1233	-.0688	-.1611	-.0290	.0129	-.1248	-.0466	.7778	-.1791			.70164
11	-.1258	-.1429	.1442	-.0257	.0240	.0348	.0168	.7517	.2275			.67646
12	.0779	.3190	-.3628	-.1391	.0418	.4571	-.2054	.3382	.0147			.62632
13	.6351	-.0755	.0774	.1243	-.0658	-.0474	-.3127	-.0575	.0740			.54369
14	.1015	-.0554	-.1487	-.0595	.8903	-.0346	-.0891	-.0122	-.0290			.84180
15	.2529	.1396	-.0270	.0310	-.8457	.0525	-.0789	-.0713	-.0876			.82205
16	.1129	.0060	.7970	-.0940	-.0430	.0097	-.0594	-.0296	-.1842			.69713
17	.0216	.0132	-.8819	-.0467	.0709	-.0390	-.0081	-.0340	-.0468			.79048
18	-.2420	.0345	.1068	-.2275	.0294	.2153	-.0986	-.0887	.7068			.68728
19	.7375	-.2506	-.0721	-.0874	-.0982	.0577	.1101	-.0910	-.2184			.70061
20	.7874	.2505	.1295	-.0475	.0684	.1325	-.0265	-.0821	-.0193			.73182
21	.7448	.1636	.0346	.1219	-.0253	-.0233	-.0164	-.0007	.0513			.60163
22	.5274	-.1202	-.1731	-.0373	-.1009	-.0932	-.1299	-.3623	.2353			.54629

TABLE 4
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX : CONGRESS (I) — LOK SABHA ELECTION 1984

Variables	FACTORS									h^2
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	
1	.8056	.0170	.1195	.1344	.0497	-.2642	.0358	-.0298	.0996	.76601
2	.7432	.0109	.0571	.1500	.0762	-.0401	.1032	-.1027	-.0147	.60708
3	.6666	.0335	.1048	-.2309	-.0081	.0363	.0098	.0912	-.1165	.53310
4	.3154	.0751	.3554	-.0236	.0167	.2332	.3495	.1510	-.3966	.58886
5	.0387	.1938	.5883	.0893	.0501	.1962	-.0870	.1585	.0677	.47139
6	.5691	-.1732	-.0225	.0495	.0405	.2172	-.0963	.1557	.4322	.62592
7	.0425	.0176	.2049	-.0952	.0777	-.0347	.1315	.0060	.8192	.74890
8	.0296	.0109	.0492	.0977	.1722	-.0809	.7778	-.0079	.0768	.66018
9	.0751	.0772	-.4517	.0084	-.0863	.0868	.6612	-.1239	.0161	.68348
10	-.0740	-.0841	-.1281	.0191	-.8367	.0192	-.0725	-.0803	.0436	.74336
11	-.0349	.0061	-.0096	.0575	-.8525	.0555	-.0450	.0074	-.1227	.75165
12	.1033	.2954	.1460	.5262	.0562	-.2602	-.1653	-.2760	-.0624	.57441
13	.1518	-.1656	.7351	.0278	.0056	-.1417	-.1027	-.0450	.0320	.62521
14	.1101	.8037	.0985	-.2214	.1145	.1041	.0687	.0213	.0064	.74595
15	.0942	-.8195	-.0536	.1489	.0102	-.0875	-.0319	-.0061	.0539	.71725
16	.0630	-.2065	-.0027	.8367	-.0091	.0038	.0907	.0539	.0252	.75852
17	.0313	.2792	-.0470	-.7864	.1188	-.0699	-.1001	-.1278	.0999	.75490
18	-.0711	.4224	-.1635	.1671	-.0218	.0853	-.0968	.6358	.1174	.67329
19	.0875	.0004	.3227	.0045	-.1328	-.6487	.1814	.1057	.1293	.61096
20	.1102	-.0690	.5405	-.0012	.1847	-.3465	.1105	-.0897	.1630	.51004
21	.0852	-.1592	.2218	-.0285	.1135	-.2615	-.0213	.7339	-.0763	.70885
22	.0266	-.2225	-.1315	.0257	.1907	-.7214	-.1459	.0910	-.0860	.66189

TABLE 5
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX : LEFT FRONT—CALCUTTA CORPORATION ELECTION 1985

Variables	FACTORS								h^2
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
1	.6633	-.0950	-.0557	.0061	.1709	-.2295	.1622	-.0488	.56276
2	.5493	-.2836	-.0033	-.0678	.0872	.1586	.2336	-.2287	.52645
3	.0960	-.0766	-.0521	-.0347	-.0501	-.0524	.8306	.1377	.73317
4	.0261	-.1407	.1046	-.0561	.7008	.0487	-.2528	.2980	.68083
5	.1091	.1766	-.0899	-.0260	.7966	.0286	.1317	-.1886	.74016
6	.1507	.1594	-.2931	-.0196	.2571	.2043	.3961	-.5120	.66128
7	-.0306	.3106	-.1584	-.0917	.2076	-.5062	.0651	.1755	.46525
8	-.0402	-.2361	-.0927	-.1641	.2545	.6620	-.2488	-.0410	.65952
9	-.0778	-.0172	.1492	.1049	.0085	.7416	.1587	.1631	.64136
10	-.1361	-.1452	.0169	.7580	-.0605	.0602	.0778	.0999	.63772
11	-.0263	-.0294	.0474	.8246	-.0244	-.0033	-.1151	.0048	.69770
12	-.0217	-.0818	.1134	-.0904	-.0859	-.0903	-.2412	-.7044	.59800
13	.7551	.0229	.0624	.0635	.0181	-.0947	.0036	-.1535	.61151
14	-.0020	-.2051	.8773	-.0309	.0276	.0280	-.0096	.0446	.81635
15	.1903	.0871	-.8412	-.1354	.0058	-.1650	.0804	.1046	.81449
16	.0514	.8281	-.1864	-.1592	.0046	-.0414	.0296	.0814	.75770
17	.0083	-.8072	.1636	.0350	-.0770	-.0342	.0832	.0582	.69711
18	-.1732	.3184	.1868	-.1747	.2957	-.2282	.2294	.0952	.39800
19	.6150	-.0295	-.0142	.0317	-.0039	-.0130	-.0849	.2259	.43867
20	.7304	.1318	-.1108	-.1398	-.0086	.0993	.0394	-.0915	.60247
21	.5850	.1429	-.1752	-.2458	-.0900	.0313	-.0046	.1483	.48484
22	.4121	-.2810	-.1971	-.3030	-.3232	.0221	-.0713	.2254	.54025

TABLE 6
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX : CONGRESS (I) — CALCUTTA CORPORATION ELECTION 1985

Variables	FACTORS								h^2
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	
1	.7255	-.1433	-.1204	-.0167	-.0957	.0597	.0126	-.1585	.59962
2	.6305	.2336	.1101	.0680	.1461	-.0486	-.1616	.1515	.54156
3	.3149	.1649	-.2913	.1256	-.0034	-.2774	-.3353	.2958	.50391
4	.0140	-.0052	.0102	-.1225	.0274	.0329	-.8760	-.0193	.78489
5	-.0207	.1131	.0381	.0021	.6187	.2188	-.2464	.1856	.54051
6	.1334	-.1066	.0309	.0553	.7726	.0972	.0361	.0019	.64082
7	.2728	-.1004	.0693	-.0708	.1392	.0091	.0545	-.4290	.30077
8	-.0657	.0304	-.2067	-.0601	.6670	-.3055	.1256	-.2492	.66764
9	-.3950	.2508	-.0658	.0949	.1588	-.2572	-.1781	-.4900	.59552
10	-.0287	-.1053	.7970	.0165	-.0013	-.1436	.0246	.0205	.66905
11	-.1087	-.0735	.7560	.0671	-.0465	.0926	.0016	-.1159	.61752
12	-.0001	.0720	.1443	.2840	-.2682	.2309	.0292	-.5914	.58253
13	.7940	-.1549	-.0137	-.0569	.0238	.0761	.1941	-.0714	.70374
14	-.0960	.7204	-.2679	-.2507	.0360	-.0424	-.0912	-.0148	.67454
15	.0740	-.7754	.1087	.1946	.1005	-.0081	-.0617	.0057	.67045
16	.0038	-.1869	-.0555	.8649	.0566	-.0030	.0167	-.1023	.79996
17	-.0207	.1811	-.1084	-.8705	.0294	-.0405	-.0918	-.0198	.81404
18	-.1614	.4830	.1874	.0616	.2000	.4051	.1323	.3974	.67777
19	.4481	-.0927	-.1130	.0214	-.0047	.3312	-.2993	.0449	.42398
20	.5436	-.0436	-.3712	.0131	.1248	.0808	-.2777	-.0638	.53869
21	.1992	-.0575	-.1353	.0364	.0838	.8090	-.0380	-.0931	.73426
22	-.0135	-.5200	-.4466	.0560	-.0261	.2369	.0580	.0302	.53425

In the factor matrix of the left voters for the Lok Sabha election there is not a single independent variable with a very high or high loading on the first factor. It should be mentioned here that in our earlier studies we had taken $\pm .20$ as the limit of significance in the sense that $\pm .20$ and lower values were treated as insignificant. But here we have combined canonical correlation with factor analysis, and in canonical correlation, as we have already noted, usually $\pm .30$ is taken as the limit of significance. So while interpreting the factor matrices also we are treating $\pm .30$ and lower values as insignificant. In this study, as in our earlier ones, loadings between $\pm .30$ and $\pm .50$ are regarded as moderate, loadings between $\pm .50$ and $\pm .70$ as high and those above $\pm .70$ as very high.

In the case of the left voters three independent variables have very high positive loadings in the Lok Sabha election : exposure to door-to-door campaign, advertisements, graffiti and posters, and tv, if we take into consideration the first five factors which account for 63.41 per cent of the total variance. Of these three, again, the score of door-to-door campaign is the highest, its loading being .8512 on the second factor. On this factor two other independent variables have high positive loadings : meetings and processions (.6942) and friends and acquaintances (.6621). In the case of the left voters, newspapers do have a very high positive loading (.7136), but this is noted only on the sixth factor.

In the Calcutta Corporation election, however, newspapers have a high positive loading (.6633) in the matrix for the left voters on the first factor. Advertisements, graffiti and posters have a high loading (.5493) on the first factor. Television and pamphlets and leaflets have very high positive loadings (.7009 and .7966 respectively) on the fifth factor.

The picture outside Calcutta was somewhat different. Meetings and processions, and door-to-door campaign have very high positive loadings on the first factor (.7606 and .7435), while radio has a high positive loading (.6510) on the first factor, and friends and acquaintances and family have moderate loadings (.3901 and .4984) on the second factor.

Role of the communication media was much more important in the case of the Congress (I) voters in Calcutta, particularly in the

Lok Sabha election. Exposure to newspapers (.8056) and advertisements, graffiti and posters (.7432) have very high positive loadings on the first factor of the Congress (I) voters. Radio as well as meetings and processions also played important roles in the communication process. They have high positive loadings on the first factor (.6666 and .5691 respectively). Another independent variable—the tv—has a positive moderate loading on the first factor. Though positive, it is nearly insignificant (.3154). In fact, it has a positive loading on the third factor also, that too near the lower limit (.3554). Pamphlets and leaflets published by the Congress (I) also played some role. This variable has a high positive loading (.5883) on the third factor. In the Congress (I) matrix the first five factors account for 64.37 per cent of the total variance. But all the loadings of all the other independent variables on the fourth and the fifth factors are trivial. It may be mentioned here that family has a moderate negative loading on the third factor (— .4517).

In the Corporation election also family has a negative loading. (— .3950) in the Congress (I) matrix, but here it is on the first factor. On this factor, three independent variables have positive loadings — newspapers, advertisements, graffiti and posters, and radio. The loading of radio, however, is near the borderline of significance (.3149). The loadings of the two other variables are more than double the loading of radio — newspapers have a very high positive loading on the first factor (.7255), while advertisements, graffiti and posters have a high positive loading (.6305).

So far as the Congress (I) voters outside Calcutta are concerned, only one variable — meetings and processions — has a positive loading on the first factor and that too only marginally significant (.3495). On the second factor, however, newspapers, and advertisements, graffiti and posters have very high positive loadings (.7635 and .8261), while radio has a high positive loading (.6643) on the same factor.

From the foregoing analysis one may safely conclude that some communication media were positively associated with the psychological variables of both the left and the Congress (I) voters. But the degree of association at the time of the Corporation election was different from that at the time of the Lok Sabha election. Moreover,

the set of media forms which played a significant role at the time of the Corporation election was different from the set which was important at the time of the Lok Sabha election. In the case of the left voters, door-to-door campaign, meetings and processions, friends and acquaintances played significant roles at the time of the Lok Sabha election. Of the two state-owned media agencies — radio and tv — the former was more important for the Congress (I) voters and much less important for the left voters.

The supermatrices clearly indicate that exposure to different media forms was closely associated with different psychological orientations of both the types of voters in both the elections. If we take into consideration only the first factor which is the most important one, it is found that sense of political efficacy, awareness of self as a political actor and partisan preference had very high loadings (.7375, .7874 and .7448 respectively) for the left voters in the Lok Sabha election. Dissatisfaction with the central government and partisan antipathy also had high loadings (.6351 and .5274 respectively) on the same factor. Exactly the same attitudinal variables were prominent in the Corporation election for the left voters, though the loadings were somewhat different. It appears that the communication media stimulated, consistently, these well-set orientations in the case of the left voters.

The pattern for the Congress (I) voters was somewhat different. In the Lok Sabha election psychological orientations have only trivial loadings on the first factor for them. But in the civic election, three psychological variables do have positive loadings on the first factor. It is of interest to note that the loading for dissatisfaction with the central government was very high in the civic election, not only for the left voters but also for the Congress (I) voters. Perhaps a particularly disparaging remark about Calcutta made by the prime minister could account for this apparently surprising attitude of the Congress (I) voters. However, if one looks at the factor matrices one finds that dissatisfaction with the central government was quite strong even for the Congress (I) voters in the Lok Sabha election also. This could suggest that all the Congress (I) voters are not necessarily happy about the centre's attitude of neglect towards West Bengal.

High loadings of some of the dependent variables show that the impact of the communication media was dependent, in the main, on the nature of the source, the orientations of the audience and the message presented. The campaign organizers have to remember that the primary function of an election campaign is to bring about the coincidence between man's practical and cognitive activities. "Man's practical and cognitive activities are interlinked and simultaneously do not coincide, being somewhat independent and possessing specific distinctions." Cognition, which is inseparably connected with activity, is "directed at the social world surrounding people and at their own inner world."¹⁸ Election campaign by different political parties and individuals increases the cohesive character of the linkage and thereby reduces the gap between knowledge and activity. The better the quantity and the quality of campaign, the more efficacious is its role.

The campaign process being essentially a question of information transmission, the distinction between the quantity and the quality of campaign is exactly similar to that between the quantity and the quality of information. Regarding this distinction between the two forms of information a Chinese scholar has correctly pointed out :

...information can be divided into three levels : semantics (meaning), syntax (structure) and pragmatics (practicality). The "quality" of information refers to the content of information on the semantic and pragmatic levels, while the "quantity" of information refers to the content on the syntactic level. These three levels are organically linked together, thereby constituting the "information object."¹⁹

Though some media play highly significant roles in the campaign process judged from the qualitative standpoint, nobody can deny the close relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of an election campaign. In fact, quality in many cases is actually dependent on the quantity. And the quantity in the ultimate analysis is dependent on those who control the levers of society.

The enormous advances in the communication techniques have tempted the owners of means of production to use these techniques to "influence 'public opinion', and to intervene much more directly

in the shaping of consciousness."²⁰ As Marx and Engels pointed out in *The German Ideology*, the owners of the means of material production also control the means of mental production :

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas : i. e., the class which is the ruling *material* force of society is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it.²¹

Two points of interest must be borne in mind in this context : (a) some media forms are relatively free, than others, from the overall control of the existing ruling forces in the sense that forms like face-to-face contact can transmit ideas not circulated by the owners of the means of production ; and (b) even those not in power can participate significantly in the communication process provided they are properly organized. Obviously, the media cannot tell the people what to think. But "they do tell the public what to think about. What is reported enters the public agenda."²² Moreover, multi-step communication process is of special significance in an election campaign. Even a person who may have never seen a newspaper would accept a piece of information on the authority of the printed word, though it has been received immediately from some other source. The public agenda therefore expands. Thus even in a country like India, where the vast majority of the people are illiterate, the newspapers and newspaper advertisements do play a positive role in an election campaign. One can easily predict the very important role to be played by the tv in the foreseeable future. In West Bengal media forms like door-to-door campaign, meetings and processions, posters and graffiti still play highly significant roles in the case of the left parties, because the Left Front is a much more organized force than the Congress (I). The Left Front is generally found to have a net campaign advantage, through the mediated multi-step communication process, mainly because of the superiority of its organizational network:



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American Elites on the Soviet Union

US-SOVIET RELATIONS blossomed for a while in the early 1970s. But soon they ran into difficulties. With the advent of President Reagan, it seemed that a new cold war was beginning all over again. What has been the significance of detente, its failure, and Reaganism? How does the future of US-Soviet relations look from America? These were some of the queries which formed part of the series of interviews which were conducted by the author in the USA during October 1985 to March 1986. The results are presented below. They form part of a larger research project on the US elite perception of the Soviet Union.

A total of 30 elites were interviewed, coast-to-coast, in America (of which two interviews were on a different aspect of US foreign policy; however, since certain questions overlapped, the responses to them have been included here). The relevant views of two more were noted in the course of their formal presentations and subsequent interaction. This brings the total sample to 32. Besides the east and the west coasts, interviews were carried out in the deep south and the mid-west.

Professionally, the sample comprised academics (20), US government officials (9), and 3 others (intellectuals and journalists). Some of the academics and intellectuals have had experience in various capacities as administrators in and outside the US government as well. Among the interviewees, at least twelve were 'hard core' specialists on Soviet politics, comprising both academics and government officials. Two others were experts in Russian and Soviet literature and history. The mix of experts on the Soviet Union and non-expert intellectuals with definite impressions of US-Soviet relations was intended to broaden the response base.

The purpose of this exercise was to retrieve at first hand the current images of the Soviet Union and America's Soviet policy

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in the Reagan era, images which intelligent, educated and expert Americans had in their minds. Any interview dealing with an entire country yields a partial picture. Imbalances in this case, however, can be corrected by the use of the voluminous printed materials on the Soviet Union and its relations with the USA, both official and non-official, which are available. This, therefore, is a preliminary approach to the problem under investigation.

Also the questions asked in the interviews were often typically third world, Indian in any case. This, it is hoped, will create a fresh perspective. The interview based on nine standard questions (slightly compressed to eight here) was an open one. Long-hand notes were taken during an average of nearly one hour per session. Each respondent was encouraged to speak freely as long as he wanted, even to criticize some of the questions themselves, with no interruptions. Each question served as an orientation point for organizing thought. Much of the colourful American imagery and idioms has been retained to render the original flavour of the responses as well as to provide insight into American cultural and thought processes. The interviews confirm some of the points which are already known to the experts in India, and they do so at first hand. Once in a while they reveal, however, an unusual angle which may surprise even the experts. Finally, the responses have been integrated for reasons of parsimony and to comply with a few "off-the-records-please" requests.

Question One : What are your views on the detente policy pursued by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger towards the Soviet Union ? More specifically, what were the goals of that policy, what was accomplished, and why did it fail ?

Nixon and Kissinger were not particularly dovish ; in fact, they were cold warriors. For them detente was "containment by other means." Nixon wanted domestic applause, and it worked. The Vietnam war divided US domestic opinion. Hence, it was important for Nixon and Kissinger to distract people by showing success with Moscow. But they did not believe what they said. A cold warrior, Nixon's detente policy suggested the artificiality of his motive as well as pragmatism. The latter element is the US ethos as seen, for example, in business, i. e., we got to deal with the people.

Kissinger wanted to involve Moscow in a series of relations ("network", "web of relationships") with the USA, economic, political, arms control. This would make Moscow more dependent on the west for technology and trade. Such dependence in turn would moderate Soviet behaviour.

In arms control a major goal was to stabilize US-Soviet nuclear relations. This was because the Soviets had achieved nuclear parity, Nixon and Kissinger aspired to achieve relations with the Soviet Union that would become "more predictable." Since the Soviets had achieved nuclear parity and the US was bogged down in the Vietnam war, detente became the strategy recognizing the Soviet-generated military momentum. That is, if the US gave the USSR recognition as an equal as well as economic incentives, that structure might contain Moscow. The US opening to China was meant to be a further restraint on the Soviet drive for expansion of power.

The US picture of the Soviet leaders is that they are "slightly paranoid." So, if a reasonable detente could be achieved with them, e.g., in arms control, Europe, and in other realms, the Soviets would cool down. It is fashionable to talk in the US of your relations with your psychiatrist, if you are rich enough. *Commentary* and other magazines, for example, talk of the Soviet "mind" and use other psychological terms like "inferiority complex" when describing the Soviets. So the US thinking was that if we accepted them, they would calm down. If allowed to meet Americans on equal terms, the Soviets would feel good !

Nixon was "very good at foreign policy", unlike many other US presidents. Nixon and Kissinger had "vision." They wanted to adjust the decline of US power by opening to the USSR.

"The whole word (detente) is discredited." People used it as a "shorthand" who did not understand it, to mean that the Soviets would not push revolutions any longer, that the Jews could easily migrate from the Soviet Union, and so on.

"You assume it (detente) existed." Detente was "overly ambitious", "overestimated", "oversold", "unrealistic" and showed a "flawed conception." It resulted in heightened expectations (which

were not fulfilled). However, it did achieve a few years of reduced tension (between the superpowers). It regulated US-Soviet relations and those of post-war Europe.

The Soviet behaviour during the October 1973 war in the middle east showed the limits of detente. Moscow was unwilling to cooperate with the USA towards a ceasefire early in that war. Kissinger's policy was to get Moscow out of the middle east, which the Soviets in turn resented. The US overestimated its ability to stop Soviet competitive gains in the third world. Along with a growing feeling in the US that detente gave America a false sense of security while it gave military power to Moscow, it fed dissidence, e. g., the Committee on present Danger. While the Soviets did not abide by 'the rules of the game', the Nixon Administration failed to get domestic support, i.e., it failed to carry sufficiently public opinion and bureaucracy.

Arms control rested on "unsustainable premises." To Moscow military power was "fundamental." Hence there were, "good reasons to believe" that the policy would fail.

Moscow was interested in "selective", "limited" detente, unlike the US. The latter's conception of detente was reflected in Kissinger's 'linkage' policy. While the Soviets viewed detente in terms of insulated competitive and collaborative tracks, the US sought to couple the two. The US refused to face the fact that Moscow could project force overseas in the 1970s. It also thought such forced projection in traditional areas of western influence as "off limits." Some of these problems grew out of the ambiguity of detente.

"Detente was unusual", its failure not so. Historically, the US-Soviet rivalry and the lack of mutual trust have been facts of life. The US with its detente policy wanted to "educate" Moscow, "make it civilized" like us. When that did not happen, the hard-liners said, "You don't negotiate with a hoodlum, you punch him out!"

Kissinger was a realpolitik practitioner who did not trust the American people. He complained that he was never given the tools with which to conduct detente. His carrot-and-stick policy

was undermined within the US itself. On the carrot side, economic ties, investments, the most-favoured-nation status (MFN) for Moscow, the latter's good credit with the Exim Bank, etc. were undercut by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. On the stick side, the impact of Vietnam was seen in the Clark amendment which tied US hands for aid to the UNITA in Angola in 1975. Further, Kissinger, even in his memoirs, seemed unaware that Moscow wanted recognition as a superpower. The Soviets read into detente that the US had granted them political and strategic equality but, despite the joint statements (issued in the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings), Nixon and Kissinger did not appreciate that.

While the US needed a settlement in Vietnam, the Soviets needed the stabilization of the postwar situation in central Europe (i.e., Yalta and arms control), especially that of the German question. Once these needs were met, the stakes changed and became competitive. So detente was successful at the beginning, but then declined. The collapse of Iran, the (US) hostage crisis there, and Afghanistan discredited the Carter Administration just as fear of Soviet power, Vietnam and Watergate had discredited the Nixon Administration. "Soviet behaviour undercut the credibility of architects of detente" like Marshal Shulman.

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 At least two respondents expressed an unqualified dislike for Nixon. "If I were to imagine what the devil was like, I'd think of Nixon." He was "vain, had inferiority complex, and persecuted others. He was a crook, not a master thief but a petty crook."

The opinions of Kissinger were of mixed admiration.

- 2 The mode average opinion on detente was that Nixon and Kissinger wanted to involve Moscow in a series of relationships in order to modify Soviet behaviour.
- 3 The mode average opinion on the failure of detente was that it was blown out of proportions.
- 4 The conscious or not-so-conscious use of psychological categories ("paranoia", "calming down", "behaviour", etc.) to

describe the Kremlin's leadership was peculiarly American. It reflected perhaps as much of the social reality of the USA as the alleged political reality of the Soviet Union.

- 5 Another more average opinion was that the Third World played a key role in the collapse of detente. The US did not approve of the Soviet expansionist drive there. Frequently mentioned were the following countries and regions in crisis: Angola, the African Horn (Ethiopia), Afghanistan and Kampuchea. A further latter-day evidence was cited as the alleged Soviet support extended to Nicaragua via Cuba.
- 6 Several US Government officials sidetracked somewhat the failure of detente and highlighted the importance of US-Soviet dialogue (under the Reagan Administration). This attitude was probably explained by the fact that the interviews with them took place in between the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva and the upcoming second one (Reykjavik).

Question 2: What are the factors which are holding up a normalization of US-Soviet relations?

Long-standing historical factors are responsible. Historical animosity between the US and the Soviet Union cannot die quickly. There is the continuation of Soviet efforts to expand in this (American) hemisphere. So long as the Soviets support governments and movements hostile to the USA, e.g., Cuba and Nicaragua, "we also do whatever we can" to make their lives "miserable" in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

A factor on the US side has been the inability of the presidents to manage public opinion on relations with Moscow. The insecurity posed by nuclear arms gets commingled with the insecurity of both actors as global powers. "Profound" differences in the domestic social organization and ideology of the two powers, i.e., socialism vs. capitalism, as well as the cold war are some of the reasons.

When the US was prepared to deal with Moscow, the latter was not. Now the Soviet Union is perhaps prepared, "but I'm not sure we are." However, Moscow has a stake in developing relations with the USA. The Soviets portrayed the Geneva summit as a

success. They wanted to give Reagan a stake in calling the summit a success. They would like to restrain 'Star Wars' (the Strategic Defence Initiative or SDI), given their domestic problems and disadvantage in hi-tech SDI competition. Gorbachev wants detente to forestall SDI. The Soviet extractive industry or labour force is no longer that ample ; so SDI is the last thing they need. Gorbachev has said that 4 per cent growth in GNP is needed for across-the-board growth, including security. This is impossible unless serious changes are introduced in the Soviet economic structure. In March 1977 the Soviets had flatly rejected President Carter's proposal of 25 per cent missile cuts. Now they have proposed 50 per cent cuts (which corresponded to an earlier Reagan Administration proposal). This shows they have need for such cuts. The Central Intelligence Agency has stated that the Soviets had slower military procurement during 1977-83 than was believed in the USA.

The US "persistently" overestimates Soviet military strength. The US estimates take the maximum or worst case into account. For example, the Mig-25 Foxbat flown to Japan (in the mid-1970s) turned out to be a lot less than expected of its performance. The Soviet Union is confronted by a host of military forces and countries. Comparing the US-Soviet military balance without taking these into account is useless. We think Moscow is paranoid, but how would the US behave if Mexico and Canada were hostile neighbours ?

The US-Soviet rivalry is a "natural, balance-of-power" rivalry. A certain amount of irrationality is "normal" in US-Soviet relations and international relations. The US feels that Moscow is out to conquer or dominate other areas. The Soviets also have "a lot of weapons" largely aimed against the US. And "the only way these weapons won't go off is by aiming our weapons against them. "Since there is mutual paranoia, each is afraid of making concessions to the other. The US military is "deeply suspicious" (of Moscow). Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has observed that the Soviet military buildup is aimed at a "world empire." The Soviet Union is a constantly expansive power—this is the American view. When the Soviet Union deploys the SS-20s (in Europe), it should know that (such act) would provoke a "strong reaction."

The Soviets "have a compulsion" to maintain "an extraordinary high level of military force." They have also been willing to use

that force to justify their "internationalist duty." On some occasions it was not clear why they used it. The paranoid Soviet view is that equal military power means having a force equal to all the adversary forces combined. The Soviet Communist Party is a continuation of the Tsarist system. The Soviets are a "very secretive, difficult, concealing, very very suspicious major power."

The Soviet Union "is an extremely closed system." Its political elites do not trust their own people and those of other states. There are also language barriers between the US and the Soviet Union. One "constant" problem of the US is that it is "extremely difficult" for its leaders to understand what Moscow does. Russian history or society is not an "intelligent" part of the US school curriculum. Funding for the study of the Soviet Union from the US Government and foundation ebbed out in the 1970s, although it is returning since about 1980, in the wake of the Afghan and Polish crises. The National Education Act (formerly the National Defence Education Act) is relevant here.

Another roadblock to normalization is the US political structure itself, which prevents granting concessions to Moscow. This is seen in the attitude of the rightwing of the Republican Party and the rightwing in the USA generally (e.g., the fundamentalist Christian right as represented by Reverend Jerry Falwell) along with a generally pervasive feeling that Moscow cannot be trusted. For instance, 60 per cent of the population of Oklahoma is southern Baptist, i.e., fundamentalist, for whom Russia is evil. Probably the military thinks the same way. The kind of regime that Moscow has, is suspect. Russian or Soviet autocracy was never exposed to individual freedom.

If 'normalization' means 1972 (when the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow took place, and spawned the SALT I and ABM treaties and led the way to many other agreements), "I don't think that's going to happen." Many important leaders in Washington DC are opposed to detente. They prefer unilateral approaches, e.g., military buildup, looking after national security interests etc., and do not believe that treaties ensure national security. Nixon was different from Reagan in this respect, although both are Republicans. Kissinger had completely underestimated the Soviet defence buildup.

The Reagan Administration sees the world as a zero-sum game (in relation to Moscow), even though it looks like the Soviets are going to do some normalizing. Carter had begun to think the Reagan way in his last year in office (due to Afghanistan).

Of course, Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT II and issued a joint statement adhering to the Basic Principles agreement of 1972. But Reagan would not do that. The joint statement from the Geneva summit between Reagan and Gorbachev did not mention it, nor was there any report that it had been discussed. In a sense, US-Soviet relations have a degree of "normalization", which does not mean they are very good.

'Normal relations' with Moscow are of "considerable difficulty", not only for Americans but also for the Norwegians, Swedes, the West Germans, Turks, etc. "What normal means, I don't know" (admitted an official of the State Department). If "normalization" means "warmer" more "quantitative" relations, then several factors are preventing them. Moscow does not have the currency to buy US goods, to engage in big-scale trade with the USA. The US put limits to hi-tech transfers to the Soviet Union. On a political plane, Moscow supports 'national liberation' *movements* which, for the US, are "terrorist organizations." Observed an official of the US Information Agency : "A Soviet friend once told me : if the US would just stop stereotyping the Soviet Union through its journalists and academics as the devil, relations would improve. I replied : the objective reality would not change even if the US media were kindly disposed towards the Soviet Union." Some of the hard facts of that reality are : Soviet troops in east Europe ; Soviet violation of human rights agreements sanctioned in Helsinki, e.g., its citizens are not allowed to travel freely and ideas are not allowed to flow unhampered ; the Soviet "behaviour" in Afghanistan, etc.

The prospects for a return to detente are "low". But there is no real crisis anywhere like Berlin or the middle east in earlier decades. Even if normalization took place, "they won't call it that (detente), knowing it's a bad word." "If I had to bet my money, I'd say no (prospects)."

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 Many respondents seemed puzzled by the word "normalization" in the context of US-Soviet relations. They were visibly uncomfortable in approaching a response to the question.
- 2 Opinion was sharply divided on whether Soviet military power posed an active threat to US national security.
- 3 The third world again intruded. A frequently mentioned road block to a normalization of bilateral relations was stated to be the ongoing Soviet involvement there.

Question 3 : Which of the US Government Departments have been, and continue to be, an obstacle to better US-Soviet relations, e.g., the CIA, Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), National Security Council (NSC), etc. ?

It is not that one department or the other is a hurdle. It depends on who heads the departments. White House-appointed subordinates may influence a department's standpoint. A department's thinking also changes from one administration to another. Again, it was the Congress which was angry over the Soviet military and foreign moves in the 1970s, not the bureaucracy. In the Kennedy Administration Dean Rusk was the State Secretary while Robert McNamara was the Defence Secretary. Even though he headed Defence, the latter turned against the Vietnam war subsequently. In the Reagan Administration, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is the hawkish Kenneth Adelman. Hence, from a major advocate of arms control, the ACDA has become a major obstacle. The roles of many key Congressional committees under the Reagan Administration have been transformed. The Joint Chiefs are uniformed staff but do not want to get involved in a limited war without full public support. This is partly due to the lessons of Vietnam. The military may have been an obstacle in the early 1970s but not under Carter, when they supported SALT. Elements within the military may have had problems. Brzezinski's NSC was hardline, not CIA or others. In the Reagan era, the DoD is "clearly the odd man out." Weinberger did not join Reagan in the summit at Geneva (nor at Reykjavik — author) and had even written to the president not to

give in on SALT II and other arms control points. Reagan's JCS is less dogmatic than Weinberger or his assistant, Richard Perle. On the other hand, Reagan called the Soviet Union "evil empire", and yet held summit with Gorbachev.

Probably the DoD (in the Reagan era) is a hurdle. "Others don't play, I think, any significant role". Even the whole of Defence may not be anti-Soviet, but Weinberger is. The latter represents "dangerous civilian zealotry". The CIA, led by Bill Casey, who shares Weinberger's views, is, however, not a powerful political body. The CIA as a whole is not an obstacle. In fact, the CIA had underestimated Soviet power unlike the DoD. Donald Regan is another conservative. Not institutions but individuals within these are obstacles, like Adelman, Charles Wick (Director of the USIA), some Congressmen, and so on. Defence and State are "institutionally" set up in such a way that while the former tends not to be friendly (towards Moscow), the latter does. Commerce and Agriculture tend to be "prodetentish" because it is their function (to cooperate). All of Reagan's advisers do not speak in one voice. So the President decides. Reagan's NSC chief (at the time) McFarlane was not as strong as some of his predecessors and was low on geographic knowledge in any case. The NSC collectively took the hardest line "we ever had", but still was more balanced than the DoD (under the Reagan Administration).

The CIA "makes trouble for us". Defence is very military-minded and "overstress" the Soviet danger. The Soviet government is also an obstacle. American and Soviet academics are not looking for truth, but keeping their jobs. In the US "we are supposed to be individuals", but everything is in government hands. So is the case in Soviet Russia.

There is not much difference among the US government departments (on the Soviet Union). Any difference is one of "style", not substance. There is much more agreement (among the departments) on the Soviet Union than it "superficially" appears (said an NSC official born in India!).

Even though DoD and the JCS are "absolutely opposed to arms control", they also favour restraint in US intervention in the third

world, e.g., in Central America. So, even though the DoD is maximizing Soviet threat, it is cautious when it comes to using arms. The State Department favours arms control but also favours military intervention in the third world. On terrorism, Shultz has been more hawkish than Weinberger.

Carter and his NSC chief Brzezinski disagreed very often. The smooth relations between Nixon and Kissinger was an exception.

In the Reagan Administration there is no internal unity on how to deal with the Soviet Union. Reagan brought in unhappy people like Paul Nitze who wanted to be tough on Moscow. But these people had little in common when it came to working out the details. There are the "squeezers" (explained Professor Alexander George of Stanford), e.g., Perle, Ikle, Weinberger. They think in terms of how to minimize damage allegedly created by any US concessions to the Soviet Union. Then there are the "dealers" (continued the professor) like Shultz, *et al.*, who are not soft on Moscow, yet would want to seriously explore the possibility of agreements useful to the USA. The proposal to cut 50 per cent of the strategic nuclear arms did not enjoy a broad consensus in the Administration. So the struggle within the latter goes on. Noone is strong enough in the White House to control inter-agency squabbles. Richard Allen was null, had to work through (Edwin) Meese. State Secretary Haig had difficulties. 'Judge' Clark had little experience in international relations but had access to Reagan. He played the role of an honest broker but was probably exhausted. McFarlane knew arms control but got tired when Chief of Staff Donald Regan messed him up.

Reagan is not Nixon or Carter, and depends on policy advice. "He is not an activist in policy matters."

(A respondent in the mid-west with a background of the deep south explained): "People's will in the US is upheld since this is a democracy. And people here are anti-Soviet."

The following were the responses of US Government officials:

State Department official: "It's a nonsensical question." The military-industrial complex (theory) is "just noise." The military

in the US is "very weary" of the other (super) power. The military tends to be "very censervative, very sensitive to risk, cost and uncertainty." It was a "reluctant participant" when the Marines were sent to the Lebanon and again in the invasion of Grenada. The reasons were our inability to control the environment and lack of resources. "There are people for whom the Soviet Union is the devil, but I don't know how they are distributed across the (US) bureaucracy." "There are some crazies in the State Department too." *USIA official*: "Taking devils like the CIA or the NSC is stereotyping, not real." The military are "cautious." Yes, they are promoting bigger budgets but the biggest spender is civilian, i.e., Weinberger.

NSC official: There is much agreement (among the US Government Departments) on the Soviet Union than it "superficially" appears. "There is such a thing as US national interest. (So) it's an artificial question."

State Department official: The US Government is "like an octopus", it is "slippery where the policy is going to be made."

OBSERVATIONS:

- 1 The mode average reaction was that no such generalization over time was possible. In the Reagan era, an important obstacle was the Defence Department.
- 2 Another frequent opinion was that the US military was very cautious in making use of arms.
- 3 The US Government officials from State, NSC and USIA reacted rather more strongly to this question than other, non-government respondents.
- 4 Although the CIA and the Pentagon (DoD) enjoy a hawkish and sinister image in India (and elsewhere), which is played up by communist propaganda, it was rather startling to know that knowledgeable Americans, coast-to-coast, honestly entertained a completely different notion of these Departments.

Question 4: Do you think that marxist ideology has any relevance in Soviet foreign policy ?

Soviet foreign policy is "essentially opportunistic", empty, and involves a lot of phrase-mongering. Overall Soviet ideology, its Gestalt, is based on a "series of assumptions" which are marxian. But when an opportunity comes along, the Soviets grab it and then rationalize it by ideology.

Moscow projects itself as the great hope of mankind, hooked on marxist-leninist ideas. Now to back off would be disastrous. Soviet political elites stand "only to gain" by using marxist-leninist ideology. And they use it constantly. Ideology is not "a real driving force" in the Soviet Union. Its "religious fervour" is nonexistent. There are very few "true believers" left. Ideology (in the Soviet Union) "has sort of run out of steam." It has less and less relevance in the "great sweep of Soviet foreign policy." "In my experience, directly dealing with Soviet scholars," observed Dr Carl Rosberg of the University of California, Berkeley, they no longer think there is a direct model for modernization in the third world, given the reality of power and resources. They are far more flexible in their thinking than, say, 20 years ago.

If ideology means that Moscow has a "blueprint" for handling international relations written by Marx or Lenin, then no (it is not relevant). "In some overall preception of the universe, in a very general sense," ideology is meaningful. "All it does is to provide the crayons which (in turn) provide the colouration," i.e., "a rationalization of policies." Further, Soviet ideology does not have "any noticeable appeal" beyond its borders.

"No, none!" Ideology is a "veneer". The Soviets have used military force in the postwar period "almost exclusively against communist states. It's a curious kind of marxism." Moscow also supported Marcos, which was hardly marxist policy. It plays "the role of a great power." Some of its foreign policy aims are traditional, e.g., outlet via the Black Sea, defence of its frontiers, and so on

Even without ideology, the US and Russia would be at odds. De Tocqueville had predicted that. Ideology reinforced the contradiction. All marxist-leninist societies in the world "are economic failures." "The only thing marxism-leninism produces in amplitude are refugees."

A more serious view of ideology was also in circulation :

The Soviets look at the rest of the world through their value system. They think "in patterns and boxes." Ideology is relevant because any type of (political) movement needs a source of legitimation. It was christianity for Russia before, marxism for the Soviet Union now. Also, it gets them allies. The idea of a marxist-leninist party taking over, for instance, serves ideology as well as ensures strong ties in an otherwise unpredictable third world. It enhances the Soviet means of control. It does not determine Soviet foreign policy but affects Soviet priorities. Marxism influences Soviet decisions on the revolutions they are going to support. However, ideology is also conditioned by realpolitik and caution.

"It has a lot of relevance." It creates a "basic mind set." Not marxism but marxist-leninist ideology is a better characterization of the Soviet tradition. It involves "normative commitments" to make the world safe for socialism by fighting imperialism. The soviet heritage contains philosophical assumptions about history, that change is to be expected, ultimately in the direction of progress. These assumptions do predispose the Soviets to optimism. For them, the world is divided into socialism vs. imperialism. So all this influences Soviet foreign policy. But in the nuclear age these considerations have also been attenuated. The nuclear age has affected their vigour to pursue socialism. The "zigzag" course of the third world is another conditioning factor ; neither superpower can control that world.

Yes, ideology is important. "It's a mistake to assume" that ideology plays no role at all. Ideology plays an important role in US foreign policy too. The Soviet attitude towards the USA reflects marxist eschatology.

Soviet international "behavior", not policy, has two strands : one, the international department of the central committee of the Soviet communist party, and two, the foreign ministry. So party and state interests interplay. The state interests are non-ideological. But the party does have "an ideological interest." Often the two are incompatible. The party often wins out, but not always. The international department is more important than the foreign ministry.

A more mixed type of reaction was as follows :

Ideology is relevant but not as Marx described it. It is the Soviet variety of ideology, i.e., marxist-leninist. It is almost indistinguishable from national self-interest, even though it plays a role.

"Yes, but." "No doubt" ideology influences fundamental Soviet interpretation of the world. *But that does not help predict* their foreign policy in any detail. They know they have to live with capitalism, even if the latter is doomed. So other considerations do play a part in Soviet foreign policy. They will not take risks when the chances are not good. Much of the Soviet interest in the third world stems from marxist doctrine. Most of Soviet foreign policy actions may be explained, however, in security terms. Moscow still thinks in terms of capitalism vs. socialism, national liberation against the west, eliminating the imperialist yoke, and so forth. "Within that framework" of marxist-leninist ideology they are "engaged in great-power politics," in geopolitics. Moscow is more heavy-handed in dealing with other states than the USA.

"In places you even have competing marxist ideologies depending on who pursues them." In Afghanistan, for instance, the Soviets have imposed an "ideological structure." The marxist movement there was "marginal," yet Moscow turned it into a major structure, which the Afghans find "hard to swallow." So, the relevance of ideology is there, at least the Soviets preach it with vigour.

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 Respondents were quite evenly divided on the question. Several rejected the relevance of ideology, others took it more seriously, yet others seemed to take a position somewhere in-between.
- 2 A number of respondents seemed to dispute that Soviet ideology represented genuine marxism. They maintained that it was the leninist version (read corruption) that Moscow followed.
- 3 A prominent view shared widely was that of the practical function of ideology as a legitimizing factor for the ruling elites in Moscow.

- 4 Several respondents preferred the term "Soviet (international) *behavior*" to Soviet foreign *policy*. The Berkeley-Stanford programme on Soviet international *behavior* is another indicator of that preference.
- 5 The respondents who took ideology more seriously than others nevertheless stopped short of attributing to it a *determining* role in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy.
- 6 US Government officials also differed in their assessment of ideology.

Question 5 : What accounts for the 'conservatism' in the US under Reagan ? Who is a 'conservative' ? And how does such conservatism relate to the Soviet Union ?

The 'conservatism' in the US is part of a global phenomenon. For example, Thatcher in the UK, Mitterand (a "conservative socialist") in France, and others. While the 1960s saw the flourishing of Keynesian economics, the 1980s emphasize deregulation, less government control, and so on. The feeling in the US is that the welfare state does not work well. In foreign policy, Moscow went for a large-scale military buildup under detente. Hence, rearmament was now needed in the west.

Conservatism in the US is a domestic phenomenon. The economy was going downhill, there was a high inflation rate too. So Reagan wanted to cut the budget, including social security. Moscow was also "probably cheating" under detente, which became so identified with a discredited Nixon. The conservatives want a strong military, less spending on social security and foreign aid, and low taxes. "You buy a set of ideology and politicians as a package." So US domestic and foreign policies are linked, and you find them as they are today. But now there is a move towards 'the centre'. Bad economics under liberal or moderate politics, e.g., under Ford, led to the swing to the right. The feeling in the late 1970s was that the politics of the centre was indecisive, while something decisive needed to be done. Reagan's personal appeal to the public was also an important factor.

"We go back and forth" between conservatism and its opposite. The "far right" is a "stuffy type of person." He is "pre-modern",

i.e. with the mental makeup characteristic of the age before the Enlightenment of the 17th century. The key decisionmakers in the Reagan administration simply don't understand international relations. They continuously overrule the state department which tries to plead more knowledgeable and sophisticated policies. Nixon had Kissinger who had brains, but not so with Reagan. McFarlane is a politician who creates obstacles to finer and more intelligent policies. Reagan, who is "not even a conservative, just dumb," makes the foreign policy decisions.

There are different types of conservatives in the USA. For instance, there is the new right, which is religion (christianity)-oriented. They are opposed to abortion, smoking marijuana, high taxes, and are socially conservative. Then there are the neo-conservatives; who are socially liberal, do not care about abortion as an issue or prayer in school, but are fiscal conservatives, take law and order seriously, and nurture "a very harsh suspicion" of Moscow. A libertarian strand (among the conservatives) says, get the government off your back. The far right views the democrats as "unpatriotic."

Conservatism means wanting to keep things as they are. The democrats are in fact conservative in the sense. They dominated the government, Congress, the labour union, etc., and want to keep things bureaucratic. People who want to change things are Reagan and his colleagues. Young people, therefore, overlook the president's age since they also want change. Since the 1970s, the old-style programmatic liberalism of Franklin Roosevelt and Johnson was becoming *passee*. It was damaging freedom. Hence, the people moved away from the democrats. The US is a country which looks forward to change and individualism. People voted Carter and then Reagan, because they saw in each a change from his predecessor.

The liberals in this country are more conservative than they are given credit for. Liberalism implies enlightenment. But in the whole spectrum of US thought there are notions of superiority, intervention, and the like. The differences may be only on where to intervene or how to get the Soviets do what the US wants them to do.

"Labels are very hard to apply these days." Neo-conservatives may be democrats. A consensus also exists between apparently

opposite political trends. In the last elections Mondale did not argue against defence expenditure *per se*, but wanted less growth there. The image of the rising Soviet power generated the consensus that we need to be strong militarily. We are moving towards a time where the US may want to cut down responsibility globally. In fact, "conservatism never left" the USA. Reagan speaks to average, 'middle' America, in geographic, social and educational senses. The population on the east and west coasts of the US are more international in outlook. (good) educational institutions are also concentrated there. The elections of Carter and Reagan showed that the "pendulum swings back and forth."

US values and traditions are in middle America, characterized by strong patriotism and national pride. This Reagan has tapped well. "God, mother and apple pie"—Reagan is a spokesman for that, and this strikes a chord in middle America. To the latter, liberals like Humphrey, Eugene MacCarthy and Carter were like leftists! Conservatism, a complex phenomenon, involves pro-Americanism, "don't trust the commies" attitude, a big military budget, and fewer dollars for social welfare or poor relief because of the fundamental belief in the free market economy. It stems from the teaching of Adam Smith in the 18th century that when each person pursues his selfish interests, the total activity results in the well-being of all.

The image of the liberals is something like we want to live with Moscow. The conservatives, on the other hand, are absolutely uncompromising in their opposition to the Soviet social system. Reagan says, for instance, that the first thing to do is to rearm. The Soviets will only understand big stick and then soften up and negotiate (on arms and other issues of concern to the US). Conservatism involves a strong commitment to family, tradition, individualism, common opposition to the concept of 'welfare', the idea of "a powerful, strong US that goes it alone in the world," that has a mission to make the world safe for anti-communism. But conservatives include both isolationists and interventionists.

America's Soviet policy has been based upon containment, shared also by the liberals. Military buildup and anti-Sovietism have been around since the end of world war II. Detente was an exception. Frustrated expectations about detente caused the rise of

Reagan. Foreign policy conservatism under the latter "is return to normalcy."

The label is "terribly bad." If conservatism means being opposed to big government, high taxes, abortion and social services, and being in favour of religion, then conservatives are a minority in the US "and are going to be so." They are, however, the first ones "to yell" when government services are cut! A consistent political behaviour, therefore, is absent.

In foreign policy, the label is misleading. There are interventionists who believe that the US is a perfect society and the rest of the world should look like it. There are isolationists who maintain that the US has no obligations to the rest of the world. Both views are shared by the liberals and the conservatives, democrats and republicans. A conservative means nothing. The liberals are as anti-communist as the conservatives.

The Reagan administration is not conservative in the classical sense but "radical rightist." Certain key elements of classical conservatism are missing in it. In economic terms, it engaged in public spending and created the largest deficit in US history. It has challenged and reopened many consensus issues like abortion, and the separation of the church and the state. This is being radical since it is an effort to undo some basic policies of the past on which a large consensus existed, except on the fringes. Conservatism has always tended to be isolationist with the 'fortress America' mentality. The Reagan administration's "global activism" as seen, for example, vis-a-vis Libya, central America and so on, is a departure from the older type of conservatism.

A conservative wants only a slow change, he wants to conserve. But the Reagan administration wants to change a lot of things in a hurry. Why the swing to the right in the USA? "I can only speculate." The US did go too far to rely on government programmes. The government became deeply involved in too many things. Reagan has an "extremely effective political personality." Recent polls show that 65 per cent (of the sample) like Reagan but a less percentage likes his policies. The democratic party has become identified with the old liberal approach to welfare programmes.

Mondale, hence, was shattered in the elections. However, there is increasingly less support for Reagan's defence spending.

Part of the conservative swing is religious. The fundamentalists have overtly become more political than they used to be. The civil rights legislation contributed to it. The civil rights movement weakened the democratic party and strengthened the republicans. Civil rights legislation desegregated the south, so the conservatives went to the republicans. Part of it is reaction against the 1960s, especially against Johnson's policies (he wanted to end poverty) and anti-war protestors.

It's a pendulum swing. Right from the beginning, the US has been undergoing such swings. There would come reforms followed by consolidation. Arthur Schlesinger, senior, had documented these cycles of change in the US in the 1930s and 1940s. Samuel P Huntington in his *Politics of Disharmony* deals with the pendulum phenomenon.

The definition of conservatism in the current context is a problem. The president is a "conservative" Senator Jackson, whose close collaborator was assistant defence secretary, Richard Perle, regarded the Soviet Union as a thief in a hotel trying every door. So keep the doors locked, he said! Yet, Jackson was a "liberal" in other areas. There are US businessmen who are well-disposed towards Moscow for their own (business) reasons. Mr Hammer of the Occidental Petroleum or the chief of Pepsi Cola are "conservative" people, yet they would like to do business with Moscow. So, "liberal-conservative" categories don't say much.

"Political labels mean very little." A Jeffersonian liberal would hold that the least government is the best government. A 20th century New Deal/Roosevelt-type liberal would maintain that large government is good since it is needed to change the environment that corrupts human nature, causes poverty and other evils. The divide between liberal and conservative is a "thin one." Both think similarly.

The US people's "psychology" has changed. They were tired of being "pushed around." Reagan promised to end that situation and make the US a strong nation again. "The swing to the right is

basically a psychological swing." Americans wanted to "feel good" by being told the right things (which Reagan did). Pushed to the extreme, this would be "nationalistic chauvinism." Franklin Roosevelt and Kennedy made the people feel good. Carter left them with a bad feeling.

"It's a philosophical question as to who is a conservative." The Reagan administration is called conservative relative to the last one. It wants to bring back old values. Americans are practical, not high on ideology. Conservatism is a very difficult thing to judge. Franklin Roosevelt, Schlesinger and Kennedy favoured big government. The Democratic Party is adopting ideas of Reagan and the republican party, ideas like smaller government, etc. Conservatives don't much care for the underdogs of society. Reagan is creating a revolution in the US. The question is, how are the democrats going to cope with it?

Reagan is a radical since he wants to change US-Soviet (power relationship, e.g., via Star Wars. The Soviets will try hard to stop US R & D on it ; hence, they returned to negotiations at Geneva.

"Conservative" and "liberal" — these words change their meaning over time. Reagan, in always making "cracks about the press", does not follow the US tradition of a free press. He prevented the press from covering Grenada. So he has been departing from conservatism in that point. Further, he is trying to upset the separation of the church and the state, and supporting a constitutional amendment to allow public prayer in school. A true conservative would be against changing the constitution. So Reagan is neither liberal nor conservative. "Words have lost their meaning." Reagan is, in fact, "authoritarian", i.e., his idea seems to be that people should obey authority which knows best. Authority also ought to interfere in private lives, like telling a woman whether she can have abortion or not.

The shift towards conservatism in the US "has been exaggerated." Public opinion polls show people are supporting domestic and foreign policy issues that are anathema to Reagan. The reason people elected Reagan was that Mondale was not a good alternative. The latter wanted to increase tax which made him unpopular. The middle class considers the welfare system corrupt.

Conservatism is an "ambiguous" term. It has two meanings :

- 1 don't change anything, and
- 2 change things in a certain direction.

It means more use of market over government. Historically, it has also meant isolationism. The democrats have had more involvement in foreign wars than the republicans. Nixon was a republican but not conservative. He fostered a larger role for the government and expanded Johnson's Great Society government programmes. He also moved detente. Carter, a democrat, moved away from detente in the second half of his administration. Hence, these labels (conservative, liberal) are not very useful.

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 A mode average opinion was that labels like "conservative" and "liberal" have lost their meaning. Also, the word "conservative" did not have a single, clear-cut meaning but diverse connotations, some of which even contradicted each other.
- 2 It emerged that a republican was not automatically a "conservative", any more than a democrat an automatic "liberal."
- 3 In foreign policy, this meant that a republican administration was not necessarily more anti-Soviet than a democratic one.
- 4 Another mode average opinion was that the Reagan administration was really "radical", not "conservative", since it was geared to change the US on a variety of fronts.
- 5 The 'pendulum swing' theory to explain the periodic changes in the mood of the US electorate was widely mentioned.
- 6 US Government officials seemed as skeptical of the "conservative" label on their government as non-government respondents.

Question 6 : Do you see any changes in Soviet attitude towards the US after Brezhnev ? If so, what kind of changes ?

"I haven't noticed much change lately. Gorbachov could change US-Soviet relations, but won't do very much."

Perhaps. The USSR is going to go through a phase like the US, an "inward-looking" phase, trying to put the house in order. Since the post-Brezhnev Soviet leaders kept dying, there was little continuity. Things might improve now in US-Soviet relations (under Gorbachov).

It is too early to tell. Something is going on in the USSR but it is not very clear. There is a change in the way the Soviets are presenting themselves. This may be tactical flexibility. A lot of Soviet activity is focussed on economic reform but I don't know how far it will go.

Gorbachov is aware of technical advances (taking place elsewhere), wants hi-tech and computers to spread, but also knows "his hands are virtually tied."

Soviet military production will go up within the context of the concentration of investment in machine-building.

Gorbachov is still very much a product of the old *apparatchik* system. His legal education does not mean that he is a great believer in legal means. He is using the party apparatus for goals which would abolish that apparatus! So, there's a built-in contradiction there.

No sharp changes are expected in the Soviet Union under Gorbachov. The latter is more interested in management changes but not going in for a large-scale market economy. He may make one or two concessions here and there but no major changes.

No, no fundamental changes. A great deal of continuity has been there in US-Soviet relations since world war II. We keep "hoping, expecting" that Moscow needs us. They want our advanced technology. The Soviet political elites see change in their country as "extremely threatening" to their power. They are really conservative. An authoritarian system bred them, and they want it to continue. The Kremlin leaders are anxious about national minorities, the rapidly expanding population of Soviet Central Asia, i.e., the Islamic population. The US is a "useful whipping boy" for gaining mileage in domestic and international politics. The US has for long kept hoping that the Soviet system will collapse.

I think relations became worse during 1982-84 (following Brezhnev's death). With Gorbachov things have improved.

Yes, Andropov was conciliatory on arms control. The Soviets have been struggling in Reagan's time to head off a resurgence of US power. Reaganism has created confusion in the USSR on how to tackle the US. Moscow's dilemma is : do we lie low to wait till Reaganism is out, or do we get tough ? Gorbachov's answer is : conciliate the US on arms control and in Europe, but increase the Soviet pressure on third world hot spots, e.g., escalated war in Afghanistan, increased assistance to Syria and Angola, send warships to protect Libya against US retaliation, etc. So the Soviet signal to the US is : we are conciliatory but not weak.

"I suppose so", but am not sure. Gorbachov's arms control proposals seem "significantly different" from earlier Soviet ones. It may mean they want to go back to the early 1970s arms control scene, but I am not sure.

There are many Soviet attitudes, not a single attitude. Some shifts are noticeable. Take Andropov's statement on missile deployment. It is clear from US behaviour that Washington (under Reagan) cannot be dealt with. Gorbachov, however, expressed more positive views of the possibility of achieving serious agreements with the US. His approach has elements fundamentally new, e.g., proposal to cut 50 per cent of (strategic) arms. Gorbachov is moving further on the question of on-site verification than his predecessors. He has put the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar station on the bargaining table rather than denying it as an issue at all.

With Gorbachov, "Yeah, sure !" Some changes are taking place on both Soviet and US sides. We are now trying "to do business with each other." The fiery rhetoric has been toned down. Gorbachov "wants to project a more favourable image" (of the USSR) not only to the US but to other states as well.

The Soviets are debating the wisdom of some of their policies, e. g., over-involvement and over-investment in the third world. There are indications that some of them have a different view of Soviet "assertive behavior" in the third world, like Angola and

Ethiopia in the 1970s. It is "self-defeating" for Moscow to make marginal gains (here and there) but lose relations with the west, especially the US.

The Soviets are quite concerned at Reagan's "menace." They had thought that Nixon had to accept detente due to a "shift in the correlation of forces," but Reagan has reversed that shift! That is "a very fundamental shock" to them. There is also a "loss of confidence" among the Soviet elites on how attractive the Soviet model (still) is to the third world.

Moscow seems to be trying a little harder to get through to us. Carter was more approachable than Reagan. The Soviets are making some "novel" kinds of disarmament proposals. This would be a good time for the US to negotiate.

"Attitudes no, policy, yes." Moscow regards us with "enormous suspicion." It thinks our dominant classes thrive on arms race, etc. That attitude has not changed at all.

(Not much change was seen) under Brezhnev due to his infirmity, under Andropov and Chernenko due to lack of time. The KAL airliner shoot down over the Soviet Union also was not an indicator of change. But change seems to be coming under Gorbachov..

"Not a great deal, I'm afraid." The Soviet view of the US is that we like the US, why don't you like us? It's an "unrequited love!" Moscow has "this mixture of envy, awe, admiration" for the US, and "that hasn't gone down a whit." Reagan calling the USSR an evil empire makes that admiration go down somewhat, but the whole of US-Soviet relations is like "a long roller-coaster ride." They fluctuate widely. Such "pendulum swings" have taken place since 1917. After detente there is a feeling that the Soviets are taking us for a ride. This is a pendulum swing. Yet, underneath there is (people-to-people) goodwill.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a "hard jolt" to US-Soviet relations which led to the undoing of detente. In terms of "action" by the Soviets, the actuals, none of the speculation about a change in Soviet attitude or policy has come true. There have been "nice words" from time to time but these have not been "translated into actual actions."

The Soviet system is "finally running down," although it is a "slow process." "Stagnation" and "fatigue" characterize the system, and "little ... meaningful change (is) in the works."

The only change I see is Gorbachov's self-perception of social and economic reforms. Changes in US-Soviet relations are possible, (but) they require certain types of containment of the USSR, given its drive in the third world.

No basic changes. Gorbachov is skillful but it is too early to say (how much change he will introduce). Soviet foreign policy remains exactly the same as in Brezhnev's time.

The official Soviet view of the US continues to be the same over a long period. It is characterized by fear and envy. "Their fear of the US is genuine." They provoked by their own behaviour US attitudes, which in turn raised their fear. Their treatment of the Jews, Sakharov and others (dissidents) is "despicable" as in their meddling in the middle east and elsewhere. Naturally, all this provoked the US.

Sometimes the Russians are provocative and may be they don't realize it or don't give a damn even if they do. But people-to-people connections are, or may become, warm.

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 The mode average opinion reflected cautious hope of an improvement in Soviet policy towards the USA under Gorbachov.
- 2 The US Government officials preferred to see little or no change at all (in Gorbachov's time).
- 3 Again, the third world and Moscow's activities and interests there came up as a potential stumbling block to an improvement of bilateral relations.

Question 7 : What accounted for the Reagan-Gorbachov summit in November 1985 in Geneva ?

Both leaders felt that the summit would be useful in terms of their domestic constituencies. Gorbachov wanted more West European support and the strengthening of his domestic position. Reagan

wanted to blunt criticism that he was relentlessly pursuing cold war without any attempt at negotiations with Moscow. He, therefore, wanted to appease the public by means of the summit, although he knew that nothing would come of it.

Reagan was finally persuaded that "he should go through the motions" due to political needs. Gorbachov wanted to show that he had arrived on the world stage. But the summit was not "terribly important" to either. The Europeans were pressing for it, though nothing much happened at Geneva. And this will probably be true of the follow-up summit.

The reason Moscow agreed to the summit was because the Soviets want to stop Star Wars, and this is because they have a healthy respect for US/western technology.

The Reagan administration has always been concerned with atmospherics and appearances. However, it came to learn the cost of extreme rhetorical positions. The Congress and the (west) Europeans set limit to the latter. So the administration had to move towards the Soviets for appearance's sake. Moscow had also made an extreme response (withdrawing from the arms control talks) to the Reagan administration's extreme policy. Hence, both sides had to back away a little.

Reagan's great achievement is that he takes extreme positions (e.g., the USSR is an "evil empire", the US is not keen on arms control talks, the Soviets "have taken us to the cleaners"), and then backs out. Geneva showed Reagan's genius in setting up a trap for himself, and then avoiding it (the "trap" being his hard positions like: don't talk to Moscow, the latter is aiming at military superiority and even nuclear war). That was what the summit was all about. Reagan is not Nixon or Carter. He is the master of his own ceremony and, therefore, can walk away from positions he himself staked out.

His movie cover prepared him for drawing up the day's script. His personality and articulation also resonate values of America, not those of Lincoln but Houdini (the magician)! He is a pragmatic and intuitive politician too. Not really dumb, as intellectuals

think. He wears the ideological garment which is very attractive (for the moment). "It's the best running soap on tv!"

Reagan is not serious about arms control. He does not accept the Soviet offer of a comprehensive test ban, because (his pet project) SDI needs nuclear testing.

Reagan could show: I met Gorbachov after all. Gorbachov could show his colleagues that he could deal with a cold warrior US president. Each side was "primarily" thinking of domestics and self-image. And they called the summit "successful."

A very strong movement in the US against nuclear arms and the US military buildup motivated Reagan to go to Geneva. The Soviets are "increasingly worried and concerned" about SDI since they have their own agricultural and economic problems to tackle. The west European allies were pushing the US to negotiations as well.

Gorbachov wanted the summit to move Reagan from his Star Wars position. Reagan went to the summit to show his long-standing liberal critics that the US could have "peace, strength and prosperity," and yet deal with Moscow, his mission in life. He feels vindicated in his promise of prosperity and military strength and now, via the summit, of peace. He demonstrated that he could get peace from Moscow with the US standing strong.

"They couldn't afford not to go." DoD was opposed. Weinberger opposed it (and did not attend the summit) since he feared that Reagan might make concessions to the Soviets. There are people in the US administration who did not like the Geneva summit. Richard Perle is the "brain behind Weinberger." Both oppose arms control agreements. Reagan, like any President, "wants to go down in history as a man of peace." Nancy (Mrs Reagan) is especially concerned about this.

Reagan had spoken during the elections through "both sides of his mouth," preaching arms buildup as well as peace. So he had to do something (about peace).

Besides, the political needs of the two leaders. "The Soviets have backed themselves into an impossible corner" on the INF issue in Europe, for which Gromyko was responsible. Their policy

proved "counter-productive". Gorbachov represents a fresh Soviet approach which became necessary.

Reagan might opt for an arms control agreement which will help the republican party. He "knows very little" of anything, but has a strong political personality. Star Wars is "terrible." The only thing good about it is it's impossible.

Reagan felt the summit would improve support for his policies. He wanted to signal his seriousness about arms control.

SDI brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table, even though the Pershing II missiles were not removed from Europe. "The American policy of negotiating from strength is beginning to work."

Reagan saw the summit as a logical culmination of his policy, and not as a "significant change or weakening of his policy."

The Soviets felt that Reagan was not giving in on SDI and other military buildup cases. Hence, the summit for them was meant to neutralize the "squeezers" (Weinberger, Fred Ikle, Perle, who do not want to negotiate for fear of making concessions to Moscow) in the Reagan administration. This was part of the Soviet strategy to outwit the rest of Reagan's stint as president and prevent via summits and talks worse developments. The Soviets do not expect any major improvements in the rest of Reagan's years in presidency.

It is to the Soviet advantage to stop the arms race since the latter means taxing the economy.

US-Soviet relations were "erratic, difficult." The advent of the new Soviet leader who was "physically capable" of attending the summit was propitious. Gorbachov wants improved relations with the US. The Soviet economy is "limping along." Gorbachov is committed to change that. To achieve this he needs a degree of normalization of relations (with the US). He needs the appearance, if not substance, of a dialogue. Moscow needs to import foreign (US) technology.

The summit "achieved nothing except for broad smiles and lengthy conversation ... In terms of substance they came up with very little."

Since June 1984 Moscow has been focussing on SDI. The US had replied that it wanted a summit for more general arms control talks. The Geneva joint conference does not mention SDI, yet Gorbachov declared the summit a success.

"Jaw-jaw is better than bang bang" (talking better than war). The Carter administration's arms control efforts were shot down since it was "too much, too fast."

Every administration which comes in, "adjusts the sights," then makes up its mind on what to do with the USSR.

The Reagan administration's attitude towards arms control is that it must be "realistic." "Opportunities for peace should not be missed," but "this does not mean it has to be done in some starry-eyed ways."

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 A mode average opinion related to the domestic compulsions of both the leaders. Another frequently mentioned reason was pressure from the European allies to negotiate.
- 2 Reagan's Star Wars was often mentioned as a powerful incentive for the Soviets to return to the arms control negotiations.

Question 8 : After Reagan, do you think the "Reagan mode" of hardline towards Moscow will continue ? If not, then what ?

Hard to predict.

If (George) Bush was to win, it will be the same confrontationist policy. If the democrats win, there will be a "limited change," e.g., in the sphere of cultural and scientific exchanges. A limited arms control agreement would also then be possible. Under a democratic administration "slightly warmer" US-Soviet relations will be possible.

A lot depends on Moscow.

"Nothing obviously is irreversible. I don't know what is coming after Reagan." I expected the revival of isolationism (in the US), but it hasn't come. With the minor exception of world war I, the US was isolationist, world war II and its aftermath changed that.

It's been forty years now that the US is engaged globally. Isolationism is a "possibility", but I couldn't bet on it."

The democrats will put up candidates with "strong elements of Reaganism." It is likely that the US now has a high degree of consensus. Most academics, especially from the liberal arts and the like, are unhappy with Reagan. But professionals like doctors and lawyers are happy. A great deal of continuity is what I see after Reagan.

Reagan has written a tune which others are going to hum first. He has defined "the theme song," so to speak.

A lot depends on an arms control deal. If there is one, others will follow. The new Soviet impulse is inside-looking. It depends on whether we can enhance that impulse.

If the democrats come to power after Reagan, changes will be "significant". The US will show high interest in an arms control agreement. A lot also depends on what is happening in the third world. For example, after Khomeini Iran may turn violent. Soviet covert involvement would then be likely. In south asia there is the problem of nuclear proliferation.

Both the US and the USSR have a stake in not allowing relations get worse.

It depends on who is elected. Nixon, even though he was a republican and cold warrior, had nevertheless opened up China.

Our relations with Moscow will continue to be precarious. There can be no "easy relations," given the nature of the Soviet social system. At best you may have some kind of "detente," whatever that means.

No, Reagan has not laid down any binding policy. Bush is already compromising with the right. If Hart becomes the president, his position with Moscow will be "more open," if he finds a positive response.

Most Americans would like to live with the USSR and feel secure. They don't want that they and the Soviets should kill each other. But there is an overwhelming "fear" and "distrust" of the Soviets

(in the US). It's hard for Americans that the Soviets don't trust us !

In domestic economic policy (of the US), it probably will continue, if the problem of deficit doesn't blow up. In foreign policy, it depends on who succeeds Reagan. If it is Jack Kemp (conservative congressman from upper New York state), then foreign policy won't change. If it is Mario Como (Democrat Governor of New York State), things might change.

Generally, in foreign policy, Reagan is full of rhetoric. If you are looking for actual action, his foreign policy is not generally different from the policies of the previous administrations, except arms control.

In international economic relations, the Reagan administration's policy is not different from previous ones, Republican or democratic. In the question of intervention in other states to destabilize "unwelcome" regimes, the difference is one of degree, not kind. This administration is a little more enthusiastic about it. But "the lesson of Vietnam" has been learnt; the Reagan administration, like its predecessors, would not go for involvement in third world land wars which would cost casualties. Reagan plays to the gallery of his conservative constituency by his speeches but not action.

The real difference is in the arms control area. The Reagan administration discarded detente on the ground that the Soviet Union posed a serious danger. In strategic doctrine, the joint chiefs of staff have been far more unrestrained in planning the use of nuclear arms than previous administration.

Will the administration after Reagan change Soviet policy ? (It depends on) how much the Pentagon budget costs. If a republican like Bush becomes the President, he will scale down the budget. Under Bush or the democrats the notion of the 'Soviets as the devils' will also be scaled down.

I expect improved US-Soviet relations after Reagan, provided the Soviets did not carry out another Afghanistan (invasion).

There is already a change in the Reagan administration (itself, i.e. its retreat from highly ideological rhetoric and "accommodation to reality." Reagan's extreme position has eroded.

Reagan is an "extraordinary" leader. The US public opinion always had these two strands: (1) Moscow is a major threat to the US, a major adversary, and the US should limit Soviet ambitions, and (2) the Soviet Union is needed to manage bilateral relations safely. A "widespread" feeling is that the US should keep up its military guard. People want arms control talks but also to keep up their guard. The Reagan administration moved too much in one direction, but has now moved back to the centre. A future administration will be similar, i.e. at the centre.

I am an optimist. I don't think George Bush will get the nomination. His label is "moderate conservative," not "radical right." A candidate further to the right will get the nomination.

Will Reaganism continue?

The defence buildup is ridiculous. There are too many weapon systems. There is no need for both the B-1 and the Stealth bombers, why two and not just one type? Navy secretary Lehman wants a 600-ship navy. Why? So, the next administration will have to make a "valiant effort" to get the military budget under control. That will be difficult. Also, Reagan probably will not get an arms control agreement since he wants his Star Wars, which the Soviets oppose. Hence, an arms control agreement will be an issue for the next administration.

I don't expect a sudden major change (after Reagan), but excessive defence spending will probably be cut.

It is difficult to predict.

The "squeezeers" (Weinberger, Ikle, Perle, *et al.*) want to push SDI as hard as possible, so later it can't be switched off—"the foot in the door technique."

There is a need to deal with the economic mess we are in. Reagan's increasing military budget has to be reversed.

Reagan is a very shrewd politician, "he is lucky" too. He has deliberately exaggerated US military weakness so as to get the excuse to cut social welfare programmes. There is a lot of support for his economic policies. There is also a great deal of nervousness about the economic future (of the USA).

Even Nixon, who has some influence on Reagan, talks of (the need for) a "hard detente." A widespread feeling is that the US must not lower its guard vis-a-vis Moscow. The challenge of the next few years would be : how to steady the swings in mood vis-a-vis the USSR. It also depends on how far the latter is pulling in its horns. There are signs that they are prepared to do that. Moscow has domestic and foreign policy problems. It has not been successful in west Europe to weaken Reagan's position there, e.g., regarding SDI, arms control, Pershing II, etc.

Reagan is a "unique, charismatic" person who brought together a coalition that is going to fall apart after he's gone. Reagan's anti-Soviet hardline is not likely to continue. On the other hand, the past few presidential campaigns showed that the macho pose on the USSR was a constant factor. It's built into our presidential politics. There is going to be no radical departure from that. US people as a whole would like to be macho, yet talk to Moscow. The majority of the people are tired of the tension and the cold war which Reagan reactivated. Yet, you have to be worried about being charged of being soft on the Soviets.

I am not sure Reaganism is an absolute thing. There's been a colossal conservative reaction but after a while it may dissipate. People may want change. There is the pendulum theory, after all. (However), the democratic party's leadership is pretty dead. "Americans tend to vote with their pocket book." (That way) Reagan has certainly done a good job. The US is generally more conservative than (outside) people realize.

A change is possible after Reagan, but it depends. "Reagan has moved considerably." He had talked of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" at Orlando, Florida, in 1982. Yet, now he is talking to Gorbachov. Nixon was a great red-baiter in California as well as nationally. Yet he signed agreements with the USSR in 1972.



US leaders won't go for ideology alone, but what the reality demands. That in turn depends on other factors, like the demands of the allies.

It's *not* a question of personality of Reagan which has set an irrevocable pattern, it is one among many factors. The best time in US-Soviet relations was during the administration of the conservative republican, Nixon. Some worst phases of US-Soviet relations were during the democratic presidency of Truman !

No, I don't think he has "set in stone" an irrevocable course towards the USSR. It's all very personal, just like what Carter did things in the middle east which was personal.

Many presidents like Nixon, Carter and Reagan tried to educate the people on the "reality" of the USSR. But I think it's "reinventing the wheel !" We have to restrict the swing of the pendulum, so that we don't have detente followed by a (wild) critique of it. We have to "flatten out the roller-coaster to something more level."

Depends on who gets elected, the platforms, and what Moscow is up to. Reagan has built on "certain themes," "not personalized" but based on "US national interests." One would assume that this would "continue now." Otherwise, there will be total chaos every time a new president comes to power. Even in the USSR "the style" (of policy) does change.

OBSERVATIONS

- 1 Except a few respondents, who felt sure that the Reagan paradigm would continue after Reagan leaves the scene, all the responses were conditional. This included US Government officials. So to the most, the post-Reagan phase did not appear to be a linear continuation of Reaganism.
- 2 At least one respondent mentioned the third world as a crucial factor in conditioning future US-Soviet relations.

Other observations

- 1 All Americans, including the bureaucrats, were easily accessible.
- 2 A frequent opinion on Reagan was that he lacked substance and knowledge but had a persuasive personality, was both "dumb"



and lucky, and shrewd in his intuition of what would move the average American, and translated his film-acting experience successfully into politics.

- 3 Not every Reagan administration official sounded like a hard-liner on Moscow.

APPENDIX

The institutions to which the respondents were affiliated :

A *Academia*

- University of Pennsylvania
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Tulane University
- University of California—Berkeley (UCB)
- Center for Slavic Studies, UCB
- Institute for International Studies, UCB
- The Berkeley-Stanford Programme on Soviet International Behavior
- Stanford University
- The Hoover Institution for War and Peace (Stanford University)
- St. Francis College, Indiana
- Indiana / Purdue University
- University of Massachusetts (Amherst).

B *The Reagan Administration*

- Library of Congress
- State Department :
 - Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 - (including one formal presentation on the Gorbachov era)
- State Department :
 - Policy Planning Staff
 - Central Intelligence Agency (comments on Soviet foreign policy in a formal gathering)
 - US Information Agency
 - National Security Council.

C *Others*

- The Philadelphia Inquirer
- International Peace Academy, New York.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Javeed Alam, *DOMINATION AND DISSENT : PEASANTS AND POLITICS*, Mandira, Calcutta, 1985, xi + 170 pp., Rs 95'00.

Authoritarianism and domination by the ruling class on the Indian masses during the long colonial era in the Indian subcontinent embittered the masses and prompted them to fight against foreign exploitation and oppression. Actually that struggle brought independence to India. But even after the attainment of independence exploitation of the downtrodden people has not stopped. Domination, exploitation and repression by some groups have been a regular feature of Indian politics. The net result of such evils is the upsurge of the suffering masses, particularly the peasants, and this brought about the downfall of the ruling Congress party in the parliamentary election held in 1977.

The book under review aims at an analysis of the 1977 parliamentary election in Himachal Pradesh as a mass upsurge against the dominant leadership. This is a serious study of the political activity, consciousness, revolts and uprising of the masses, especially an upheaval of the peasants as observed in the parliamentary election of March 1977, particularly in Himachal Pradesh. Such an upsurge resembled India's freedom struggle during the colonial era. The author has also raised various fundamental questions about the political process in India.

The author studies the relationship between resistance by the deprived masses against exploitation and the determination of the ruling class to continue domination. He feels that this 1977 upheaval "has all the characteristics of the great struggles witnessed during 1919, 1921-22, 1931, 1942 and 1946 when popular outbursts changed the very character of those struggles from what was conceived by the nationalist leadership" (p. 1). In analysing the results of this election he tries to focus on the masses, particularly the peasants, who are generally viewed as indifferent and unwilling to participate in politics. The author has further attempted to examine the various aspects of the behaviour and motivation of the masses. In doing so he has attempted to go into the electoral anthropology of

voters as individuals, groups and classes having multiform socio-economic surroundings, compulsions, psychological embarrassments and political restraints.

The field reports acquired through prolonged discussions on chosen topics with different persons in different walks of life have become the main basis of his analysis. He has categorically referred to the twin effects of authoritarianism of the ruling Congress party which declared emergency in 1975. He points out that under emergency the ruling party introduced some new ideas in its programme, particularly family planning, which went against the traditional beliefs of the masses and created a situation of revolt. The twin effects are : (i) the alienation of huge sections of Congress groups from their own established political leadership—particularly in the rural areas, and (ii) heavy loss at the base of political leadership of the ruling classes. The popular upsurge was given a new shape in the form of a new electoral verdict in favour of the Janata party.

The author correctly points out that the result of the parliamentary election of 1980, when the Congress(I) got a landslide victory, was the outcome of 'non-performance' of the Janata party and the in-fighting in the party. He holds that the people's verdict in 1980 reflected the urge for a strong and stable government at the centre.

In this book the author has also given a sample of the slogans used by the Congress and the Janata parties in 1977 election. The author has given party-wise and constituency-wise tables of performance of the different political parties in the Lok Sabha elections held in 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971 and 1977. He has also presented some socioeconomic data and data relating to the scheduled castes in Himachal Pradesh.

But the book is not at all well-arranged. The analysis made by the author is superficial at places. The book, moreover, is descriptive in nature. There is neither a bibliography nor any index.

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ROMA CHAKRABORTY

Pulin Das, PERSECUTION OF DRAMA AND STAGE — CHRONICLES AND DOCUMENTS, M. C. Sarkar and Sons, Calcutta, 1986, viii + 124 pp., Rs 20.00.

The author, though a teacher of Bengali, might very well have been a distinguished political analyst as has been evident from his objective inquiry into the different aspects of the Dramatic Performances Control Act 1876, which forms the subject matter of the book. The author, like a modern political analyst, has not adopted only a legalistic approach, but, as has been stated in the preface to the book, he has attempted "to provide (i) a comparative estimate between the position of the theatre laws and regulations prevalent in the homeland of the (British) rulers and what were prescribed for them in the colony (India) they ruled; (ii) the events that prompted to frame a law unparalleled in the annals of theatre laws and their real motives behind it, and (iii) the impact of the law on the growing stage and drama ...". Thus Dr Das engages himself in a pursuit that has not only a broad sociological and historical canvass, but has the ambitious objective of exposing the imperialistic class-oriented designs of the foreign rulers that prompted them to enact the legislation. And any reader of the book would admit unreservedly that the author's attempt has been quite successful.

The author has put forth hard labour to salvage forgotten materials from the court files and archives, and the details thereof, which, though not that interesting to the lay reader, are really very relevant. If this treatise on drama and stage, which deals mainly with the Bengali stage (as dramatic movements elsewhere are comparatively of later origin), is read by foreigners and by the Indian readers too, it will unfold to them the saga of a glorious struggle for freedom fought with such gusto, courage and devotion. The author narrates how the zamindars, who had originally been the main patrons of the growing Bengali stage, were not at all enthusiastic about staging *Nildarpan*, "which inspired revolt against all sorts of tyranny and exploitation" (p. 4) on their 'palace theatres.' The author notes that "the National Theatre fulfilled this taste, chose *Nildarpan* for its maiden venture and thus became a symbol of national aspiration" (pp. 4-5). In this connection, the author reveals the interesting fact that even a white bureaucrat like Mr W S Seto Karr, secretary to

the Government of Bengal, had to relinquish his post for having had allowed the English version of *Nildarpan* to be despatched under the seal of the Government of Bengal.

While drawing our attention to the impact of dramas and the stage on the socio-cultural life, the author informs us that *Nildarpan* when it was acted on a public stage, inspired several other writers to mirror different aspects of life in a similar fashion and that during the years between 1873 and 1876, the number of dramatic compositions increased at least threefold in comparison to those written in earlier years and a large number of "darpan" dramas, like *Jamidar Darpan*, *Kerani Darpan*, *Jail Darpan* and *Chakar Darpan* were published. The author rightly points out that the 1876 Act was enacted as a precautionary measure against the staging of the last-named drama as that would very adversely affect the commercial interests of the ruling class. Numerous such historical evidences have thus been marshalled by the author to prove his point that "whenever they have clashed with the class-interest of the rulers, restrictions in the form of legal prohibitions have been clamped upon the stage and drama" (p. 1).

Perhaps there may be some lapses here and there in the book, but these cannot deprive it of the plaudit which it truly deserves. The battle on the stage was fought in other fronts too and this lent it a vital support. *Nildarpan* was not a lone crusader; the Bengali press — *Tattobodhini*, *Hindu Patriot* — to name only two among many, were there to uphold the cause of the indigo cultivators with extreme ardour. When we think of Michael, James Long, Aukshoy Datta, Kangal Haridas, we feel that the whole nation was astir and afoot, the intelligentsia taking sides with the masses — a rare happening which was to be repeated only during the anti-partition movement of 1905. The blue mutiny and the partition of Bengal could so stir the soul of the whole country not only for what the then drama achieved (the role of *jatra*, especially of Mukunda Das, is unforgettable in this context, *vide* p. 106), we should pay our homage to the press too — the stage and the vernacular press being two great freedom fighters. Political organizations like the Indian Association did not also lag behind when the stage was persecuted.

The message of renaissance, the call to explore the universe afresh, passed on from the elites down to the masses mainly through the stage, literacy being a rare thing. In spite of so many efforts at suppression, the stage remained ever combative during the period when imperialistic tyranny prevailed. Today there is none to say "stop," yet the old spirit seems to have been exhausted.

That our 19th century intelligentsia did not accept the Dramatic Performances Control Act of 1876 without offering brave resistance speaks a lot of their worth. A huge amount of interesting and shocking pieces of information – the author has offered in this slim volume. If one analyses the different themes of drama which became popular from time to time, the stage would prove to be the barometer for measuring the degree of political consciousness of the people at different periods of our struggle for freedom. It is sad to notice that our public theatre has been purchased and controlled by Rajasthanis ever since 1876 (when the bill was enacted), which perhaps explains the present crippled stage of our dramatic literature, for they would not have progressive themes on the public stage. Group theatres are not equipped with the financial strength which can sustain them. The Dramatic Performances Control Act had scared away the serious spectators who were interested in political plays; the new stage with its mythological plays or pure entertainment, ceased to play the former educative and stimulating role.

The notorious Dramatic Performances Control Act framed in 1876 remained in force all through the British regime and, strangely enough, for a fairly long period even after that. The indigenous rulers who swore in the name of "liberty", "freedom" and "equality", curiously did neither repeal the Act nor refrained from utilizing the Act's repressive provisions, perhaps with the object of suppressing the opposition. Thus the author informs us that in 1949 the West Bengal Government alerted its district and police authorities against the Indian People's Theatre Association and the Progressive Writers' Association in a secret circular (p. 16) which, among other things, read as follows: "It is likely that some organizations such as All India Progressive Writers' Association with communist affiliation and leaning may be organizing public dramatic performances, songs etc. with the object of spreading communist propaganda. Should

any attempt be made by them to stage drama or other performances in public places, these should be stopped by District Magistrates as far as possible by the use of the Dramatic Performances Act 1876 or any other law which may be applicable."

The author has also referred to similar other circulars and notifications by district magistrates, police commissioners of different parts of India under the Act of 1876 prohibiting the staging of dramas. One such notification issued in 1953 by the Police Commissioner of Calcutta on the Secretary of West Bengal IPTA asked for submission of 54 manuscripts for censor, among which were listed *Mahesh* by Sarat Chandra Chatterjee, *Gora* and *Bisarjan* by Rabin-dranath Tagore, *Nildarpan* by Dinabandhu Mitra. In this connection, the author also informs us that even Sisir Kumar Bhaduri, a renowned actor-director, had to observe on 15 August 1952: "During the British regime, the merit of a drama used to be judged by police officers. This same law has continued to be in force for the last five years in "free India."

The author has rightly concluded that the Dramatic Performances Act 1876 actually served "to change the entire course of drama and stage in Bengal and turned the natural healthy growth into a twisted and tailored incongruity."

Nildarpan permanently damaged the indigo industry and had hard hit the British bourgeoisie. *Chakar Darpan*, had it been allowed to be acted on the stage, would have ruined the British commercial interest in another important sphere. All this was done in the teeth of severe repression. This goes to show how the men of letters of nineteenth century Bengal identified themselves with the sorrows and sufferings of the masses. The saddest part of all is that there is none today to produce a "jute-mirror," although there is no question of being persecuted.

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Asok Kumar Mukhopadhyay

The Changing Role and Functions of Local Government in Third World Countries

IT IS NEITHER easy nor proper to generalize about the nature of politics and political institutions in the so vast and variegated an area as the third world. The countries in this area are different from one another in respect of their levels of social evolution, political development, economic achievement and technological change. The only thing common among these countries is their colonial past. They are now all (with some exceptions) formally free, but their political, socio-economic and technological development continue to be influenced by the hangover of colonialism. Local government system is one of the fields of state activities where the hangover of the colonial past is quite obvious. Whatever indigenous institutions of local administration these countries had were made defunctionalized and moribund by the colonial state machinery. The local government system in post-colonial societies is basically the continuation of the colonial idea of treating local government institutions as central government agents for local administration. These local administration agencies fall far short of the standard definition of local government having the following characteristics, viz., (i) separate legal existence, (ii) powers of adopting own budget, (iii) authority to allocate substantial resources, (iv) comprehensive functions dealing with local development and (v) popular mandate and local choice for local development.¹ Against this backdrop of understanding about the nature of local government in the third world countries, its changing role and functions are to be analysed.

Changing Function

Almost in all the third world countries the colonial rulers created local institutions primarily for public health and sanitation reasons

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and asked the local people to contribute to the maintenance of the system.² With gradual awakening of political consciousness, people demanded, and were given, partially elected councils. The argument was the traditional one of *democratic functions* that if people are to pay local taxes and rates, they must have their representatives on the local council. After attaining formal independence, the state in the post-colonial societies began undertaking some welfare functions and local government system had to be involved, in varying degrees, in this task. Hence the second important function of local government in third world countries has been the *welfare (i.e. social service) functions*. Very closely connected with these two basic functions of local government, there are two other broad and interrelated functions : *development functions* and *nation-building functions*.

These are very significant functions which are closely related with, and dependent on, the general process of socioeconomic transformation of post-colonial societies. Next, in designing and reforming local government, its *infrastructural functions* need to be detailed in the total scheme of governmental structural arrangement. This is an important function in so far as it is influenced by the load-bearing capacity of local government machinery and leadership. And last, but never the least, important function of local government is its *linkage functions*, that is, how successfully it helps link local political leadership with national political leadership. In assessing the changing functions of local government, each of these functions need to be closely examined.

Democratic Function

In the developed countries of the west, local government institutionalizes local freedom. Alexi de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill stressed the importance of local freedom in the life of the nation and put up classical defence in favour of local government. In recent times when some of the reform measures in Britain threatened local choice for deciding on the priorities in local government expenditure, Jones and Stewart again put forward the argument of democratic functions of local authorities and new modes of service delivery, new forms of decentralization and new relationships with the public.³ The point relevant for the third world countries has

two dimensions in this respect. First, in many third world countries local democracy is imperfect in so far as the superior government (national or regional) enjoys and, in practice, frequently exercises its power of superseding or suspending elected local councils. Secondly, even when the elected councils are not superseded/suspended, normally they are to function under very many administrative controls exercised by the superior government.

Thus local government in third world countries cannot effectively discharge its democratic functions. The local council which is elected formally is frequently prevented by the higher state machinery from reflecting local preferences in decision-making, especially in planning and development of the local area. People's right to be governed by their elected representatives is seriously compromised by the unfettered executive discretion of the superior government to cut short, or put an end to, the life of elected local councils. Moreover, such exercise of discretion is not justiciable in any court of law.⁴

Social Service Function

In respect of social service or welfare functions, local government in post-colonial societies again seems to be losing ground. Primary education and elementary health services are two such functions which have been, in recent times, taken over by the higher-level government from the hands of local government. There seem to be compelling reasons for such development. As population in these countries is fast increasing and demands for better services are becoming stronger, the financially weak local authorities are found to be palpably incapable to manage these social service functions to the satisfaction of the people. Local government definitely loses functions in this field, but this loss of function is regretted neither by the local authorities nor by the local people. The considerations of better quality of service, technical standardization of uniform service, and big financial investment in rendering non-profit-making services have proved stronger than that of local democratic control over policy-making and implementation of these services. The imposition of service charges in regard to certain municipal services for the purpose of cost recovery, at the insistence

of the World Bank, in some developing countries is a case in point. In practice, the functional relation between the higher-level government and local government in this respect has tilted the balance against local government. In some cases like Bangladesh and Nepal the initiative and enthusiasm of the central government for improving social services have led to loss of local initiative.⁵

Development Function

Development is the crying need and the primary slogan in the post-colonial societies. Most of these countries have chosen the capitalist path of development. The roots of development here can be found in the capitalist mode of production. The degree of variation from one country to another can be explained by the mediating nature of culture, historic compromise and specific on-going struggles in these societies. The third world countries basically following the capitalist path of development experience a relation between state and social class different from that in developed capitalist societies but nevertheless these countries display similar conflicts over rights on land and demands for investment. The management of urban land policy in India is a good illustration of this point.⁶

Again, in the matter of managing urban renewal and slum improvement programmes, elected local councils in developing countries usually receive a backseat. The entire responsibility of policy-formulation and policy-implementation is given to some non-representative bureaucratic development agencies of the higher-level government. This is also true, so far as the concrete experience is concerned, in regard to major water supply, housing and road-building programmes. The core of land-use planning and development functions is denied to local government and all capital expenditures for development of local area and services are channelled through non-representative, bureaucratic, ad hoc development agencies. Elected local councils are considered anachronistic to the requirements of modern management. The normal practice is to entrust local councils with operation and maintenance of assets created by development agencies which are nothing but bureaucratic-technocratic extension of the centralized state. This trend can be found in a large number of third world countries where the development process is marked by centralized control and decision-making.⁷

Being systematically deprived of development functional responsibilities, people as well as leaders of local government in these societies have developed a restricted perception of municipal management functions. The recent research on electoral perception of local government management in an Indian state reveals that nearly 38.5 per cent of the voter-respondents consider infrastructural development like road-building and road-maintenance, and 15.3 per cent of the voter-respondents perceive public health facilities, as the main electoral issue. So far as municipal leadership is concerned, 45 per cent of the leader-respondents consider civic amenities and public health as the chief concern of municipal government and only 5 per cent of them consider infrastructural investment like housing as an item of municipal management.⁸

Nation-building Function

Closely connected with development function is the range of nation-building functions of local government. This aspect of local government function has always been emphasized in the socialist countries but has been only partially taken note of in some third world countries. In the long debate on nation-building and political development in the third world there has been a contest between political-administrative stability and local autonomy through decentralization as the chief goal. Except Yugoslavia and China in the post-Mao period, the other socialist countries usually have valued stability as the desideratum of political development. The same is the case with a large number of third world countries who have tried to build up regimented state system with local government as the grassroots outpost of the centralized state. But quite a few developing countries in Asia and Africa have also tried in their own ways to use local government institutions for nation-building purposes by providing for people's participation in development programme and reconciling local aspirations with national identities.

Mao's concept of self-sufficient communes in China and Gandhi's concept of self-sufficient village "swaraj" in India were basically a sort of semi-utopian ideas of nation-building by-passing the conventional local government apparatus. But what these ideas inherently stressed was that any over-developed, centralized state

using bureaucratic machineries would be inimical to the nation-building process. Taking the clue from these ideological adventures, local government system in the third world countries can be reformed and revitalized for meeting the socioeconomic as well as ethnic-cultural needs of the people, and for mobilization of manpower and financial resources at the grassroots level. In the evolving societies of the third world where the process of nation-building and state-building still remain incomplete, local government institutions, especially in rural areas, can achieve something very substantial.⁹ But in order to achieve the best result, local autonomy and decentralization need to be accepted as the two essential values. And it is on this point that most of the third world countries have defaulted in recent times.

Infrastructural Function

One of the proverbial infrastructural weakness of local government in post-colonial societies is the absence of constitutional recognition of local government as a recognized limb of the total governmental structure. This weakness has put local government in the third world at the mercy of higher-level government. However, in the Nigerian federal system, local government has obtained distinct constitutional recognition under the reforms of 1976, as the third tier of government and has been assigned clearly stated functions and financial resources.¹⁰ But the Nigerian system suffers from structural and functional imbalances.¹¹ In Brazil also local government (municipalities) has been recognized as a distinct tier of government under the Constitutional amendment of 1988. This is a very crucial point to note.

In designing infrastructural functions of local government it is important to determine what function should belong to which level of government. Allocation of functions between national, regional and local government, and, also between different tiers of local government, must take note of not only manpower, financial and technological, but also political and cultural factors concerned. Local government in the third world is generally condemned as inefficient and corrupt and is regarded as mere "garbage-dustbin" government. The reason for this state of affairs is not far too seek. Being denied of adequate functions and matching resources to serve

the local community, local government in these countries fails to attract competent political leaders and trained career officials. This seems to be a vicious circle which irrevocably condemns local government to an inferior status in the estimation of the people.

Linkage Function

The importance of competent local leadership in making local government a success can hardly be overemphasized. One of the avowed objectives of a well-developed local government system is to provide a two-way channel of communication between the local community and the higher-level government. From the viewpoint of political sociological analysis, the power elite in the third world countries is a "limited" one, but it has started "expanding" in recent times in some of the post-colonial societies.¹² Local politics assumes importance only when its outcome has significance for regional and/or national politics. The kind of issues which are seen to arise in local-level politics (for example, land-use planning, resettlement policy, school education system, etc.) are clearly linked with higher-level policy and political attitude. Rosenthal's study of Indian city politics has clearly found linkage between local-level politics and state-level politics; similarly Rodney Jones finds that local politics in India is no autonomous political phenomenon and is essentially linked with state-level political process.¹³

Most of the third world countries have, more or less, the same kind of experience of state-local linkages. The change in local government's linkage function can be noted in the growing preference for political management of local government. In very few countries today local government is considered an apolitical delivery machinery of social services under the leadership of local notables fighting for local liberties. Partisan and ideological politics is on the growing at the local level in many third world countries ranging from Nepal and Pakistan to Nigeria and Brazil. Autonomous local government and politics, performing little linkage function, is today more an exception than the general pattern.

Changing Role

With changing functions, the role of local government in third world countries is also undergoing a change. More and more it is being

realized that local government in these countries is an eminently suitable machinery to increase people's participation in policy-formulation and its implementation. Strategies for macro-level development may be determined at higher levels of government and they are also determined, in some cases, by international development agencies like the World Bank. But successful implementation of development policies can never be ensured by-passing local government and popular involvement. Herein lies the real significance of the role of local government.

Development of local government presupposes democracy and decentralization. The third world countries have to accept this bigger political challenge. For the avowed purpose of economic development, the national bourgeoisie in these post-colonial societies always tend to concentrate more and more decision-making powers in the centralized state which is dominated by two other collaborating agencies, viz., the bureaucracy and the military. This is because of the fact that in most post-colonial societies power-sharing has been confined to these three groups, and they have committed themselves to the capitalist path of development. When power-holders in the third world countries talk of grassroots democracy, their tactic is populism and misleading the toiling masses about the real centre of decision-making power. Local government in these societies is usually given the role of an agent of the centralized state, engaged in preliminary public health functions and implementing localized development schemes in accordance with higher-level policy direction and supervision. Unified and integrated personnel system for local government administration is advocated on grounds of increasing the administrative and technical competence of local government, but the real motive seems to be a deep disinclination to part with controlling powers over local government.

In the third world countries there is a dangerous polarization between the interests of the ruling elites and those of the poor. Development policies and programmes are mostly out of touch with the aspirations and attitudes of the poor masses. There is also a strong reluctance to entrust local self-governing institutions with planning and development of the new towns established in post-independence period.¹⁴ In the post-colonial societies there is hardly

any stable national consensus about the desirable pattern of social development. The ruling elite is eager to imitate the development process of the western countries. The locally accountable political leadership is hardly given any decisive voice in the formulation of local development policies. The remarkable feature of the development process in the third world is the delinking of local government from responsibilities of managing local development. Local government in the third world has not been allowed to play the role of 'local state'¹⁵ reflecting state activity in socioeconomic policies in the local area. It simply does not possess meaningful powers and functions for controlling local economy and its production and distribution system.

No Re-municipalization Trend

In sharp contrast to the recent trends in some western countries, there is no trend towards re-municipalization of the welfare state in the third world. The ruling elites in the majority of the post-colonial societies have consciously opted for working within the broad parameters of the capitalist system. When they talk of decentralization they mean, in practice, "deconcentration" of the centralized state machinery. In the social welfare democratic countries in the west the demand for strong local government rests on the need to reduce both decision over-load and implementation over-load of the central government. It is argued that local government would be able to share the load of decision-making and implementation, and thereby would strengthen the democratic basis of the welfare state by distributing widely the power of decision-making and implementation.

The argument is frustrated in the case of third world countries because of their political economy working for inequitable distribution of national income. Their social structure is inherently lopsided, state-building is imperfect and nation-building is incomplete. The formal democratic institutions and practices adopted in a few third world countries are constantly under threat from a host of sociological and economic forces like tribalism, communalism, religious fundamentalism, black money and widespread politico-administrative corruption. The ruling elites comprising the bourgeoisie, bureaucracy and military take full advantage of this state of affairs

and push back local government into a position of subordinate implementor of policies decided at the central level. Re-municipalization of welfare functions, particularly of housing, health, education, slum improvement and land-use planning, would go a long way in achieving genuine decentralization. But this programme cannot be achieved with a local government system, as is found in the third world countries, suffering from vulnerable constitutional status, archaic management structure, acute fiscal debility, insignificant functional competence, and lack of inter-sectoral coordination among development agencies.

Third world's political system is threatened by the reproduction process prevailing there. Most often it is tied to the needs of international capitalism which dictates the general shape of planning and development policy. The weak role of local government in the third world is a reflection of this tie-up between this bigger economic force and the indigenous elite interested in exercising power with the help of centralized state apparatus. The ills of local government in the third world are multi-dimensional in character and can be correctly diagnosed only with reference to the nature of the state and political economy prevailing there.

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The Political Economy of State-Capital Relationship in Chile, 1964-1982

THE ROLE OF the state in the economic development of third world societies becomes crucial in the sense that the urge for local industrialization and accumulation can hardly be undertaken without the help of the former as the local propertied classes can rarely impose its domination over indigenous industrial development because of its technologic deficiency and managerial inefficiency. Broadly speaking, three different policies can be suggested : First, following liberal school of international political economy, one can argue that the major policy objective of a peripheral state should be to create a healthy atmosphere so that foreign aid and foreign investment may pour into the economy—this, in turn, will increase capital goods, imports, improve balance of payments, reduce inflationary pressures and transfer technology in such a society.¹ Secondly, the state can pursue a policy of protectionism so that local capital does not enter into direct competition with foreign capital, and simultaneously can play an entrepreneurial role and thereby supplant local capital. Finally, the state can reconstruct its economy by destroying its dependent economic structure.

A look into the first two options would reveal that both of them are consistent with the 'mediating' function of a peripheral state. Foreign capital will seek to have an alliance with local capital because of its need to secure information from local capital regarding the internal market as well as to overcome its vulnerability to national criticism in a given peripheral society.² Neither can the policy of protectionism be a panacea as local capital continues to rely on foreign capital on account of latter's superior technological and financial capabilities as well as managerial efficiency. The same

logic can be applied to the possible role of state capital : if local capital cannot fulfil the requirements of superior technological capability, greater financial investments and better managerial efficiency in relation to foreign capital, it remains debatable and doubtful whether and how a peripheral state can ensure these qualities. In other words, both the first two policy options would require balancing the interests of foreign and local capital. The third policy option will necessitate "a restructuring of the mode of articulation of the economy with the world economy" and "the only realistic alternatives are revolution or continued dependency".⁸

The main purpose of this paper is neither to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the three policy alternatives mentioned above nor to formulate alternative, but viable, development strategy for a third world country. Our objective is rather modest — the main purpose of our paper is to argue that neither autonomous capitalist development nor dependency-reduction will be possible in a peripheral country, within the existing political framework as its economy is too tightly integrated into the international division of labour. Two different questions will be asked : First, to what extent is it possible for a peripheral state to pursue a policy which will pave the way for autonomous capitalist development in such a society ? Secondly, to what extent is it possible for a peripheral state to bring about changes in the dependent status of such a society through peaceful means ? We shall try to answer these two questions by looking into the state-capital relationship in Chile during the period 1964-1973. This period is important as it reflects clearly the contrasts between two different policy options — autonomous capitalist development and dependency-reduction — for a peripheral state and their possible limitations.

This paper will be divided into three parts. In the first part, we shall show how, the Chilean state under President Frei (1964-1970) pursued a policy of Chileanization whose main purpose was to stimulate increased use of Chilean products and investment goods by copper companies, and thereby help indigenous bourgeoisie to consolidate their position vis-a-vis their metropolitan counterpart, and with what consequences. The second part will be concerned with how the Chilean state under President Allende's stewardship

(1970-1973) tried to lessen or break its links with the world capitalist economies within the existing politico-juridical framework, but ended up in one of the greatest tragedies in human history. In the third part, we shall try to show very briefly how the military regime, through its economic policies, had virtually tried to reassert Chile's traditional position in the international division of labour as a raw material producer. This paper will show two different things : first, it will reveal that the main challenge to the democratic foundations of a third world country would come not from the left, but from the right, and the so-called democratic forces even if any elected government seeks to bring about radical transformation in such a society ; secondly, the success or failure of development strategies in the third world can be assessed only through a clear understanding of the dominant forces in the international economy and by recognizing the class linkages between domestic and international force of such a society.

State Intervention

Direct intervention by the state in the capital accumulation process in Chile was not something new. In fact, although Nuevo Tracto (New Deal) in 1955 eliminated the discriminatory exchange rate treatment which large-scale copper industries had been facing for local costs of production since 1930, its, at least implicit, nationalist undertone cannot be ignored. The main function of the newly established Department of Copper, under this law, was not merely to "intervene in the international commerce of copper, with the object of maintaining or extending markets for Chilean copper and preventing or counteracting any action tending unilaterally to control or restrict its markets",⁴ but also to encourage and compel copper mines to use locally produced goods. The latter had been reflected in the issue of a list of 'import qualifications' by the Department. Not only that, the effort to return to laissez-faire policy was, at least partly, an effort by the domestic bourgeoisie to restrain government from intervening in their activities.

The major impetus for Chileanization under Frei could be traced back to the fact that foreign companies raised their profits without

contributing to the industrialization process of the country. The profits of foreign companies increased nearly 90% during the period 1955-1959, compared to that of the 1950-1954 period. They did not reinvest in Chile — while Kennecott's subsidiary, the Braden Copper Company, did not reinvest anything at El Teniente during 1955-1959 period. Anaconda's investment in Chile Exploration Company and the Chuquicamata mine was rarely more than 40% of the annual average for 1950-1954.⁵ On the contrary, these companies started using their profits to expand their operations in their homeland — while a refinery was built at Baltimore by Kennecott, Anaconda continued to modernize its domestic ore bases in copper and aluminium.⁶ The Chileans were not merely concerned about the suspension of import duties on machinery and equipment, amortizations of new investment over a period of five years, but were also concerned over the loss of vast amounts of capital through remittances.⁷

Such a concern had been reflected in the way the Chilean Congress and various political groups reacted to Kennecott Corporation's proposal for bigger investment in Chilean copper mines, and for freezing the Nuevo Tracto for the next twenty years. Not a single political group supported such proposals — on the contrary, the Chilean Congress imposed two special taxes on profits both for El Teniente and Chuquicamata copper mines and reintroduced the old discriminatory exchange rate for the Gran Minería or the Large Mining Sector. In fact, one of the main issues of the 1964 presidential election was not whether copper mines should be nationalized or not, but what would be the degree of nationalization.

Apart from that, the demand for Chileanization was also partly a reaction to the nature of the Chilean state — which can be described as a 'compromise state'⁸ — and contradictions inherent in such a state. The contradiction of such a state arises from the fact that it should be able to accommodate interests of various social groups. The problem with such a state in Chile was how to accommodate interests of a strong, but not hegemonic, industrial bourgeoisie without giving the idea to other groups that they had been deprived for the former's expansion. By the mid-60s, the Chilean economy reached an almost stagnant stage and it was clear

to the dominant group in Chile at this point, in the context of increasing social unrest, that Allende, who lagged behind Alessandri only by 3% of total votes cast in the 1958 presidential election would achieve victory. The result was that they extended their support in favour of Frei, who came out with an apparently progressive, but a neo-capitalist, programme.

One surprising development of this period was that local capital did not seek an alliance with foreign capital even though the societal status quo continued to be threatened by the increasing social unrest. This is because a skepticism continued to grow among the local bourgeoisie regarding the role of foreign companies following promulgation of Nuevo Tracto and the American insistence on agrarian reform under Kennedy's Alliance for Progress programme. The landed oligarchy, though no longer the main partner in the social power structure, still had a strong social hold as industrialization in Chile had started only with, at least tacit, consent from the landowning class with a guarantee that land reform would not be initiated.

The Alliance for Progress naturally contained a threat to such an understanding. Enrique Serrano, the minister of mines in Alessandri cabinet, reacted sharply to land reform proposals under the Alliance for Progress when he attributed Chile's developmental problem not to the landed oligarchy, but to the copper companies. The skepticism of the Chilean local capital against foreign capital was expressed when the rightist newspaper *El Diario Ilustrado* wrote in its issue of 9 June, 1961, "... despite the concessions given by the Nuevo Tracto, the hoped-for new investments never materialized. Our percentage of world production keeps declining and the companies will not invest enough to keep up, let alone recover, the 1945-1949 Chilean share of the world market".⁹ Thus, according to 'not anti-North American' Conservative Party Senator, Francisco Bulnes, the government should nationalize copper mines.¹⁰

The question is: to what extent did Chileanization help the indigenous bourgeoisie? Did such a policy produce any conflict between foreign capital and the Chilean state? We shall try to answer these last two questions together. The Chileanization of Gran Minería did not generate any rift between the Chilean state

and foreign capital as the Chilean state had been able to reach agreement with Anaconda and Kennecott Corporations in 1966,¹¹ and also made an agreement with the Continental Copper and Steel Industry as well as its Chilean subsidiary, the Sagasca Copper Mining Company in 1967-68.¹² In fact, the Kennecott Corporation voluntarily requested the Chilean government to purchase 51% ownership in the El Teniente Mine, while, the Anaconda Company, after initial resistance to Chileanization, urged the Chilean government to acquire 100% of the shares over a period of several years.

Another question is : why and how did it happen ? First, neither Kennecott nor Anaconda did so out of their generosity nor did they accept Chileanization out of respect for the increasing strength of the Chilean state. Both of them accepted Chileanization as a bargain against complete nationalization — while Anaconda found better growth possibilities in the newly discovered nickel-copper deposits at Montana and high-grade nickel sulfides in southern Australia, Kennecott was able to secure tax concessions from the Chilean government as well as guarantee for loans both from EX-IM Bank and the Chilean government for its further investment.

Secondly, Chileanization was not nationalization, but rather a mechanism of joint partnership between the Chilean state and the copper companies. To the US government such a policy was better than the possible victory of Salvador Allende, as the *Engineering and Mining Journal* in November 1964 stated : "Washington remains hopeful of getting along well in Chile with the new moderate-leftist Frei's government even though problems are apt to crop up. The feeling is that any problem created will probably be minor compared to those that would have resulted if the Marxist Allende had won ... Privately, top Washington officials admit Frei's election was greatly helped by the 'serious efforts' of US copper interests aiding the US information Agency" (sic.)¹³

Although the main purpose behind Chileanization was, as we have already seen, to help local capital, in reality, it was foreign capital which became the real beneficiary. Keith Griffin has shown, on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, that Chileanization programme

could not bring about a greater benefit to the Chilean government (Table 1).

TABLE 1

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT IN COPPER
UNDER CHILEANIZATION PROGRAMME (US \$ MILLION)

<i>Project</i>	<i>Chilean Government</i>	<i>Foreign Companies</i>
El Teneiente		
Benefits (B)	134.48	129.00
Costs (C)	129.39	39.23
B/C	1.04	3.29
B-C	5.09	89.77
Rio Blanco		
B	59.00	57.31
C	19.35	46.97
B/C	3.05	1.22
B-C	39.65	10.34
Anaconda Group		
B	118.69	295.39
C	6.66	146.16
B/C	17.82	2.02
B-C	112.03	149.73

Source : Kenneth Griffin, *Underdevelopment in Spanish America : An Interpretation* (Cambridge : MIT Press, 1969), p. 164.

He shows that "in both Teniente and Rio Blanco projects, particularly the former, Chile's costs were excessive, and in the Anaconda project her benefits were deficient. It seems clear ... that the Chilean negotiators were at a severe disadvantage when bargaining with the former ... The partnership that was formed with the companies has been decidedly unequal".¹⁴ Ingram has also shown that the profits of Gran Minería rose from 32.1 million dollars in 1965 to 61.1 million dollars, 72.9 million dollars and 73.3 million dollars in 1966, 1967 and 1968 respectively.¹⁵

Thus, there is no doubt that President Frei's Chileanization programme deliberately discriminated against the local bourgeoisie who were neither given protection nor granted equal rights even to

import equipment duty-free.¹⁶ Frei's failure to get a fair share of the copper enterprises led the Chilean Congress to pass a legislation in 1968 which would enable all large mining companies to pay the Chilean government all incomes beyond 29 cents per pound.¹⁷ Though Frei refused to implement this legislation, such a move by the Chilean Congress reflected the concern of the conservative forces in Chilean society. One should note that by this time, conservatives, radicals, liberals, communists as well as the socialists — all were demanding nationalization, rather than Chileanization of copper mines.¹⁸

Again, a study of fifty-seven individuals, who were keen on inviting foreign investments into the country and hold government positions in Chile, during May-August 1969 and April 1971, had shown that a sizable number of people, nearly 50%, believed that the Chilean foreign investment policy was unfair to the domestic industrialists and supported some kind of restriction on foreign investment.¹⁹ Assuming that these interviewees came from an upper or upper-middle class background, by virtue of the criterion for selection, it can be argued that Chileanization policy generated a growing opposition to the state by the better-off section of the society. This was reflected in a comment, made by a conservative member of the National Agricultural Association, although in a different context. He said, "In whose interests is there devaluation of our money every 15 days? Why are trucks that the mines acquire 15,000 escudos, yet for agriculture they cost 80,000? (sic.) Why are agriculture prices not fixed with the same criteria with which they fix the price of iron? Why aren't equal guarantees for capital and agricultural profits given that are given to capital and profits of the telephone company?"²⁰ The emphasis on 'capital and profits of the telephone company' is very significant.

In fact, this was for the first time that the division within the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA or Society for Factory Development), a national manufacturers' association, became clearly apparent. It was divided into pro-government and anti-government factions — in fact, election to its presidency, the first ever in its history, showed a clear division between these two groups. While one-third of its members supported Frei, two-thirds remained in

opposition. Again, one study of sample industrialists showed that 47% of the industrialists were opposed to Frei, while 4, 14, 26 and 8 per cent extended 'very favourable', 'moderate', 'limited', and 'no support at all' respectively to Frei's programmes.²¹

If Chileanization did create a gap between the Chilean state and the local bourgeoisie, the constitutional amendment bill of November 1964 further reinforced such a process. Although the main purpose of this bill was to bring about a radical transformation in the country side, the main provisions of this bill — introduction of the concept 'social function' of property and reservation of exclusive state-domination of certain types of property in the face of community demands — made the industrialists equally frightened. One SOFOFA member said, "This is a problem that will come down on us with all its force when it will no longer be possible to stop it. Everyone is convinced that it only affects agriculture when what is really at stake is the right to property itself".²² Such a breach became apparent when Ernesto Pinto Lagarrigue, the acting President of the SOFOFA, in front of President Frei in the opening ceremony of annual industrial fair at Antofagasta in 1966, urged both landowners and business community not to approve such a bill.²³ Although the bill was passed in 1967 after a compromise had been reached, the alienation of the state from the propertied sections of the society was completed.

From the above analysis, two conclusions follow: First, although Chileanization had resulted in an increasing partnership between the Chilean state and foreign capital, especially US capital, it had failed to establish a linkage between foreign and local capital, which, in turn, had alienated the Chilean state from the latter. Secondly, the failure of foreign investment to contribute to local private capital accumulation process and the rigid faith of President Frei on the need for foreign capital²⁴ led to a complete breach between the Chilean state and local capital.

Configuration of Political Economy

A look into the ideological orientation and the presence of parties within the umbrella of the United Popular (Popular Unity or UP) would clearly reveal that such an alliance was least sympathetic to

the interests of the Chilean propertied classes, and the process of alienation between the two was almost inevitable. But a close look into the configuration of Chilean political economy during the early-70s would reveal certain unique features which might help us to explain the Chilean coup of 1973 in terms of certain structural constraints in which the Chilean society was trapped.

Three different features can be identified. First, it was true that both Allende and UP paid too much emphasis on nationalization as well as state intervention in certain sectors of the economy. But neither nationalization nor state intervention constituted an important issue in Chilean history. Although the Corporacion de Fomento (Development Corporation or CORFO) was established in 1939, state intervention in the economy can be traced back to the 1840s when the Chilean state played a significant role in the establishment of the country's first sugar refinery — both Presidents Balmaceda (1886-1891) and Alessandri (1920-1925) played a significant role in bringing about modernization and industrialization of the country through significant state intervention.

Further, most of the mass transport system, including the railways and electricity in the Santiago-Valparaiso area, part of oil exploration and processing, and the national steel firm were either state owned or had been established by the state. We have also seen that both Nuevo Tracto in the mid-50s and Frei's Chileanization programme contained nationalist as well as interventionist overtones, despite their contrary outcomes. In this sense, Allende's emphasis on nationalization and state intervention did not indicate any significant alteration or reversal of the role of the Chilean state. Naturally, the question arises : Why did Allende's policy of nationalization and state intervention raise so much hue and cry at an international level, especially in the US ? In what sense was his policy a break with the past ?

Secondly, we have already shown how the process of Chileanization generated a rift between foreign and local capitals and how the Chilean state leaned towards, as well as became more dependent on foreign investors. The issue of nationalization of copper was not an issue either in 1964 or in 1970 presidential election. Frei pursued a middle-way which, in turn, created a serious controversy and

ultimately a rift within his Christian Democratic Party on PDC. Not only was Allende committed to "release Chile from the domination of foreign capital" but he also declared his intention to nationalize copper, iron, saltpetre and other natural resources as soon as he came to power.²⁵

On 21 December 1970 Allende announced a draft amendment to the Chilean Constitution, which was adopted unanimously by the Chilean Congress after a long and heated discussion. The advocacy of nationalization of the copper industry both by Allende and the PDC contestant, Tomic, and the unanimous approval of the Chilean Congress reflected the consensus behind such a move. The reaction of foreign capital could be inferred, but the role of local capital remained ambivalent. If Allende acted against foreign capital, why did local capital oppose him? How did Allende alienate local capital from the Chilean state?

Thirdly, one of the main objectives of the Allende regime was to establish a new socioeconomic sector of production, known as the Areas de Propiedad Socialy Mixta (Areas of Social and Mixed Property or APSM). This scheme divided the Chilean economy into three areas: first, the 'social area' (Area de Propiedad Social or APS), in which all firms would be controlled by the state; secondly, the 'mixed area' (Area de Propiedad Mixta or APM) in which both state and private, including foreign, firms would engage in joint ventures; and, thirdly, the 'private area' (Area de Propiedad Privada or APP), in which all small enterprises would operate, and the non-expropriation of those firms were assured.

The PDC introduced almost a similar bill, mainly known as the Hamilton-Fuentealba bill, almost along the same line. The difference between the two, however, was that the latter wanted to create an area, known as the Empresas de Trabajadores or the Self-management Area where the workers would create their own enterprises. While UP rejected this provision on the ground that it would negate the main logic of a planned economy, PDC objected to the transfer of certain farms to the 'social area' and its organizational set-up. The main implication of such a difference lies in the fact that they resulted in a serious deadlock between the presidency and the Chilean Congress. The question is: how did the Chilean

capitalists react to those institutions ? How did the APSM bring about a rift between the Chilean state and local capital ?

These questions can be explained by examining the nature and commitment of these two different regimes under PDC and UP respectively. We have already seen that Frei's Chileanization programme was, in reality, an effort to reconcile the two opposing trends of private ownership and nationalization. We have also argued that the whole process of Chileanization resulted in a greater consolidation of the holdings of the foreign capital over the Chilean economy.

Allende's policy was much more committed than that of Frei as had been reflected in the pursuence of an aggressive nationalization policy by the former. Only in its first year of office, the Allende regime, using Law 520 of August 1932, secured "almost complete control of the production of nitrates, iodine, copper, coal, iron, steel ; about 90% of the financial and banking sector ; almost 80% of the exports and 55% of imports, as well as a substantial part of the textile, cement, metal, fishing, soft drinks, electronics, part of

TABLE 2

ANACONDA AND KENNECOT PROFITABILITY AND INVESTMENTS, 1969 (IN \$)

<i>Investments :</i>	<i>Anaconda</i>	<i>Kennecot</i>
Worldwide	1,116,170,000	1,108,155,000
In Chile	199,030,000	15,877,000
% in Chile	16.64	13.16
<i>Profits :</i>		
Worldwide	99,313,000	165,395,000
In Chile	78,692,000	35,338,000
% in Chile	79.24	21.37
<i>Rate of Return :</i>		
% Worldwide	8.5	15.0
% in Chile	39.5	24.1

Source : Chilean Government Advertisement in the *New York Times*, 25 January 1971.

the distribution industries".²⁶ All these minerals, except coal, had some kind of US investment, although copper constituted the largest and most important investment — both Anaconda and Kennecott considered Chilean investment highly important both in terms of profitability and the rate of return (Table 2). Thus Allende's nationalization policy would have severely affected the interests of the two American companies. In fact, Chileanization under Frei had the consent of two American companies and the latter secured prices from the Chilean government much beyond the bookvalue of their assets, while the Allende regime nationalized all foreign assets in the Chilean copper sector with an amount of compensation which did not satisfy its foreign owners.²⁷

The US direct investment in the nationalization question became crucial in two different ways. On the one hand, the two US companies had insured their assets with Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) against any possible expropriation.²⁸ On the other hand, the Chilean government made a clearcut demarcation between American and non-American companies. While the Chilean government did not nationalize a Brazilian-owned bank and a British tobacco company, and returned Swedish-owned property after seizure, it did not spare the American companies.²⁹ Obviously, the US government was afraid that other developing countries might undertake such steps as was reflected in a comment made by John Petty, the then Under Secretary of the Treasury, who said: "We hope that it (the US government's retaliation policy) will make any other government contemplating such steps (the expropriation of American property) think twice before taking them."³⁰

Secondly, it is true that the Frei administration alienated itself from the Chilean bourgeoisie through its Chileanization programme which clearly strengthened foreign capital in Chile. But Frei, or, in that sense, the overall policy orientation of PDC was less threatening to the propertied classes than that of Allende, or the UP. A study of class composition of three political alliances as well as party preferences according to Class bias in 1970 by Barbara Stallings had shown that while the bourgeoisie, the professionals, and the petty-bourgeoisie favoured either the rightist alliance or PDC, the UP derived its support mainly from the blue-collar workers.³¹

Michael Fleet has criticized Stallings' findings and argued that PDC, had a good deal of working class support, but even he argued : "This working class base was not a very progressive one ... Some Christian Democratic sympathizers (14.1%) were actually planning to support Alessandri, most of those sticking with Tomic (60.8%) expressed greater opposition to Allende than to Alessandri."⁸²

The point is : the PDC was able to generate more confidence among the rightist people than Allende. In fact, nationalization measures, undertaken by the Allende regime, raised severe criticism from the Chilean industrialists. As the President of SOFOFA asked Allende in a letter : "If 1972 is to be the year of investment, as the ODEPLAN planners say, must we interpret that to mean that the state is only going to invest in buying up existing enterprises ?" — and one year after, the answer became straightforward as the SOFOFA President said, "This (Allende) government is systematically destroying Chilean industry".⁸³

Thirdly, we have already referred to the fact that SOFOFA was divided on the issue of supporting Frei. We have also argued how Frei's Chileanization process alienated the local bourgeoisie from the Chilean state. But one should not forget the fact that Frei's regime did not pose a threat to the whole property-relations of Chilean society. Neither should one ignore the historical fact that there exists a close linkage between the Chilean industrialists and foreign capital. For example, a study Richard Ratcliff has shown that the domestic industrial structure was not merely characterized by an interlocking family ties, but was also dominated by a coalition of foreign interests as well as foreign-oriented local capitalists.⁸⁴ Thus, even if we assume that the Allende regime was much more hostile to foreign, rather than local, capital, the latter would have every reason to be threatened because of its interlocking relationship with the former.

Finally, the UP programme made a clear division between multi-nationals, large business houses and monopolies on the one side and small and medium industries on the other. In fact, Allende announced openly that "we must realize that the programme of Unidad Popular offers the soundest and broadest guarantees of

security for small and medium-scale industries ... These firms will receive thoroughgoing and powerful support of the Unidad Popular government."⁸⁵ Despite such a proclamation, the Allende regime failed to secure clear support from small industrialists. This can be substantiated by referring to the nationalization of banks in Chile and its impact on small industrialists. The main purpose of bank nationalization was to extend greater credit facilities with lower interest rates to small companies, agricultural cooperatives as well as to disperse loans on a wider geographical basis. But, unfortunately, credit monopoly, enjoyed by the state as a result of bank nationalization, generated a confrontation between small industries and the state as the former started accusing the state of discrimination since large enterprises under government control continued to secure a larger share of the total credit, available to industries.⁸⁶

From the above analysis, two conclusions follow: first, the Chilean ruling class, which was split, was unable to get rid of its dependent character within the international capitalist hierarchy in the late-60s and early-70s, neither was it in a position to offer any solution to the crisis besetting Chilean society. But its hegemonic position within the Chilean society and its historically interlocking position helped it to stand united in the wake of a serious threat from the dominated sections of the society.⁸⁷ Secondly, a question has been raised as far back as 1972: "Can a legally elected Marxist government bring about socialism without breaking through the legal framework of the bourgeois state through which it gained power in the first place? And if it does try to break through, won't it be overthrown?"⁸⁸ Today, the answer, on the basis of Chilean experience is clear — that is, an unequivocal "No".

Capitalist Development

Finally, we shall show very briefly how the policies, pursued by the military junta in post-1973 era, had affected the process of capitalist development in Chile. Two features can be identified. First, initially, the junta, in its effort to normalize capitalist relations, sought not only to control inflation and redistribute income in favour of the capitalist class but also tried to establish a cordial relationship with international capital.⁸⁹ Since 1975, under the impact of Chicago

school, the junta decided to open up the economy to the international competition that optimal allocation of domestic resources could take place. Secondly, in its effort to achieve a normal equilibrium within the Chilean economy, the Chilean state resorted to increased privatization of the economy, the purpose being to secure no state intervention in the economy as well as not to share surplus with various fractions of capital.⁴⁰

Two consequences followed. First, as a result of excessive import liberalization, the domestic bourgeoisie had suffered tremendously. In 1982 alone, more than eight hundred companies declared bankruptcy.⁴¹ Further, a small part of the bourgeoisie, whom Frank⁴² had called 'monopoly bourgeoisie', had either established or had been trying to establish its hegemony — a forecast, made nearly ten years ago by Henderson⁴³ — had come true. A study of publicly-subsidized companies registered in two largest Chilean cities in 1978 had shown that more than 5% of the total assets were in the hands of the five largest Chilean economic groups and foreign-owned companies. The same study had also shown that the two largest economic groups controlled about 50% of the total assets.⁴⁴ Another scholar had also reached the same conclusion. He found that only six financial groups controlled two-thirds of Chile's 250 firms.⁴⁵

Secondly, as a result of declining economic functions of the state⁴⁶ the Chilean economy had become more integrated into the international capitalist system, as local entrepreneurs were relying more and more on foreign capital. Only between 1977 and 1980, \$ 4,338 million out of \$ 6,460 million, i.e., 75% of total loan, was in private debt and the Chilean banks borrowed it from foreign banks.⁴⁷ Apart from that, foreign direct investment had not poured into the economy, as was expected by the policy makers — neither did they go into the investment sector. As a result the level of industrialization continued to be hampered in Chile. In fact, nearly half of the accumulated total of actual foreign direct investments in Chile went not to new investment, but were used to purchase assets of existing firms.⁴⁸ It is true that the Chilean military junta had been successful enough to diversify the export sector by resorting to exports of non-traditional items like forestry, fishing etc. and thereby reduced Chile's exclusive reliance on copper from 75.5% in

1970 to 45.7% in 1980.⁴⁹ But, lack of reliance on local or state investment and excessive reliance on foreign investment, may reverse the process⁵⁰ which would mean, in the Chilean context, the further reinforcement of deindustrialization process.

The adoption of strictly monetarist policy by the Chilean state in post-1973 era was the result of culmination of a process, started in the 1940s. The state-directed, protectionist policy created a proletarian class and was successful to generate internal demands. This, in turn, "created economic and political pressures, which the economic system — assumed to have been inefficient because of protection — could not meet and which the 'compromise state' could not contain. A radical departure from that model was required ; a move away from protection of domestic industry, in fact, from industrialization itself. The 'inefficient' national industrial capitalist was as much responsible for the debacle as the populace. Financial capital was thus ready to take its place as the hegemonic fraction, and monetarism was the alternative economic philosophy."⁵¹

Dependent Nature

The dependent nature of peripheral economy and the constraints of the Chilean state in pursuing autonomous policies were reflected in comparison with that clearly in the area of state-capital relationship. There was no doubt that Frei, in his own way, played a significant role in the process of capital accumulation and Allende tried his best to reduce dependency in Chile. Their attitude to foreign capital had been shaped by various factors including strong pressure from the domestic bourgeoisie (Frei) as well as by the ideological orientation of the executive organ of the state (Allende). However, it was Frei, rather than Allende, who showed a compromising attitude towards foreign capital. His Chileanization programme offered a classic example of compromise — but even such action did not help him to secure support from the Chilean bourgeoisie as such compromise resulted in the failure of the state either to protect the local bourgeoisie or to transfer profits from the copper mines to the Chilean bourgeoisie.

Again, nationalization is a two-edged sword : on the one hand, such a strategy would alienate the state from foreign capital as

happened in Chile under Allende ; and, on the other, nationalization can also alienate the state from local capital as such measures can be used by the state to undermine the existing property relationship. Even the small-scale industries may become doubtful about the role of the state in view of nationalization strategy as happened in Chile. Finally, the role of the state sector in Chile during Allende revealed that the strategy of state monopoly over large-scale and/or capital intensive industries required a preferential treatment for state-controlled enterprises as far as credit facilities and other financial incentives were concerned. As a result, the private sector (including small-scale industries) not only felt discriminated against and deprived in relation to state enterprises, but also considered such strategy as a mechanism of undermining the entire concept of private property. The lesson is clear : autonomous capitalist development in peripheral societies would prove to be an illusion, and dependency-reduction by peaceful means would continue to be a myth. At least that is what the Chilean experience tells us.

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Political Region And Nation In India : Towards A Paradigm Of Identity Reproduction

THE MAIN AIM of this paper is to offer a critique of two of the prevalent theories of identity—the discontinuity and choice theories—as they have been developed to explain the Indian context. Our first objection to these theories lies in their failure either to sensitize us to the phenomenon of social change or to explain it in a satisfactory way. They are mostly deterministic in that they intend to explain how identities come into being rather than what they do at present. Their functions are relevant for an understanding of their contribution to social change. Secondly, the theories put emphasis on the individual as the subject of identity. They hardly look into macro-political configuration of all the possible identities.

At the end, we also draw up a paradigm of social reproduction of identities. In this the arrangement between different identities on the one hand and different levels of the mode of production (say, economic, political, ecological, etc.) is far less important than the internal arrangement of different identities themselves. All this is done with reference to only two identities for purposes of convenience : *political region* and *nation*.

This paper consists of three unequally divided parts. The first part tends to focus on the problem that we set out to discuss. The second part basically is a restatement of the aforementioned theories. In the third part, we present a tentative framework of our paradigm. This is tentative because it needs to be empirically worked out further, and hence, is subject to verification.

The Problem

Political region and nation conceptually shade into my paradigm insofar as they constitute two dimensions of an individual's identity-discourse. Both impinge on the individual or the individual embraces them as two identity subsystems. The converse is also true.

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In between them we can think of a continuum from partial impingement to partial rejection. It would be our major contention, as we shall see later on, that the two subsystems are enmeshed in a hierarchy.

It is the individual who is *inserted* into the hierarchy of identity subsystems. Individual insertion into the hierarchy is not specifically biased in favour of a theory which holds that the identity is like a hat that he may put on and off at his own will. The sovereignty of the individual is not the built-in-assumption of the theory. Nor do we jump to the other extreme that the subsystems are determined by the realities of the two dimensions—political region and nation. My argument is one of *configuration*: once configured, the identity implies 'a series of constraints on the kinds of roles an individual is allowed to play, and the partners he may choose for different kinds of transaction.'¹ The configuration is futuristic: it is more interested in discerning what it does than how it becomes what it is. The pre-configuration hypothesis is our given datum, as we cannot undo the past.

Hence, my problematic is the individual's insertion into the configuration of identity subsystems universally constituting numerous 'moments' of hierarchy. And I must say that hitherto this has been only inadequately researched. Almost all the studies available in the field are deterministic, or at their most, cross-deterministic in that they tend to link up the two dimensions of political region and nation within the broader canvas of developing capitalism.² But, identities once formed a wide range of possibilities in which the individual may be inducted and may present him as an epistemic subject. To examine the range of possibilities is a bold attempt and our point of departure would be, what I call, the discontinuity school.

Two caveats must be noted before we leave the point. First, the concept of individual insertion into the hierarchy of identity subsystems does not necessarily mean a battle won by the individual over the collective. While a nation entails the 'atomization' of the individuals in Europe, the regional identity is 'collective', though of course it can be 'collective individualistic' as in the case of south India.³ The point at issue is whatever be the dimension, identity

subsystem pertains to the individual and it is the individual along with many who must get mobilized to consolidate the two identity subsystems and who must be prepared to pay relative obeisance to them. Hence, the individual here is an *analytical* unit rather than an *ontological* unit. Since the individual exists only in intellectual analysis to consolidate the identity subsystems, the empirical method of surveying the individual will be simply irrelevant to the purpose. Secondly, if by state process we mean 'mode of power', then the way the state organizes the exercise of power in post-colonial India will also be a good commentary on how the identity subsystems may prove worthwhile in analysing it.⁴ I shall touch upon that as we shall have occasions to move back to it.

Discontinuity : A Brief outline

What we call 'history' may be simplistically collapsed into social change from 'tradition' to 'modernity'. Each epoch is characterized not in terms of the social functions that the society organizes and patterns but in terms of identity form or forms commanding such organization and patterning. Each identity form revealed in a dimension directs the way varieties of social functions are organized and patterned, and hence, is of utmost importance. Political region and nation are two identity forms distinguishing traditional society from a modern society.⁵

Thus conceived, the identity form is endowed with a "fixed" essence — a set of pre-postulated properties never amenable to human manipulation. As a result, a caste becomes 'a state of mind'⁶ and a nation, 'human sensibility'.⁷ Identity is defined in stasis. Identity form regulates and directs, organizes and patterns the whole gamut of social functions nauseatingly in tune with the "fixed" essence it is invested with.

Once this is done, the breakthrough of social change cannot be explained with reference to the identity form internal to the society. The stimulus for social change must be extraneously supplied, in order that change may be ushered in : 'a traditional society was fractured — losing its unity, cohesion, prestige and self-respect — by contact with more advanced societies'.⁸ But, a changed society in time has to be directed and regulated, governed and commanded

over by a new identity form, e.g., the nation. Thus, the hiatus between synchrony and diachrony of a society becomes complete and social change is the *discontinuity of the identity forms*.

Often the discontinuity proposition is stretched to senseless extremes whereby each identity form governing any epoch has to exhaust its potential such that it can demonstrate its readiness to receive the external stimulus. The existent identity form must be rendered impotent before any external stimulus can make its headway. It was Marx who had shown the extremely barren nature of village communities, the role that the British rule in India performed being 'an unconscious tool of history'. Marx also formulated that the British rule in India, through a number of mediations, laid down the rudimentary imprints of Indian nationalism.⁹

Choice of Identity Forms

As an 'ideal-typical' exercise, it is theoretically immensely helpful. But, in reality, the neat epochal distinctions commanded and governed by equally distinct identity forms are blurred and it hardly requires any proof to evince that. In order to account for the complexities and variegations that a social system is, the early optimism that regional identity forms are fated to give way to modern national identity form as 'naturally' as the sun rises in the east¹⁰ began to crumble and in its place, or in opposition to it, a new construct was elaborated — the 'choice' construct, as I put it. The basic premises of this construct are stated below :

- 1 Underlying the construct, there is an assumption of social system that wields at present more than one identity form and continually strives for maximization of the number of optional identity forms at the transitional phase. Or, in other words, in a transitional society, the rate of creation of 'modern' identity forms outruns the rate of replacement of 'traditional' identity forms. As the process of modernization grows apace, such quantitative profusion inevitably leads to a qualitative change (emergence of national identity form as a monad).
- 2 As a result, an individual has two or more (dual or multiple) identity forms, available to him.
- 3 An individual is necessarily 'rational'—capable of making a choice from among a whole host of them—'choice is a

matter of calculated effectiveness, of communicational ease, of operational efficiency'.¹¹ Being 'rational', it refers to a way of making decisions—which is secular. It does not mean automatically deciding in favour of 'secular' identity forms (say, nation, in the western sense).

4 By making a choice, an individual asserts one or a set of identity form or forms.

5 Since assertion of identity is a function of choice, the choice is situational and identity assertion is subject to change. But, here previous acts of identity assertion impose constraints on future 'rational' decisions.

The individual's status as a subject of choice—his very 'rationality' becomes a potential source of tension in the construct, especially in a country like India. Hence, the notion of 'situated individual' may be introduced to complicate it slightly and two additional premises may be requisitioned to focus on this aspect :

a Not all individuals are equally gifted with the faculty of choice. Some are more able to choose their identity forms than others. Thus, elite-subaltern cleavage may be effected.

b The massive incapacity of the subalterns is systemic. 'A peasant's identity is his very subalternity'.¹² His identity is cloistered on him and he consolidates in his being the 'image' of others.

Hence, history is not the social change from one identity form to another—mutually discontinuous. But, history is 'what man chooses to make it' by dictating over the plethora of identity forms.

The discontinuity school, in sum, conveys three interrelated notions of identity forms. First, identity form may be designated as the mechanism for ego-defence in an era of crisis, where loss of traditional-regional identity forms has caused a void yet to be replenished by modern-national ones. Second, identity form may be 'reified' in that it may be the prosaic narration of what the individual is—whether traditional or modern or Janus-faced. Third, identity form may be projective—an article of what the individual wishes to become. It is contrary to his 'being' as in the second—it is but his process of 'becoming'.

Differential Configuration of Identity

Conventionally, political region and nation are presupposed as two "solid" identity categories : each identity category has have an invariable and "fixed" essence whether the individual exercises his prerogative of choice or the identity category fixes up the individual 'naturally' from above.

Contrary to these presuppositions, we treat political region and nation as two crucial dimensions of India's macro-politics. Each makes up an identity subsystem whereby individual insertion is represented. Two sets of interrelations ought to be classified in this connexion. First, we are to be very careful about the interrelations that take place among the various rituals, signs, symbols and diacritical marks—the ideological fragments of the symbolic code of the identity subsystem. That some symbols are horizontally more equal than others is argued elsewhere in various usages as 'dominant symbol', 'core symbol' 'key symbol' or 'synoptic paradigm'. Political region as an identity subsystem can be articulated only through a subordination of caste-specific signs and symbols of identity. It functions as a symbol of 'near-maximal' political mobilization over and above the caste-specific signs and symbols.¹³ Also, the national identity stands at a still higher level of maximization : it is not merely the highest in the ascending series but in the political sphere as well. It often claims to be an exclusive one.¹⁴ So, all these refer to transformations wrought within the sign-system—the code of symbols that an identity subsystem stands for. An identity subsystem, in short, is a differential configuration.

On the other hand, these identity subsystems brought together, weave one identity system for any particular society : the latter 'condenses into one symbolic event, sign or act—patriotic pride, anxieties, remembrances of the past glory, or humiliations, promises of future greatness : some one of these or all of them'.¹⁵ With a risk of overgeneralization, we may submit that the identity system that condenses is also the constellation of the social relations of production.

The configuration of identity subsystems—political region and nation in a context, aptly sums up intra-systemic relations. It shows

a *symbolic division of labour* between the proximate and the distant, between the concrete and the abstract, between the collective and the individual. As it may sound, it is 'reciprocal and generalized co-operation of all individuals within the framework of identity system'¹⁶ represented by the fundamental pairs of ideological opposition. It reminds me of Dumont who speaks of the binary opposition between the pure and the impure embodied in the caste system in India.

A Model of Binary Opposition :

<i>Nation</i>	<i> distant abstract individual</i>
<i>Political Region</i>	<i> proximate concrete collective</i>

In passing, we may note that identity system thus constructed is again only a subsystem along with many such subsystems like material, demographic, ecological, social, etc. existing in any given society.

Identity Configuration and Social Reproduction

By way of writing down an interventionist theory of social change, the discontinuity proponents plot down the scope of social change to the intervening domain that spans between two distinct social stages. This theory exempts any particular stage of society from the quality of historicity. Evolution is thus reduced to something that occurs between stages, rather than presented as the outcome of processes that are inherent in the identity forms themselves. Therefore, it fails to see social variation that occurs in the social stage itself. (Such social variation, I shall argue, is generated by the outcome of the processes inherent in the identity subsystems and other systemic levels of mode of production).

The urgent task is to theoretically foreclose the dichotomy between social stage and social change, between synchrony and diachrony. Hence, it is far less concerned with the production of social stage as a definite 'moment' of break from one to the other. Our general interest is ; once produced, how does the social stage reproduce itself? So, social reproduction becomes the principal analytical tool if we refuse to enforce a dichotomy.

I am not pushing forth a general theory of social reproduction in India. That has been more ably and commendably done by structural and post-structural sociologists.¹⁷ Suffice it to say here that every system or 'structural level' has its 'relative autonomy' not in the sense of 'functional independence' that Althusser talks about, but in the sense of the intrinsic systemic properties — its tendencies emanating from its internal contradictions. These are called, intra-systemic properties. For instance, within the total identity system, the contradiction between political region and nation is encapsulated. Each system contributes to the social reproduction in India.

But any theory of social reproduction is against the identification of any identity form undertaking the given inventory of social functions.¹⁸ What appears as 'caste' in terms of a number of inherent cultural characteristics might function as a superstructure in one society and as relations of production in another.¹⁹ As a result, inter-systemic relations are likely to be taken into account and properly analysed. Thus, Kenneth David's book, *The New Wind : Changing Identities in South Asia*²⁰ — perhaps the only of its kind on India, dwells at length on these inter-systemic relations.

But the intra-systemic relations have received only scant attention. Hence, *the configuration and its role in the social reproduction of the identity-system itself with unpredictably multifarious mediations* have to be fruitfully researched than the mere determination of such configuration. Of course, we must note that the properties of intra-systemic relations (e.g. the ideological divergence embodied in the identity system) require an investigation into other systemic levels in the mode of production for their realization.²¹ In order to make the tendencies realize, the role of inter-systemic relations is mediatory. Hence, my theoretical emphasis should by now be amply clear. It is keyed on the basic query : how does the configuration reproduce itself manipulating properties internal to the configuration itself with the possible mediation of other 'structural levels' ? The study, viewed in this light is doubly limited : it does not study the role of 'intersystemic relations' in the determination of the configuration, as I have pointed out earlier. Secondly, it does not study the totality of the process of social reproduction that obtains in India ; it only studies the extent to which the configuration, howsoever determined,

generates endogenic properties capable of reproducing itself. It is reasonable to assume that in the reproduction of the particular configuration, intra-systemic relations matter more than inter-systemic relations. But in course of enacting these relations, inter-systemic relations have their own bearings ; they enter into the configuration as mediations. Political system is one that effects the mediations.

Identity Configuration And Negative Determination

We will study the process of crystallization of the tendencies within the configuration. The process is one of 'negative determination' that the subsystems within the configuration mutually exert on each other.

Negative determination is what the subsystem cannot do rather than what it must do.²² For example, national identity does not imply withering away of regional identities. It only says that the regional identity in a configuration is always non-dominant. The corollary is that the national identity inevitably dominates over the entire configuration involving regional identities.

This domination confers on the national identity subsystem the autonomy of imposing "metaconstraints" — such constraints that rechannel 'actions' on the relations among different regional identity subsystems that it encloses. Explicit *modes of imposition* should be delineated. In doing this, I shall draw overwhelmingly from the present-day Indian context.

First, national identity often strains the relations among regional identity subsystems in India.

The argument can best be comprehended if we place it in the historical perspective. Historically, in India, there was a dissociation between the cultural and political systems with the concomitant 'relative indifference' of the cultural system to the specific contours of the political order. As Rabindranath Tagore says, Indian life in the past was social-cultural, and surprisingly apolitical. The cultural system that comprises the identity system could develop 'autonomous' techniques of adoptiveness to forces of modernity—i.e., independent of the political system. But, such a high rate of adoptiveness has also led to the growing impingement of the periphery on different

levels of the political processes. And this has created new problems for the political system. Being historically inert and never having the experience of coping up with the dispersed nature of social change, the political system lags far behind the cultural system. The politicization of the periphery has nearly shattered the dissociated character of the cultural system.

But, the inability of the political system is most appalling. The autonomous regulation of regional identities was done at the cultural system : the political system that now is the vanguardism of national identity in fact 'strains' the inter-regional relations by curbing the autonomy of the cultural system, but is itself swept away. The problem is the extent to which the centre would be able to forge out new binding symbols of national identity, which could overcome the more "parochial"—mostly linguistic symbols—of the different regions and states, and develop some feelings of civil order and of political community.²³

This typical instance shows that the politically induced national identity installs only a contentious identity subsystem without ever having the capacity to 'modernize' the regional identity. It only strains the interrelations among regional subsystems which hitherto were effectively managed at the socio-cultural level. But, it can 'strain' only to the extent that the political system suffers from incapacity and the very incapacity of the political system is a measure of its historical lack of exposure. Here, history, society and politics serve as viable mediating points.

Secondly, national identity enlists its domination by way of delimiting the discrepancies among different regional identity subsystems and thereby mutually adjusts them.

This point needs no further elaboration. It refers to India's impressive records of nation-building. As Kothari comments :

... the paramount challenge that India faced once the authority of alien power was lifted, was to evolve a nation out of a vast heterogeneity of social and regional entities and to do this by involving all these entities into a common undertaking rather than imposing something new and alien on them.²⁴

Kothari evaluates the task employing some tangible indicators of performance in this direction.

Thirdly, national identity subsystem operates also with respect to the reproduction in time of the regional subsystems. National identity subsystem keeps intact, resuscitates and rejuvenates the regional identity subsystems as a strategy in the 'mode of power'. The domination of national identity does not lead to destruction of all the rest : it only means that others are retained as dormant, though they may get out of sobre limits. Destruction might prove to be a too costly proposition for the national elite.

Since independence, the formation of an independent state institutionalizes the 'mode' : state forges new national identity subsystem in a sanctioned way. But it is the state that, in order to 'appropriate' the regional identities, has a vested interest in their revitalization and reinforcement : 'the unorganized domain of politics outside the legal political processes of the state creates new possibilities by which the consequences could be appropriated in a variety of forms in the organized domain. These included the forms of 'communalist' appropriation just as they also included the forms of 'secular' appropriation'.²⁵

As an addendum, it might be noted that community as an ethnic group, may, given the processes and consequences, reinscribe itself as a political region. Thus, it contributes to the reproduction of the configuration through the domination of the national identity subsystem.

In sum, the national identity exercises its domination by straining the inter-regional identity relations, though it normally seeks to narrow the discrepancies existing between them. Still, it does not stamp out the regional identity subsystems as a strategy of 'mode of power'.

The configuration is differential to the extent that the national identity subsystem exercises its dominance throughout the whole of it. That is, from up downwards, the relation is one of domination. But, from the bottom up the regional identity subsystem *constrains* the national identity subsystem, in its turn. It sets forth the breakdown limits of the national subsystem.

I will cite just one 'instance' to explore the point. Usually, the constraint that is exerted on the national identity subsystem by regional identity subsystems is accompanied by a 'functional change in the sign system' of these subsystems. For us, the theory of social change in this context, is the site of displacement of functions inside a sign system. The displacement is 'a violent act' — a discontinuity in the 'semiotic chain' that any identity subsystem constructs. Such a discursive activity is predated by 'a force of crises': 'there is a force at work ... which would contradict ... a metaphysics. For consciousness is not consciousness-in-general, but a historicized political species ...'²⁶

Two extremes of this discursive activity can be easily seen. On the one hand, it may be a staunch entrenchment of the existent configuration — a defence of the *status quo*. Here, regional identity may be 'resignified' to legitimize political, social and economic change and it may facilitate the task of nation-building.²⁷ Surprising, but true, despite their traditionally conservative role, Nehru reformulated the major religious system (that is, Hinduism) to provide positive ideological support for a largely secular national identity.²⁸ Unless this is done, national identity may itself be very weak. On the other hand, it may be 'resignified' to subserve the cause of mobilization of the masses into revolutionary movements. In respect of 'religion', it has been found to engender the expressions of popular aspiration and popular revolt,²⁹ and by engendering them, they only constrain the national identity subsystem when the former aims at challenging the latter.

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M N Roy, Comintern and India

M N ROY HAS BEEN generally treated either as a messiah or as an outcast. While it is not unusual that the followers of Roy's ideology continue to highlight the contributions by Roy to the extent of his departure from the canons of marxist orthodoxy, there has been an interesting, and in a way somewhat subtle, shift in the marxist assessment of Roy in recent years. There was a time when Roy was regarded as the arch-enemy of communist movement in India and thereby looked upon with a feeling of unbridled hostility. However, a perceptible change of attitude is now evident since the publication of the multi-volume *Documents of the History of the CPI* under the editorship of G Adhikari. A careful reading of the first few volumes, which deal with the early years of the communist party, suggests that Roy is no longer regarded as an outcast; on the contrary, despite his shortcomings, his contributions to the growth of communist movement in India in the Comintern period have been positively highlighted and, moreover, he has been described as one of the first Indian marxists. This rehabilitation of Roy, as a pioneer of communist movement in India, makes way for a sober appraisal of his understanding of the colonial question in the Comintern. This is all the more important in the context of two rather controversial issues, which have been raised by quite a good number of scholars.

The Roy-Lenin Debate

The first problem arises out of the widely held view that in the Lenin-Roy debate on the colonial question in the second congress of the Communist International, it was Roy and not Lenin who displayed the real revolutionary temper and thereby truly championed the cause of the colonial people. Those who share this viewpoint¹ also argue in the same breath that Lenin's position, on the contrary, was compromising, as distinct from Roy's stance. Their arguments come down to the following. In the first place, it is suggested that

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Roy in his Draft Supplementary Theses put emphasis, in unambiguous terms, on the importance of accomplishing a proletarian revolution in India, the accent being on class struggle and the leadership of the communist party. Secondly, Roy was totally opposed to the idea of forging any alliance with the nationalist bourgeoisie and thereby he rejected the Leninist strategy of an anti-imperialist united front, since for Roy the bourgeoisie in the colonies was virtually the lackey of imperialism.

Since the publication of the documents concerning the Lenin-Roy debate, we know it today that Roy's original Draft Supplementary Theses were drastically amended by Lenin in his own handwriting in order to be read as Supplementary Theses to the original Colonial Theses as prepared by Lenin.³ It is also true that Lenin appreciated the importance of Roy's Theses, since they were written keeping in mind the conditions of the East. Lenin, however, did not agree with the basic thrust of Roy's Theses, in the sense that while Roy proceeded from the premise that India had already witnessed considerable industrialization under the aegis of British imperialism, which in turn had given birth to an industrial proletariat and thereby prepared the ground for polarization of classes between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and made way for a proletarian revolution, Lenin disputed this idea altogether. His contention was that, despite some industrially developed pockets, India remained primarily agricultural and the dream of an imminent proletarian revolution was strategically not correct. While he certainly appreciated the importance of building up a communist party, he also cautioned that working class movement in India being in its embryonic stage, in the given context it was necessary to fight against colonial domination by building up the broadest possible anti-imperialist united front; while this would include the bourgeoisie, the independent character of the proletarian movement would also have to be preserved.

Unfortunately, this prescription of Lenin is generally interpreted as his advocacy of tailism, and it is exactly on this score that Roy's 'revolutionary' outlook is pitted against Lenin's 'compromising' gesture. Actually, it was a tussle between Roy's somewhat immature and sectarian outlook and Lenin's dialectical perception of the colonial question. This is very strongly evident in the fact that

Lenin did not simply emphasize the importance of united front against imperialism; he was equally concerned about the necessity of protecting the emergent working class movement in the East. Very significantly, Lenin, while looking into the proof sheets of the German version of his Draft Theses, underlined, indicating stress, the following words, "The Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries" and "uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic form." Furthermore, in the English version of the proof, Lenin stressed the words, "temporary alliance" and "should not merge with it, and should under all circumstances uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in its most embryonic form."⁸

Reznikov, a fine scholar who has worked extensively on this subject, has quite correctly argued⁴ that Lenin, from the outset, made a distinction between the necessity of assuming revolutionary work and that of assuming leadership. While he was never in favour of surrender of leadership by the communist vanguard to the bourgeois democrats, what he had in mind was that revolutionary leadership could be established only through revolutionary work. Reznikov admits⁵ that Roy was right on the point that he emphasized the importance of revolutionary leadership to be provided by the communist party in his Draft Supplementary Theses, but, unlike Lenin, he made revolutionary leadership, and not the process, his point of departure. Current researches have proved that this perspective of immediate seizure of power was shared, together with Roy, by a large number of eastern delegates. As one scholar has correctly noted that what Lenin, on the contrary, primarily emphasized was "not speedier revolution, but speedier preparations for revolution."⁶ This, in fact, aptly sums up the basic methodological difference between Roy and Lenin and perhaps explains the elements of "compromise" or "reformism" in Lenin, as distinct from the "revolutionary" thrust of Roy's outlook.

Roy's 'shift' and the Comintern

The other controversial question engaging the attention of the scholars concerns the left-turn of the Comintern at the sixth congress

(1928) in the wake of the emergent leadership of Stalin and Roy's position vis a vis this new line. It is generally argued that, ironically enough, by the time of the sixth congress while the Comintern had shifted to the original Royist strategy of class vs. class, Roy himself had shifted to the right,⁷ and, eventually, he found himself excommunicated from the orbit of international communism.

This argument can be contested on two counts. First, it can be contended that, despite certain apparent similarities, there were interesting methodological differences between Roy and Stalin and, moreover, Stalin's own position underwent important theoretical shifts between 1925 and the seventh congress (1935). Second, it would be rather simplistic to suggest that by 1928 Roy had been shifting to the right, since, despite new thrusts in his thinking, Roy's basic theoretical and strategic position remained consistently leftist.

As regards the methodological question, Roy's position can best be appreciated with reference to certain major shifts in Stalin's perception of the problem. In its early phase, for example, in his well-known address entitled 'The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples' of the East' (1925),⁸ Stalin argued that in the colonial countries a split had taken place between the revolutionary and reactionary wing of the bourgeoisie. While the collaborationist section had to be isolated, it was feasible to extend cooperation to the revolutionary wing. Roy's position was, however, different. In his 'Report on the Eastern Question',⁹ delivered at the fourth congress of Comintern in 1922, he, referring to India, also talked of a split between a collaborationist section and a section that was leading the nationalist struggle ; but he described the latter as indecisive and vacillating and hence *non-revolutionary*. Quite logically, the idea of establishing a front with this section did not occur in Roy although in this Report he did not underrate the importance of united front tactics. Theoretically, then, Stalin's perception of a split between a revolutionary and a reactionary section was not tenable for Roy. It can be contended that Roy's position stemmed from his original scepticism about the role of the bourgeoisie in the colonies—a point that lay at the root of his difference with Lenin. Roy's position at this time was reflected in *The Future of Indian Politics* (1926). R P Dutt's *Modern India* (1926) also was written more or less in the same spirit.

Interestingly, despite this sectarian stance, Adhikari has highlighted the positive aspects of Roy's and RPD's contributions in this period¹⁰: (a) they emphasized the importance of criticizing the compromising and vacillating tendencies of national bourgeois leadership; (b) they advanced the slogan of complete independence and a concrete programme of anti-imperialist democratic revolution; (c) they stressed the need for organization of workers, peasants, and toiling masses and creation of a militant mass base.

It is true that by the time of the sixth congress Stalin's criticism of the role of the bourgeoisie in the colonies grew sharper. But a careful scrutiny of the adopted Colonial Theses, which certainly reflected Stalin's understanding, shows that, despite sharp criticism of the growing compromising role of the bourgeoisie, the Theses had not yet asked for a total break with it. This idea was codified only *after* the sixth congress at the tenth plenum of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) in 1929 and continued to dominate the Comintern till the reversal of its line in 1935 at the seventh congress.

Roy's position, however, during this period till 1928, was substantially different. While he was consistently sceptical of the idea of any split between a revolutionary and a collaborationist wing of the nationalist bourgeoisie, he envisaged a division between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, particularly the left-wing elements belonging to the latter, while assigning the leading role to the working class and the communist party. Consequently, his understanding of the tactical line in India was quite different. Proceeding from the premise that the bourgeoisie in India had gone over to imperialism, he argued that what was necessary was to create a forum through which the communists would work by distancing themselves from the Indian National Congress (INC) and thereby the bourgeoisie, and simultaneously they would strive for strengthening contact with the petty bourgeois elements which were becoming increasingly critical of the national bourgeois leadership. This explains why Roy was quite forthright in extending support to organizations like the Independence League, Republican Party, Republican Army, Volunteer Corps and last, but not the least, the Workers' and Peasants' Party (WPP) which were emerging as groups parallel to, and rivals of, the

INC.¹¹ Roy, in other words, stood for intervention to be made from outside the INC and this was to be effected independently by the communists in cooperation with the left petty bourgeois forces which were emerging as a result of class differentiation within the ranks of the bourgeoisie. This theoretical position was quite strongly evident in two articles of Roy¹² written in 1928, namely, 'The Role of the Proletariat in the National Revolution' and 'The Indian National Congress.'

The Comintern position, however, was altogether different. It did not accept the idea that the petty bourgeoisie, particularly its left wing, had any revolutionary potentiality. Consequently, as Stalin's original prescription in 1925 of a split between the revolutionary and reformist sections of the nationalist bourgeoisie was slowly giving way to a hardened attitude towards the bourgeoisie as a whole, the Comintern took a sharply negative view of the petty bourgeoisie in India and, quite evidently, rejected Roy's tactical line of extending support to petty bourgeois parties and organizations. In fact, the Comintern consistently advised the CPI to intervene by remaining within the fold of the INC and not by operating from outside or by joining the WPP which was opposed to the INC. After the tenth plenum of the ECCI in 1929, when the Comintern formally adopted the position of total opposition to the bourgeoisie, its hostility towards the petty bourgeois forces in India, especially its left-wing, grew increasingly critical and, significantly, these elements, represented by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose, became the main target of Comintern's criticism. It is quite true that after the tenth plenum the Comintern veered to the strategy of class vs. class and thereby this understanding closely resembled Roy's position; what, however, is important is the fact that, methodologically speaking, the tactical lines of Roy and Comintern were altogether different.

Besides this, the other controversial question centring around Roy refers to his so-called thesis on decolonization, the implication being that Roy was gradually shifting to the right, while the Comintern was turning to the left by the time of the sixth congress. This, again, is a misnomer. The basic theory of decolonization was formulated by Roy in his 'Draft Resolution on the Indian Question',

a document which remained unpublished till its discovery by Adhikari.¹⁸ Carefully analysed, this document emphasized the following : (a) Roy's original idea that India was becoming rapidly industrialized ; (b) industrialization was leading to growing collaboration between the bourgeoisie and imperialism and this might eventually lead to the grant of dominion status and thereby the gradual dismemberment of the British Empire, culminating in decolonization ; (c) the collaboration between imperialism and the bourgeoisie coupled with industrialization, would also lead to the final battle and intensification of class struggle and this would be the logical corollary of decolonization.

Those who suggest that Roy was shifting to the right, primarily refer to (b), which seems to be a rightist formulation, ignoring (a) and (c) altogether. Even Adhikari observes¹⁴ that Roy's position on decolonization paradoxically contains both 'right' and 'left' elements and concludes that quite often an ultra-right position coincides with an ultra-left stand. This, however, is no explanation of how an extreme right position like (b) could be combined by Roy with an extreme left position like (c). I have tried to argue elsewhere¹⁵ that this apparently paradoxical position can be explained with reference to (a), that is, to the basic thesis on industrialization. Industrialization would create simultaneously two contradictory effects. On the one hand, this would strengthen the bond between imperialism and the bourgeoisie ; on the other hand, this would heighten the prospects of class struggle. While collaboration would lead to the possibility of grant of dominion status and the prospects of dismemberment of the British Empire, — an obviously 'rightist' formulation, this would be eventually overshadowed by the prospects of an intensive class battle — an evidently 'left' prescription. Those who consider that Roy was shifting to the right, interpret the question of decolonization in a narrow political sense, identifying it exclusively with the idea of gradual dismemberment of the British Empire, ignoring thereby the fact that for Roy the decolonization question was basically rooted in the economic concept of industrialization. It is precisely this flawed understanding that lies at the root of the formulation that Roy's stand on decolonization was an indication of his shift to the right and as if by now he had discarded the idea of his original accent on class struggle.

In fact, Roy himself, clarifying his stand on this question a year after the sixth congress, stated¹⁶ that he never used the term in a 'rightist' sense and by 'decolonization' he simply referred to a tendency in relation to the bourgeoisie alone and it was never implied that the Indian people would become free with the sanction of imperialism. Moreover, as early as 1927, Roy had stated in an article entitled 'Dominion Status or Independence'¹⁷ that it would be suicidal to believe that the road to independence lay through dominion status. Rather, this meant increasing exploitation of the Indian masses by the British and Indian capitalists and national independence would have to be realized by people's struggle.

The Question of Voluntarism

History, however, has eventually disproved the strategy of both Roy and Stalin. By 1935, the Comintern had to revert to the original Leninist line of building up an anti-imperialist united front in the perspective of the growing menace of fascism and the 'Leftist' stance of both Roy and Stalin was proved untenable. In a way, their erroneous understanding of the colonial question and rooted in a common premise in the sense that both of them proceeded from a voluntarist perception of the colonial question. However, it has to be admitted that their individual historical experience perhaps largely shaped their understanding and thereby explains the specificity of their respective positions.

Roy, who remained almost totally isolated from the mainstream of communist movement in India had very little understanding of the real strength of the Indian proletariat. This, coupled with the idea that industrialization was progressing quite rapidly, logically led him to overestimate the revolutionary potential of the working class in India and drove him to adopt the strategy of immediate seizure of power under the exclusive leadership of the communist party. The Stalinist understanding, too, proceeded from a voluntarist reading of the situation. It can be surmised that the Stalinist perception was perhaps coloured by two contradictory realities. On the one hand, the Comintern had before it the tragic experience of the Kuomintang in China; this, coupled with Gandhi's compromising steps in relation to British imperialism in India and the passivity of

German social democracy in Europe in its fight against fascism largely reinforced the notion that besides the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, too, was universally sliding towards compromise with reaction. On the other hand, Stalin also had before him the experience of unprecedented success of socialist construction scored by the USSR under the leadership of the communist party. It is not unlikely that in Stalin's reading of the colonial question it is this notion of the leadership potential of the communist party which overshadowed all other considerations, giving rise to the 'left' turn after the sixth congress. This, too, was subjectivism par excellence; evidently, this notion was used mechanically for assessing the potential of the CPI. It is thus perhaps a remarkable irony that travelling along two different paths, both Roy and Stalin arrived at the formulation of almost a common strategy that was ultimately proved abortive and for which the communist movement in India had to suffer serious setbacks in its early years.

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Political Participation by Women in West Bengal

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IS a necessary ingredient of every political system. It is a complex phenomenon in the sense that its forms vary from country to country, from era to era, from one type of people in a society to another. Researchers have shown that the generalizations derived from researches in western countries may not hold equally true in India.¹ It has been pointed out by some that to exercise political influence is a special kind of political involvement, one which female citizens, no matter where they live, or what their level of education is, find it hard to engage in.²

The Preamble to the Constitution of India resolved to secure to all its citizens : "Justice, social, economic and political ... Equality of status and of opportunity." To attain these national objectives, the Constitution guarantees certain fundamental rights. Indian women were to be the beneficiaries of these rights in the same manner as Indian men.

In India, the early fifties constituted, apparently, the period of women's triumph. Middle-class women from a background of restricted lives confined to the roles of wives and mothers entered administrative, professional and political fields as equals of men. Women from aristocratic families, both Hindu and Muslim, began to abandon 'purdah' and sought public offices. Women were elected to parliament and state legislatures. They became cabinet ministers, governors of states, ambassadors, vice-chancellors of universities, and judges. Women exercised their vote in increasing numbers in successive general elections. Institutions of professional education, law and technology, which had till then barred women's entry, were compelled to admit them. Women entered new occupations in the modern sector in increasing numbers.³

All these could suggest that the expected revolution in the status of women with the extension of their roles in the society was well on

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the way. But the Committee on the Status of Women in India reached a very different conclusion. The Committee reported: "... the right to political equality has not enabled women to play their role as partners and constituents in the political process. Instead these rights have helped to build an illusion to equality and power. In spite of increase in participation women's ability to produce an impact on the political process has been negligible."⁴

Three years after the publication of the Committee's report, a group of social scientists pointed out in an even sharper manner what they called "the national neglect of women."⁵ This group holds that though women do not constitute a minority numerically, they are acquiring the feature of one by the inequality of class, status and political power. Still, it is encouraging to note that some recent projects undertaken in various countries and also in India show a changing trend. These researches reveal that voting participation has increased among women.⁶

Here an attempt is being made by the researcher to study the political participation of women of West Bengal. The researcher believes that the political role of women and their attitude towards politics can properly be understood not from the analysis of their own political activities, attitudes and performances alone, but perhaps much more clearly through a comparative analysis with those of men. The researcher has also undertaken here a study of the urban-rural differences, and their impact on the political behaviour of women.

Data Base

This study is based primarily on the data collected through a sample survey of the electorate just after the West Bengal Assembly election of 1982. The researcher stratified West Bengal into two regions: urban and rural. One parliamentary constituency was chosen from each of these two regions on the basis of the lottery method. The constituencies thus selected were: Calcutta South (urban region) and Hooghly (rural region). Two Assembly constituencies were selected, again by the lottery method, from each of these constituencies: Ballygunge and Dhakuria from Calcutta South Parliamentary Constituency, and Chinsurah and Dhaniakhali from Hooghly

constituency. Two polling stations from each of these Assembly constituencies were selected. These were situated in the Sebakbaidya Street and Lansdowne Place in Ballygunge constituency, Babubagan Lane and Salimpur Lane in Dhakuria constituency, Bankim Kanan and Kamarpara Duttgali in Chinsurah constituency and Kharua-bazar and Mahalia in Dhaniakhali constituency. From each of these areas 50 individuals were selected. The selection was made from the electoral roll by using Tippett's table of random numbers. A sample of 400 was taken at the initial stage, though the researcher had intended to interview 300 individuals. This was done to provide against non-response. Data have been collected through structured interviews with the respondents on the basis of an interview schedule. The interview schedule was pre-tested and the necessary changes were made. The data collected through structured interviews were processed at the Regional Computer Centre, Calcutta.

Participation Scale

Researchers have often sought to rank in order, different types of political participation in terms of the number of people involved in each type of activity. Activities involving a small number of people stand at one end, while at the other end stand activities involving most of the people. It has been held that there is a latent structure in the pattern of political behaviour and this pattern reveals that if a person is a member of some politically oriented association, he is almost certain to vote.⁷ It is true that this pattern of associated behaviour varies from one place to another, and even in the west the afore-mentioned pattern has not been supported by each and every study.⁸ Yet it seems logical to expect members of associations to vote rather than to abstain. That is why Lester Milbrath speaks of political participation as being "cumulative". This cumulative characteristic feature arises from the fact that persons who engage in the topmost forms of behaviour "were very likely to perform those lower in rank also." Milbrath's hierarchy of political involvement includes voting and initiating political discussions at the bottom, attending a political meeting in the middle and holding a public office at the top of the scale.⁹ In a 1966 study of the Negroes in the United States, Matthews and Prothro also used a political participation scale with the following rank order of activities : talking of

politics, voting, taking part in campaign, holding public office, and belonging to a political group.¹⁰

The justification for building a political participation scale is that different political acts are not only interrelated but are, in fact, different expressions of the same psychological predisposition. Since all political acts are but a sub-set of the same phenomenon, knowing about a person's participation in one activity enables us to assess how far he is likely to participate in another activity. Those persons who participate in the most demanding form of participation will probably also participate in the less demanding ways. For example, it may be expected that a person who takes an active part in campaigning would also cast his vote.¹¹

In applying a similar scale to women's participation in India, however, some modifications would have to be made. The chasm between the values of a new social order proclaimed by the constitution and the realities of contemporary Indian society, as far as women's rights are concerned, remains almost as wide as that at the time of the achievement of independence. Some women have indeed been intensely engaged in public activities. India has had a woman as a prime minister, and several women have served as state governors. The number of women holding public offices is naturally larger. Still, the number is not large enough to warrant the inclusion of this item on a participation scale to measure the extent of participation by women in general.

In this study, a Likert-type scale has been constructed to measure political participation. The scale was based on the following questions :

- 1 Did you vote in the Assembly election ?
- 2 Did you participate in the election campaign during the last Assembly election ?
- 3 Did you participate in any of the following activities :
 - a Did you work at the election office ?
 - b Did you join any election meeting ?
 - c Did you join any procession or demonstration ?

Respondents were divided into three ranked categories on the basis of the scores obtained by them.

Here an attempt is being made to examine the relationship between the attitudinal dimensions of the respondents and the different levels of participation. This naturally calls for an examination of the concept of attitude. It has to be admitted that different researchers have sought to define 'attitude' in different ways.¹³ But here Allport's comprehensive definition may be adopted. According to Allport, an attitude is "a mental and neutral state of readiness organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related."¹³ An attitude is not a behaviour. Still, attitudes, especially feelings of party identification and feelings of political effectiveness, do appear to influence behaviour.¹⁴ Here the researcher tries to examine the association of political participation with the following attitudinal variables : political ambition, sense of political efficacy, financial expectations about the future, political knowledge, attitude towards decision-making by women in the sphere of partisan choice and partisan preference. All these attitudinal variables have been sought to be measured through a Likert-type scale. The researcher's survey data show that the number of women having high participation scores is practically nil. So, in the case of women, moderate scores in participation have to be taken into account here for the purpose of analysis.

Political Ambition

Thomas Hobbes spoke of political ambition when he said : "I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death."¹⁵ The search for power may not be as universal as Hobbes supposed, but his thoughts are still pertinent, three centuries later. In the present study, the political ambition scale has been constructed on the basis of responses to two questions :

- 1 Do you want to contest the election ?
- 2 Some say that they want to participate in politics, but cannot participate due to unfavourable circumstances. Again, some express the view that they do not like to participate at all. What about you ?

The respondents were placed in trichotomized categories on the basis of the scores obtained by them.

TABLE 1

POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
RURAL WOMEN

<i>Degree of Political Ambition</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	19.17%	80.83%	0.00%	54
Medium	23.40	76.60	0.00	13
High	0.00	100.00	0.00	3

Among our rural women respondents, only 4.29 per cent had high political ambition scores and 18.57 per cent had medium scores. Thus almost three-fourths had low scores in political ambition. Not a single rural woman had high participation score. Table 1 shows that among those with low political ambition 80.83 per cent had moderate scores in political participation, while in the highest group all the three respondents with a high degree of political ambition had such scores. But the rise is not consistent. Those in the lowest rung of ambition would be expected to be less involved in political participation than those in the middle category of ambition. Our data however reveal a different picture. It has already been noted that all the three respondents with a high degree of political ambition had moderate scores in participation. But the percentage of women with moderate scores in participation was higher in the lowest category of political ambition (80.83) than in the intermediate category (76.60).

Among the rural men, more than half of the respondents (i.e. 57.14 per cent) had low ambition scores. But over one-fourth (27.28 per cent) had a moderate degree of political ambition, and 15.58 per cent had high political ambition scores. Table 2 suggests a positive relationship between political ambition and political participation. If only the high scores in participation are taken into consideration, it is found that 58.30 per cent of those with high scores in political ambition had high participation scores, as against a mere 6.20 per cent in the low ambition category. In fact, the percentage of rural men highly involved in participation rises consistently with a rise in the degree of their political ambition. Again, in the high ambition category, 58.33 per cent have high participation



TABLE 2

POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
RURAL MEN

<i>Degree of Political Ambition</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	4.20%	89.60%	6.20%	44
Medium	4.90	66.80	28.30	21
High	8.33	33.33	58.33	12

scores, and only 8.33 per cent have low scores on the participation scale. Exactly one-third have medium scores.

Urban women have been found to be less ambitious than their rural sisters, on the whole. The percentage of women with high scores in political ambition was exactly the same in both the cases : 4.59. But among the urban women only 5.75 per cent had a moderate degree of political ambition, and 89.60 per cent of the urban women had low scores in political ambition. Here also, not a single woman had high scores in participation, and all those with a high degree of political ambition had medium scores in participation. For the purpose of analysis, moderate scores in participation have to be taken into consideration here, and no consistent pattern of association emerges. While 78.70 per cent of those with a low

TABLE 3

POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
URBAN WOMEN

<i>Degree of Political Ambition</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	21.30%	78.70%	0.00%	78
Medium	40.00	60.00	0.00	5
High	0.00	100.00	0.00	4

degree of ambition obtained moderate scores in participation, the percentage dropped to 60 among those with medium scores in political ambition to rise again to 100 in the highest category.

TABLE 4

POLITICAL AMBITION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
URBAN MEN

<i>Degree of Political Ambition</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	6.53%	91.30%	2.17%	49
Medium	0.00	100.00	0.00	2
High	0.00	60.00	40.00	15

Table 4 reveals that only 22.72 per cent of the urban men had high political ambition scores. The middle group comprised only 3.03 per cent, and almost three-fourths had low political ambition scores. High scores in participation were more widespread among those with a high degree of political ambition (40 per cent) than among those with a low degree of political ambition (2.17 per cent). But here again no consistent pattern emerges, because not a single urban man with medium scores in political ambition had high scores in political participation.

When the four groups are taken together for consideration, it can be observed that a positive relationship between political ambition and political participation has been established only in the case of rural men. Among the women, moderate scores in participation have been taken into consideration, and no consistent pattern of association emerges. Among the urban men high scores in participation no doubt were most widespread among those with a high degree of political ambition, but here again no consistent pattern is visible.

Sense of Political Efficacy

The sense of political efficacy has been defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have or can have an impact on the political process."¹⁶ The researcher tried to assess the intensity of the sense of political efficacy of the respondents through a battery of questions and on the basis of their answers divided them once again

into trichotomized categories. The following questions were put before the respondents :

- 1 Do you think that politics and government are so complicated that people like you and me cannot understand these ?
- 2 It is sometimes held that people like you and me do not have any say about what the government does. Do you agree with the view ?
- 3 Some people think that public officials do not care much about what people like you think. Do you hold the same view ?
- 4 Would you say that the candidates you elect by voting generally care for your interest or would you say that they do not care ?

The relationship between sense of efficacy and political participation is among the most widely documented ones. It has been found over and over again that a person who feels efficacious participates at a higher level than those who lack such a feeling. The evidence comes from many different national samples taken at different times.¹⁷ But in most studies, including the present one, women have been found to feel less efficacious than men.¹⁸

TABLE 5

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : RURAL WOMEN

<i>Degree of Sense of Political Efficacy</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	23.92%	76.08%	0.00%	46
Medium	10.00	90.00	0.00	10
High	14.28	85.72	0.00	14

Only 20.00 per cent of the rural women as against 45.45 per cent of the rural men had a high sense of efficacy and 65.72 per cent of the rural women had low scores while 14.28 per cent had medium scores in the sense of political efficacy. The researcher's data show that involvement in political participation did increase, initially at least, with an increase in the efficacy score. Thus 76.08 per cent of the low efficacy group had moderate scores in political participation

while 90 per cent of the next higher group had such scores. But, strangely enough, moderate scores in political participation were obtained by 85.72 per cent of those in the high efficacy group.

So far as the rural men are concerned, an increase in the sense of political efficacy has been associated with an increase in the degree of political participation. Here high scores in participation could be taken into consideration. High scores in political efficacy were certainly widespread among the rural men : 45.45 per cent of

TABLE 6

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : RURAL MEN

<i>Degree of Sense of Political Efficacy</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	15.38%	84.62%	0.00%	13
Medium	6.89	75.87	17.24	29
High	0.00	68.57	31.43	35

whom had a high sense of political efficacy. As expected, a high rate of participation was higher in this group (31.43 per cent) in comparison with those having a moderate sense of political efficacy (17.24 per cent).

TABLE 7

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : URBAN WOMEN

<i>Degree of Sense of Political Efficacy</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	42.43%	57.57%	0.00%	10
Medium	4.00	96.00	0.00	50
High	0.00	100.00	0.00	27

In the urban region, 31.30 per cent of the urban women and 66.68 per cent of the urban men had a high sense of political

efficacy. It may reasonably be expected that participation in politics would increase consistently with an increase in one's sense of political efficacy. Table 7 fulfils that expectation. Among the urban women moderate scores in participation were obtained by 57.57 per cent of those with low scores in sense of political efficacy as against

TABLE 8

SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : URBAN MEN

<i>Degree of Sense of Political Efficacy</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	42.86%	57.14%	0.00%	7
Medium	3.78	84.90	11.32	15
High	0.00	73.34	26.66	44

96 per cent of those with moderate scores and 100 per cent of those with high scores in the sense of political efficacy.

Among the urban men also a positive association between the sense of political efficacy and a high rate of participation is revealed by the researcher's survey data. Table 8 shows that a high rate of participation increased with an increase in efficacy scores. While in the lowest category of the sense of political efficacy none of the respondents recorded a high participation rate, high participation scores were obtained by 11.32 per cent of the respondents with a medium sense of efficacy and by 26.66 per cent of those with a high sense of political efficacy.

When the four groups are considered together, it can be observed that except in the case of rural women political participation has been found to be positively associated with the level of the sense of political efficacy. Involvement in political participation did increase with an increase in efficacy scores.

Financial Expectations about the Future

The financial condition of an individual is likely to have an impact on the individual's reactions to the political process. Even if an

individual is not satisfied with the existing financial situation he or she may have bright hopes about the future. He or she may feel impelled to participate in an election in order to translate those hopes into reality. Or, if he or she believes that worse might follow, he or she may participate in an attempt to counteract the downward trend.¹⁹

In order to assess our respondents' expectations about the future the following question was put to them : Looking ahead, and thinking about the next few years, do you expect that your financial condition will stay about the same as it is now, get better, or get worse ? On the basis of their responses, they were then placed in three ranked categories : low, medium and high.

TABLE 9

FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: RURAL WOMEN

<i>Degree of Financial Expectations about the Future</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	16.65%	83.35%	0.00%	12
Medium	23.60	76.40	0.00	40
High	11.15	88.85	0.00	18

So far as the rural women are concerned, 25.72 per cent of the respondents had high hopes of a bright future. But high expectations were not associated with a high rate of participation in politics. Among those with high expectations, 83.85 per cent had moderate scores in participation and only 11.15 per cent had low scores. As against this, among those with low expectations about the future, 83.35 per cent had moderate scores and 16.65 per cent had low scores in participation. But among those standing in between — as far as expectations about the future are concerned — moderate participation scores were even lower. Only 76.40 per cent had such scores. Thus no consistent pattern of association between expectations about the future and the rate of participation emerges here.

Though high expectations about the future were more widespread among the rural men, here again no consistent association with political participation could be discerned. The researcher's survey data, presented in table 10, reveal that high scores in participation were obtained by only 15 per cent of those who had low expectations about the future. But the percentage was double (30·34) among those with high expectations about the future. In the intermediate group only 10·30 per cent had high scores in political participation. Table 10 thus suggests that either a positive or a negative orientation towards the future induces greater participation than a neutral one.

Among the urban women 43·67 per cent obtained low scores in expectations about the future while the majority — 54·03 per cent—had medium scores. Those with high scores cannot be taken into consideration as this group covered only two respondents. Here again it is found that a negative orientation induces

TABLE 10

FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: RURAL MEN

<i>Degree of Financial Expectations about the Future</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	5·00%	80·00%	15·00%	19
Medium	13·85	75·85	10·30	28
High	0·00	69·66	30·34	30

TABLE 11

FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: URBAN WOMEN

<i>Degree of Financial Expectations about the Future</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	13·16%	86·84%	0·00%	38
Medium	23·40	76·60	0·00	47
High	50·00	50·00	0·00	2

TABLE 12.
FINANCIAL EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : URBAN MEN

<i>Degree of Financial Expectations about the Future</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	11·76%	76·48%	11·76%	34
Medium	0·00	92·00	8·00	25
High	0·00	85·71	14·29	7

greater participation, while 86·84 per cent of those with low expectations about the future obtained medium scores in participation, similar participatory scores were obtained by only 76·60 per cent of urban women having medium expectations about the future.

So far as the urban men are concerned, an analysis of the survey data shows that 51·52 per cent of the respondents had low expectations about the future and only 10·60 per cent had high hopes for a bright future. High scores in participation were undoubtedly most widespread (14·29 per cent) in the group which had bright hopes for the future and such scores were less extensive (11·76 per cent) among those who had a dim view about the future. But high scores in participation were lowest in the category having medium expectations about the future (8·00 per cent). Thus table 12 suggests once again that either a positive or a negative orientation induces greater participation than a neutral one.

Therefore, when the four groups are taken together, it can be observed that no consistent pattern of association between expectations about the future and rate of participation emerges here. But at the same time the present survey suggests that either a positive or a negative orientation towards the future induces greater participation than a neutral one, except in the case of rural women.

Political Knowledge

In spite of various changes it is still evident that there is a sex-related difference in the level of political information and perception regarding implications of various political issues (such as the right to franchise), both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Committee on the Status of Women has attributed this to the lack of interest

shown by political parties, women's organizations and pressure groups in improving the political knowledge of women.²⁰ In this study, an attempt was made to measure the political knowledge of the respondents through a battery of questions :

- 1 Which were the parties that contested the recent election to the legislative assembly from your constituency ?
- 2 Who were the candidates ? To which parties did they belong ? What were their respective symbols ?
- 3 Who is the prime minister of our country ?
- 4 Which party does the prime minister belong to ?
- 5 Who is the chief minister of West Bengal ?
- 6 Which party does the chief minister belong to ?
- 7 Please mention the names of three male members of the legislative assembly.
- 8 Please mention the names of three female members of the legislative assembly.
- 9 What are the parties that constitute the Left Front ?
- 10 Is the CPI a member of the Left Front ?

In the eleventh item on this battery the respondents were asked to mention the party identification of several specified political personalities. The respondents were placed in trichotomized categories on the basis of the scores obtained by them.

Only 11.43 per cent of the rural women as against 55.86 per cent of the rural men had high scores in political knowledge, 47.14 per cent had low scores, and 41.43 per cent had medium scores. The researcher's data show that involvement in political participation

TABLE 13
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
RURAL WOMEN

<i>Degree of Political Knowledge</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	24.24%	75.76%	0.00%	33
Medium	20.69	79.31	0.00	29
High	0.00	100.00	0.00	8

did increase with an increase in the level of political knowledge. Among the rural women, moderate participatory scores were obtained by 75.76 per cent of those with low scores in political knowledge as against 79.31 per cent of those with moderate scores and 100 per cent of those with high scores in political knowledge.

TABLE 14

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
RURAL MEN

<i>Degree of Political Knowledge</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	20.00%	80.00%	0.00%	10
Medium	8.34	91.66	0.00	24
High	0.00	67.44	32.56	43

So far as the rural men are concerned, 55.86 per cent had a high level of political knowledge, while 12.98 per cent had low scores and 31.16 per cent had medium scores. Here high scores in participation could be taken into consideration. In the lowest and the medium categories of political knowledge, none of the respondents recorded a high participation rate. But high participation scores were obtained by 32.56 per cent of the respondents with a high degree of political knowledge.

TABLE 15

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
URBAN WOMEN

<i>Degree of Political Knowledge</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	84.72%	15.28%	0.00%	7
Medium	33.33	66.67	0.00	15
High	9.24	90.76	0.00	65

Among the urban women, a positive association between political knowledge and a high rate of participation is revealed by the researcher's survey data. Here again medium participation scores have to

be taken into consideration for the purpose of analysis. Among the urban women, 15.28 per cent of those with low scores in political knowledge had moderate participation scores as against 66.67 per cent of those with moderate scores and 90.76 per cent of those with high scores in political knowledge.

TABLE 16

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
URBAN MEN

<i>Degree of Political Knowledge</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	2
Medium	0.00	100.00	0.00	2
High	0.00	88.70	11.30	62

The researcher's data show that 93.94 per cent of the urban men had a high degree of political knowledge. High participation scores were noted only in this category (11.30 per cent). None of the respondents with low and medium scores in political knowledge had high participatory scores.

Therefore, when the four groups are taken into consideration together, it can be observed that both among the rural and the urban women, medium participation scores increased consistently with a rise in the level of political knowledge. Among the rural and urban men high participatory scores were found to be most widespread in the category having high political knowledge scores.

**Attitude towards Decision-Making by
Women in the Sphere of Partisan Choice**

In a study on political behaviour it has been noted that women are considerably influenced by the wishes of their husbands and family in political matters. For married women, the important male influentials are their husbands, while for single women, fathers play an important role in opinion changes.²¹ Of course, this pattern is beginning to change and many women now exercise considerable autonomy in using their right to franchise.²²

In order to find out the opinion of the respondents on the question whether women should be guided by others in the sphere of partisan choice or whether they should vote independently, four questions were put to them :

- 1 Do you think it is important for the female members of the family to vote the same way as the male members ?
- 2 Do you think that women's voting decisions are influenced by the male members of the family ?
- 3 Do you think that generally wives vote the same way as their husbands ?
- 4 Do you think that it is important for a wife to vote the same way as her husband ?

The respondents were again divided into trichotomized categories on the basis of the scores obtained by them. Here, those with a more positive attitude towards independent decision-making by women were given higher scores.

TABLE 17

ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT DECISION-
MAKING BY WOMEN IN THE SPHERE OF PARTISAN
CHOICE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
RURAL WOMEN

<i>Degree of Positive Attitude towards Decision-Making by Women in Partisan Choice</i>	<i>Degree of Political participation</i> N		
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>
Low	30.00%	70.00%	0.00% 30
Medium	14.28	85.72	0.00 7
High	12.13	87.87	0.00 33

Among our rural women, almost half (47.15 per cent) had a highly positive attitude towards independent decision-making by women, 10 per cent had medium scores in this regard and 42.85 per cent were placed in the lowest category. Table 17 suggests a close relationship between a positive attitude and political participation. The researcher's data show that involvement in political participation did increase with an increase in such a positive attitude.



Among the rural women 70 per cent of those with low scores in this regard had moderate participation scores as against 85.72 per cent of those with moderate scores and 87.87 per cent of those with high scores in respect of a positive attitude towards decision-making by women in the sphere of partisan choice.

A highly positive attitude is slightly more extensive among the rural men than among their female counterparts. While 50.64 per cent of the rural men had a highly positive attitude, 19.48 per cent had medium scores and 29.88 per cent had low attitude scores. If only the high scores in participation are taken into consideration,

TABLE 18

ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING BY WOMEN IN THE SPHERE OF PARTISAN CHOICE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: RURAL MEN

<i>Degree of Attitude towards Decision-Making by Women in Partisan Choice</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	8.70%	82.60%	8.70%	24
Medium	13.34	53.34	33.32	14
High	2.56	76.92	20.52	39

no positive association between the two variables can be established. Of those with a highly positive attitude 20.52 per cent did have high participation scores (table 18). But the percentage of those having high participatory scores increased in the medium category: 33.32 per cent of those with a moderately positive attitude obtained high participation scores. The percentage of respondents with high participation scores dropped in the lowest category. Only 8.70 per cent of those with low attitude scores had high participation scores.

Again, among those with a highly positive attitude, 20.52 per cent had high participatory scores, and only 2.56 per cent had low participatory scores, while the majority (76.92 per cent) had medium scores.

Support for independent partisan choice by women was much more prevalent among the urban residents: 63.22 per cent of the

urban women and 53.03 per cent of the urban men had a highly positive attitude. In the case of urban women, moderate scores in participation have to be taken into consideration and a consistent pattern of association between the two variables emerges. While 80 per cent of those with low attitude scores obtained moderate

TABLE 19

ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING BY WOMEN IN THE SPHERE OF PARTISAN CHOICE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: URBAN WOMEN

<i>Degree of Positive Attitude towards Women Making her own Decision in Partisan Choice</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	20.00%	80.00%	0.00%	20
Medium	16.66	83.34	0.00	12
High	12.72	87.28	0.00	55

scores in participation, the percentage increased to 83.34 among those with medium attitude scores and rose still higher to 87.28 per cent in the highest category of attitude scores.

It has just been noted that a highly positive attitude towards independent decision-making by women was less prevalent among the urban men than among their female counterparts. Still, the researcher's data indicate a positive association between high positive

TABLE 20

ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING BY WOMEN IN THE SPHERE OF PARTISAN CHOICE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: URBAN MEN

<i>Degree of Positive Attitude towards Women Making her own Decision in Partisan Choice</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	7.15%	92.85%	0.00%	14
Medium	17.64	70.58	11.76	17
High	0.00	85.72	14.28	35

attitude scores, and high participation scores among the urban men. As expected, a high rate of participation was higher among those with highly positive attitude (14.28 per cent) than among those having moderate scores in this attitude (11.76 per cent).

When the four groups are considered together, it can be observed that except in the case of rural men, higher scores in a positive attitude towards independent decision-making by women have been associated with higher involvement in politics.

Partisan Preference

Various studies have shown that partisan preference is a fundamental explanatory variable in the sphere of political participation. Partisan preference measures the degree of psychological attachment or commitment to a political party. Other things being equal, one is likely to vote for the candidate of the party one identifies oneself with. More than a dozen studies in different countries have shown that persons who strongly identify themselves with or intensely prefer a political party are more likely to participate actively in the political process.²³

One study holds that those who have a strong preference for any political party are more active than those with a weak partisan preference or those who have no preference for any particular party.²⁴ The impact of party identification on participation, however, varies a great deal with the mode of activity. It correlates most strongly with voting and electoral activities, but only minimally with communal activities or with particularized contacting of government officials.²⁵

The researcher tried to assess the intensity of partisan preference of the respondents by asking them several questions and, on the basis of their answers, divided them once again into three categories. The following questions were put before the respondents :

1. Do you think that there is any particular party which looks after the interest of the people like you ?
2. (If yes) Will you kindly mention the name of the party ?
3. Do you support any particular political party ?

- 4 (If yes) Will you kindly mention the name of the party ?
 5 Are you a member of any political party ?
 6 (If yes) Will you kindly mention the name of the party ?

TABLE 21

PARTISAN PREFERENCE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION :
 RURAL WOMEN

<i>Degree of Partisan Preference</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	20·00%	80·00%	0·00%	67
Medium	0·00	100·00	0·00	3

Not a single woman respondent in the rural region had high partisan preference scores. Only 4·28 per cent had a moderate degree of partisan preference. Since there was, likewise, no woman respondent with a high score in political participation, the correlation between high scores on these two dimensions could not be examined. Table 21 reveals that a medium degree of participation was less extensive among those with a weak partisan preference than among those who had higher scores in partisan preference.

TABLE 22

PARTISAN PREFERENCE AND POLITICAL
 PARTICIPATION : RURAL MEN

<i>Degree of Partisan Preference</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	10·00%	83·33%	6·67%	60
Medium	0·00	38·47	61·53	13
High	0·00	25·00	75·00	4

It is found that among the rural men the majority of the respondents (i. e. 77·92 per cent) had low partisan preference scores, 16·87 per cent had a moderate degree of partisan preference and only 5·20 per cent had high partisan preference scores. Table 22 suggests a positive relationship between partisan preference and political participation. If only the high scores in participation are taken into

consideration, it is observed that 75 per cent of those with high scores in partisan preference had high participation scores, as against a mere 6.67 per cent in the low preference category. In fact, the percentage of rural men highly involved in participation rises consistently with a rise in the degree of their partisan preference.

TABLE 23

PARTISAN PREFERENCE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : URBAN WOMEN

<i>Degree of Partisan Preference</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	30.44%	69.56%	0.00%	46
Medium	9.75	90.25	0.00	41

Again, among the urban women, there is no evidence of any respondent recording either high partisan preference or high political participation scores. Of them 52.88 per cent had low partisan preference and 47.12 per cent had medium partisan preference scores. Of those who obtained medium scores, 90.25 per cent had medium participation scores. The percentage in medium participation was lower - 69.56 - in the lowest category of partisan preference.

Table 24 shows that among the urban men 10.61 per cent had high preference scores. High participation scores were no doubt most widespread in this group (71.43 per cent). But there is no evidence of a consistent increase. Among the respondents with low partisan preference, 6.25 per cent recorded high scores in participation, while in the next higher category only 2.33 per cent had such high scores in participation.

TABLE 24

PARTISAN PREFERENCE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION : URBAN MEN

<i>Degree of Partisan Preference</i>	<i>Degree of Political Participation</i>			<i>N</i>
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>	
Low	25.00%	68.75%	6.25%	16
Medium	0.00	97.67	2.33	43
High	0.00	28.57	71.42	7

When the four groups are considered together it can be observed that only in the case of the rural men a positive association between the two variables could be established, i.e., there is evidence of a consistent increase of participation scores with increase in partisan preference scores. In the three other groups it has been observed that though there was no evidence of a consistent increase, high participation scores were most extensive in the group with maximum partisan preference scores.

Conclusion

This study was mainly concerned with examining the impact of attitudinal variables on the level of political participation. Some general conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the data analysed in the study :

- 1 There is a difference in the political ambition level of men and women. In case of women, urbanization cannot be identified with high political ambition level. While higher political ambition scores raised the participation level among men, no such correlation could be observed in case of women.
- 2 Women have been found to feel less efficacious politically than men. However, urban women have been found to be more efficacious than the rural ones. Among the urban women, as in the case of the men, a correlation could be noted between a higher political efficacy level and a higher level of political participation.
- 3 The present survey suggests no consistent pattern of association between the level of financial expectations about the future and the level of participation among the respondents. Among the women, however, urbanization did increase the expectation level.
- 4 The present survey shows that there is a sharp difference in the level of political knowledge between men and women. Urbanization raises the level of political knowledge. Among the women, in both the regions, the participation level increased consistently with an increase in the level of political knowledge.
- 5 Support for independent partisan choice by women was more prevalent among urban women and here it was higher than that among their male counterparts. Among the women in both the

regions, a more positive attitude has been found to be positively associated with higher participation level. Similar correlation could be noted in case of the urban men also.

- 6 Partisan preference level is much lower among women than among men. Among women, urbanization did increase the preference level. No positive association could be seen between the partisan preference level and political participation level among the women.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, *HOW TO COMPARE NATIONS : STRATEGIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1988 (Chatham House, New Jersey, 1986), 178 pp + index (7 pp), Price Rs 50.

Despite phenomenal and momentous changes in the scope, range, content and character of the evolving discipline of comparative politics, there is a strong feeling among present-day scholars that the field remains in the same state of flux as before, and that there has been little theory-building and cumulative empirical testing and data collection, and little agreement on concepts and definitions or on the scope and range of comparative analysis. The study is still confronted with competing paradigms none of which is widely accepted, and the methodological issues are still subjects of debate.

In the ultimate analysis, emphasis has to be placed upon the comparative method as the only truly scientific approach to the study of government and politics. It is in carefully designed comparative research that the 'student' of comparative politics finds something closely approximating the controlled experimentation in the scientist's laboratory. Comparative method seeks to lay bare the crucial aspects of the political system, note uniformities as well as differences from one system to the next, search for laws about the relationship of variables, and attempt to account for such similarities, differences and relationships by means of systematic and integrated theory. Whether comparative analysis is holistic or segmented, synchronic or diachronic, intra-cultural or cross-cultural, the crux of comparative political analysis is the joining of theory and data that transforms information into intelligence and discrete descriptions into general explications. Not only may it lead to new knowledge and insight on a cross-national spectrum ; it may even produce new understandings with predictive possibilities in political science. Systematic comparison of segments of political systems might close the information-gap, contribute better to the articulation

and testing of middle-range propositions, and bring comparative politics closer to policy-related problems. Comparative method has advanced far beyond the pioneering enquiries of Aristotle and Mill, Bryce and Ostrogorski.

In the welter of proliferating publications of comparative politics literature in recent times, it is indeed hard to single out many for their stamp of brilliance or abiding qualities. Mettei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy have offered the readers one such uniquely fascinating masterpiece, one which will be difficult to ignore or set aside for many, many years. For the record, the book discusses strategies of comparison and explores some new perspectives in comparative research. The focus is on the 'general strategy' rather than making an inventory of all the accumulated knowledge of political parties, pressure groups, parliaments, bureaucracies, elites, and so on. The aim is to present a critical appraisal, a 'state of the art'. The authors admit, with humility and modesty, that their English is 'like the Latin used in monasteries during the Middle Ages'. The admission is indeed too modest; no less a scholar than Giovanni Sartori has already hailed its 'Cartesian clarity in English', and Richard Rose considers it 'an unusual book for its clarity and range'. The book, indeed, has become an instant masterpiece, 'a masterful work of synthesis and erudition', 'an elegant synthesis of the insights of European political sociology and American political science,' a rare introduction to contemporary methods and theories of comparative analysis, imaginative and broad-ranging in its analytical coverage, eclectic in its choice of concepts and paradigms, and remarkably up to date on current research. To write such an 'introductory' essay within the compass of 178 pages divided into 4 parts and 24 chapters is an achievement of the highest order. The authors admit that the field of comparative politics is dominated by Americans; but they have done a unique service to the fraternity of political scientists by providing the perceptions and perspectives of European scholars which differ from those widely accepted on the other side of the Atlantic.

Mettei Dogan needs no introduction to students of comparative politics. With a background of study of philosophy, history, sociology and political science, he has been director of research

at the National Center of Scientific Research in Paris since 1954, and a recurring professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles. His junior co-author is a political scientist and a research associate at the same Center. They had set the trend in their earlier publication, *La comparaison internationale en sociologie politique* (Paris : 1980), and this book is itself an adaptation of *Sociologie politique comparative* (Paris : 1982). Their acknowledgement of the contributions of philosophy, history and sociology to the development of a 'scientific' discipline of comparative politics has not only released 'politics' from narrow cultural limits ; it has driven home the basic fact that social reality can be perceived in its totality only in a proper historical perspective, and that the social base of political theories must remain the foremost concern of scholars in all countries. Comparative politics has been animated in no small measure by anthropology, *a la* Claude Levi-Strauss, Wilhelm Muhlmann and Georges Balandier. Similarly, sociology has played an important role in pointing out the dangers of ethnocentrism. The concept of culture developed by the sociologists of the Chicago School has accordingly lessened, if not eliminated the 'pains' involved in cross-cultural research.

Part I of the book comprising five chapters, deals with 'The Compass of the Comparativist'. International comparison, the authors rightly believe, requires an articulated conceptual framework. "When concentrating on a single country, a single culture, a single system, one may possibly grope. But comparativists, on the contrary, need a compass that will allow them to pass from one context to another, to select in each country the differences or similarities that can be integrated into their general scheme" (pp 3-4). As knowledge of the self is gained through the knowledge of others, international comparison, by being the best antidote to the danger of ethnocentrism, provides a key to more objective judgment. It represents not just a quest for information, but a quest for enlightenment. The perception of contrasts makes researchers sensitive to the relativity of knowledge, and consequently helps liberate them from cultural shells. The authors demonstrate, in the last two chapters, how comparison leads to synthesis and to the progress of human knowledge, and is at the same time capable, to some degree, of guiding one's comprehension for the future.

While dealing with the indispensability of operational concepts and theoretical frameworks in any meaningful comparative analysis, the authors warn us against the "trap of conceptual imperialism", against "slipping from theory to doctrine, from clarifying caricatures to distortion, from concepts to myth" (p 24). The most general analytic categories, the most ambitious ones, they argue cogently, are not the easiest to operationalize. In reality, under the facade of words like integration, socialization, politicization, and modernization, we find an extremely large number of complex phenomena, whose analysis would require refined models and subtle interpretations. Those who are involved in comparative research cannot avoid becoming theorists; but they must resist becoming prisoners of 'grand explanations' that are too encompassing not to arouse doubts. The refinement of theoretical and conceptual tools is the point at issue. The problem, as Alfred Grosser points out, is precisely to find the level of generalization that will simultaneously avoid 'sterile theory' and 'useless accumulation.'

In Part 2, the authors deal with the internationalization of analytical categories. International comparison has had a great influence on some analytical categories that originated in the west, even if they were originally forged with a comparative perspective. The authors have considered such significant concepts as social classes, cultural pluralism, consociational democracy, political culture, political socialization, political clientelism and political crises. These concepts are selected carefully to exemplify with particular clarity the way in which comparison helps refine the intellectual tools which in turn permit comparison to progress further. The concepts become more accurate throughout the processes of continuous exchange between reality and abstraction. The problem of conceptual equivalence, as distinguished from that of operational equivalence, is also treated with reasoning, clarity and precision. Designing and executing cross-national survey research is fraught with complexities that encompass the basic concepts and theories or propositions to be tested, the translation of questionnaires or interview guides into symbols that are functionally equivalent, the drawing of comparable samples, the holding of interviews, and the interpretation of the data and results obtained. The authors gratefully acknowledge the pioneering efforts of Almond and Verba (*The Civic Culture*) in the

1950s and a host of other comparativists like Robert Dahl, David Apter, Joseph La Palombara, Giño Germani, Daniel Bell, Lucian Pye, Dunkwart Rustow, Arnold Heidenheimer, Karl Deutsch, Richard Rose, S N Eisenstadt, Seymour Lipset and others whose tribe is increasing day by day with growing sophistication and importance of cross-national, cross-cultural research. The two approaches suggested by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (*The Logic of Comparative Social Enquiry*, 1970), namely, 'most similar systems' and 'most different systems' design, are also examined critically. But the best analysis is reserved for Part 3 which concerns a judicial choice of the field of enquiry.

The authors distinguish the various strategies that are open to the comparativist and discuss their relative advantages and disadvantages. These strategies are : the case study in comparative perspective, the binary analysis, the comparison of rather similar countries, the comparison of rather contrasting countries and the conceptual homogenization of a heterogeneous field. The analysis in these chapters is crisp, precise illustrative, critical and illuminating, and provides an excellent introductory manual for a student aspiring for cross-national, cross-cultural research. The specific problem areas which call for investigation, and the strategies to be employed in tackling them, could serve as a sure guide for the budding researcher who may be groping in a maze of bewildering magnitude. While not abandoning the 'holistic' perspective, the authors have correctly dwelt on the need to segment before comparing. The reference to the Verba-Bhatt study on *Caste, Race and Politics : A Comparison of India and the United States* (Sage, 1971) is instructive inasmuch as the authors take into account the objective distance between the situation of the American blacks and that of the Indian Harijans. The authors also correctly emphasize the complementary nature of these strategies. Approaching a field of research by a single path gives only a partial view of reality. The choice of countries, the formulation of concepts, and the adoption of a method are not independent, successive decisions ; they are inextricably linked.

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Om Bakshi, *THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL THEORY: AN INQUIRY INTO CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987, pp x + 130, Price Rs 90.

With the rise and spread of the behavioural movement in political science during the decade after 1945, there was a perceptible shift in approach towards the nature and role of theory in political research. The traditionalists had viewed political theory as being mainly concerned with substantive and normative questions regarding the relation between the individual and political authority. Most behaviouralists (barring those who were entirely preoccupied with methodological issues) addressed themselves to the task of *building* 'scientific' theory out of empirically established "if *a* then *b*"-type propositions. In the relentless search for a rigorous and 'elegant' theory of politics, the traditionalists' concern with ethics and history appeared to have become increasingly irrelevant.

This is the context of Om Bakshi's central argument in the book under review. Surveying the different trends in contemporary political science — the behavioural movement, the school of linguistic analysis and traditionalist adherents of the history of political thought — he comes to the conclusion that contemporary political scientists have failed to approach their subject meaningfully; this failure, in his view, arises principally out of their rejection of a basic feature of traditional political theorists — their abiding interest in the major problems confronting their societies. Rejecting the prevailing view that classical political theories were merely 'value' theories, Bakshi contends that such theories "combined normative inquiry with empirical investigation. Though for purposes of analysis the normative and empirical elements could be separated, they were closely connected in the works of the past thinkers Since the primary concern of traditional thinkers was with the solution of problems confronting society, it became necessary for them to inquire into the existing social and political reality" (p 7).

This plea for a return to the traditional *approach* in developing theory in response to changing social and economic conditions does not, of course, imply an unthinking insistence on the *contemporary* relevance of the past theorists. The author, however, suggests,

that the study of the history of political ideas could still be useful. "An inquiry into the history of prevailing values would be of great help in understanding them. And this need not ... be merely a descriptive enquiry. An effort can certainly be made to generalize about the origin and development of prevailing values" (pp 69-70). Also significant is the contention that a "dialogue" with a past thinker like Plato or Machiavelli would be useful, as they raised some general questions regarding the nature of the polity and the grounds of political obedience. "The quest of historicity and the quest relevance, far from being opposed, supplement each other" (p 79).

This important point, as the author properly insists, has been missed by most contemporary students of politics. Apart from theorists like Popper and Macpherson who, albeit from different standpoints, have demonstrated that the quest for historical varacity is not detrimental to theoretical inquiry" (p 71), there has been very little interest in the history of political thought.

The plea for a return to this feature of traditional political theory should be considered also in the context of Bakshi's critique of behaviouralism, linguistic analysis and also of the contemporary attempts to revise, if not to transcend, the liberal democratic principles. He assails the behaviouralist position on the familiar ground that it does not tackle substantive issues. The behaviouralist theorists "are not particularly interested in asking whether the political system is organized on a rational basis. What interests them is that it is a 'going' system" (p 69). It is doubtful if this omnibus indictment applies to all empirical theorists.

Bakshi appears to be on firmer ground in his criticism of the linguistic philosophers' claim to political and ethical neutrality. He makes the pertinent point that "if one does not consciously decide about one's preferences, one tends to imbibe the values prevailing in the society" (p 66). The basic conservative orientation of the linguistic analysis of politics is brought out clearly.

On the contemporary attempts to re-state the liberal democratic case, the author seems inclined to accept Macpherson's contention that liberal democracy is no longer able to bring about an improvement in the quality of life. For with all his incisive brilliance, Rawls

in his theory of justice ultimately seeks to provide moral justification for the prevailing system.

In his postscript on the fact-value dichotomy, Bakshi reiterates his basic position on visualizing normative questions in terms of problems confronting society.

There should be general agreement with this plea for investment with the pressing social and political problems of our times, "while making full use of the philosophical and methodological achievements of recent times" (p 97). This reviewer, however, is left with a feeling that the author has been less than fair to the post-behaviouralists, and in particular to David Easton. The insistence on criteria of relevance" in political research and on the dynamic character of systems analysis (which, theoretically at least, can comprehend *total* transformation of systems) would appear to bring Easton much closer to the traditional concern of political theory with social and political reality than Bakshi is prepared to concede.

Altogether the book must be regarded as an important contribution to the on-going debate on the predicament of contemporary political science.

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PRASANTA KUMAR GHOSH

Prabhat Kumar Datta, LAND REFORMS ADMINISTRATION IN WEST BENGAL, Daya Publishing House, Delhi, 1988, pp xii + 192, Price Rs 150.

Land reform involves a re-structuring of agrarian relations. A major stage in land reform in post-independence India was the abolition of landlordism. It could, however, be only the first step towards an equitable distribution of landownership and adequate security to the tillers of the soil. Unfortunately, these follow up actions were either not taken at all or taken up half-heartedly in most parts of the country. West Bengal under the Congress rule, of course, took a few hesitant legislative steps in that direction, but no serious efforts

were made to enforce those legal provisions. The vested interests, with the connivance of those in power, had an almost unchallenged sway over the countryside in West Bengal, as in other parts of the country, till the United Front Government came into being. The U.F. government embarked on a policy of effective enforcement of ceiling laws, redistribution of surplus land among the rural poor, and prevention of eviction of sharecroppers. The advent of the Left Front Government in West Bengal in 1977 ensured the continuation, consolidation and extension of the progressive land reform policy initiated by the U.F. government, culminating in *operation barga* as a firm bulwark against eviction of sharecroppers and an invigorated panchayat system as an effective guarantee for mass mobilization to ensure a speedy land reform.

Prabhat Kumar Datta has presented a brief history of land reforms in West Bengal since 1947. But his focus is not on historical narration. His focus is on the politics of land reforms on the one hand and the sociology of agrarian relations on the other. As such, he has dealt with the policies of the political actors and their ideological commitments; the attitude and behaviour of the officials entrusted with the task of implementing the government's policies; and also the cluster of relations involving the political parties, the land reform officials, and the peasants.

Datta's study is based partly on library research, that is, on available literature on the subject. And partly it is based on empirical research, that is, on data collected through field work. The author has collected the data from two sample villages, namely, Aminabad and Bhatsala in Murshidabad district of West Bengal. He has used the survey method for this study and supplemented it with case studies.

In my opinion, such a study ought to cover more villages if the inferences drawn are to be valid for the state as a whole. However, the two villages have been well chosen, one under a Congress(I) and the other under a CPI(M) dominated panchayat, because the choice has enabled the author to throw light on two contrasting political ways of reacting to the same set of opportunities and constraints. Datta has studied the sample villages in depth, and the inferences he has drawn from this in-depth study are based on reliable

data and sound logic. Those conversant with the subject will readily agree with him that the land reform programme in West Bengal has "not only generated a sense of confidence among the beneficiaries but also brought a change in the rural power structure"

The book under review is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on land reforms. The author has made a painstaking study of relevant facts and his analysis of the social political and administrative aspects of land reforms in West Bengal is incisive and insightful. The inclusion of maps, appendices and a bibliography has added to the equality and usefulness of the book. It is a book that would enlighten those who do not have any idea or have only a confused idea about the socio-political transformation that is taking place in rural West Bengal and would aid those who intend to undertake research in land reforms with tested tools and dependable guidelines for further study.

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